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Abstract 
Tacit knowledge and craft skills are widely discussed in management 
research and practice. Impacts of computer technology on knowledge and skills 
attract great interests in the field of organisation research. Research in the paper-
making and other continuous process manufacturing reveals that the computer 
leads to skills to cope with abstraction of work. However, none of the key work 
explicitly addressed the issue of the tacit knowledge and skills. 
This research draws on the philosophy of tacit knowledge of Michael 
Polanyi to explain an exercise of tacit knowledge and skills in critical problem-
solving. The interpretive research uses a critical incident technique and a thickly 
descriptive method to study the production workers’ exercise of their unique 
problem-solving capability at the disruptive events to the routine activity. 
The finding shows that a workaround to overcome limitation of the control 
system are key to successful problem-solving at a computer interface. In contrary 
to a number of studies that placed an exclusive focus on an ability to perform 
abstract reasoning, the successful workaround presupposes the workers’ 
traditional physical and sensory-based exposure to the work process. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Thesis Outline 
Tacit knowledge is a widely debated subject in management research. 
Michael Polanyi is widely known for his notion of the tacit knowledge and a 
distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge.1 His emphasis on the tacit 
knowledge covers all exercises of knowledge and skills, both explicit and tacit, 
rooted in our personal tacit dimension (Polanyi M., 1967b: 4). This opposes the 
view that the articulate and the inarticulate knowledge are two mutually 
exclusive entities (Cook S. D. C. and Brown J. S., 1999; Musgrave A. E., 1974). 
There has been considerable attention on division of the knowledge into 
articulate and inarticulate forms. Gilbert Ryle, for example, makes a distinction 
between the knowing-how and knowing-that (Ryle G. 1946).  Indeed, one of 
Polanyi’s key contributions is the interplay between the articulate and the 
inarticulate knowledge as we deliver skilful or intellectual performance as in 
solving a problem. Experience allows us to cope with novel situations with 
heightened subtlety as we learn to become more adaptive and to less follow a 
strict logical pattern. It is positively related to an ability to improvise – i.e., to 
make a quick and reliable decision without prior stipulation (Weick K. E., 1998). 
It will also be shown that the same tacit faculty allows us to effectively overcome 
the problem inherent in a computing system’s limitation as an act of workaround.  
An impact of a computer technology on a work process has become a 
subject of interests since its debut in manufacturing since early 1960s.2 This 
dated back to the skill debates on the consequence of the computerisation, as an 
automation technology, in the workplace. The debate originated from the work of 
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Braverman’s (1974) Labor and Monopoly Capital. The scientific management 
method, or Taylorism, seeks to deliver maximum economy in factory production 
by imposing capitalist control over labour process. Management should 
monopolise knowledge over how production process should be organised 
(Blackburn P. et al., 1985: 43). To obtain the lowest cost of labour necessitates 
the deskilling thesis: “substituting simple for complex labour” by dissolving 
“esoteric skills” into simple and discrete steps (Wood S., 1982: 26; Braverman, 
1974: 100; Elger T., 1982: 26). Taylorism is concerned with the control of labour 
at any given level of technology (Braverman H., 1974: 110). Automation 
technologies from mechanisation to computerisation are tools to impose 
increasing level of control. The result is “a replacement of skilled workers by 
machines or machine operatives … with any remaining skill allocated to a few 
specialised workers” (Thompson P., 1989: 91). Technological progress leads to a 
steady degradation of work: a divorce of conception from execution restricts 
workers to simple manual operations. “[K]nowledge, responsibility and 
judgement are taken from the workers” (Wood S., 1982: 13-4). Microprocessor 
places a strong tendency for removing discretion from the workers, thanks to its 
ability in mimicking intelligent human responses (Thompson P., 1989: 109). 
The deskilling thesis attracts a wide range of debates. In essence, it is often 
criticised for an uncritical adoption of the scientific management ideology, a 
uniform transition to the subordination of labour that does not consider an 
uneven pattern of rationalisation and mechanisation (Wood S., 1989: 15; Elger 
T., 1982: 28; Littler C., 1982: 122). Other management methods in addition to 
the scientific management are not considered (Manwaring T. and Wood S., 1985: 
174). Several factors limit managerial imperatives for control, and there exist 
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unique circumstances facing firms and workforce specific to firm, locality and 
industry (Manwaring T. and Wood S., 1985: 189-90). The automation 
technology has the potential to sacrifice the traditional know-how in favour of 
the theoretical and scientific knowledge in various industrial settings, with an 
exception to the craft industries (See Nichols and Beynon, 1977; Blauner, 1968). 
Relative strength of workers’ collective control of the strategically most 
important task prior to an introduction of the new technology or production 
technique determines an effectiveness of an exercise of labour power and 
political struggles in the workplace. Social organisation of skill, through 
bargaining, partially determines what skills are recognised. Evidence has shown 
not only slower real-world change in skill than what one might expect from 
Braverman’s analysis, but also only a partial shift to the new technology in many 
factories (Lee D., 1982: 154, 160; Attewell P., 1992: 65; Manwaring T. And 
Wood S., 1985: 184).1 Positive and social definition of skill is hard to find, 
making it unclear what changes in skill are being measured against (Thompson 
P., 1989: 92). Workers’ fate also varies in accordance with external economic 
condition and availability of employment (Lee D., 1982: 147, 9; Manwaring T. 
and Wood S., 1985: 191). 
New technology creates opportunities for new skills, and leveraging the 
utility of the traditional ones. For the former, an automation substitutes for tasks 
that are relatively simple allows workers to concentrate on more challenging and 
complex aspects of the job (Adler P., 1992; Giuliano V., 1982; Hirschhorn L., 
1984). When the workers in automated plants give up manual operation and 
                                       
1 See for further details. 
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become monitors and troubleshooters of the process, it reveals that an emerging 
type of skill increases cognitive demand and complexity, focusing on diagnostic 
skills and an ability to cope with uncertainty and mutual interdependence (Adler 
P., 1992; Blauner R., 1964; Faunce W., 1965). The pre-computer automation 
result in a net upgrading of skill levels among the blue-collar workers, whilst the 
computerisation increases workers’ responsibility and skill in a wide range of 
manufacturing during the 1970s and 1990s.2 Blauner R. (1964), and Nichols T. 
and Beynon H. (1977) found reskilling evidence in chemical, textile and printing 
industries; that is, the debased craft skills with emergence of the new tacit skills, 
both conceptual and physical. The extent to which manual dexterity is built into 
machines depends on standardisation of the production process (Blauner R., 
1964: 35-6). And the greater the level of mechanisation, the greater the repairs, 
maintenance and control over the production process are deferred to specialist 
roles, as is evident on auto assembly lines where major operations consist only of 
basic manual work performed by semi-skilled workers (Blauner R., 1964: 36, 95-
6). 
For the latter, the technology produces a symbiosis between the formal, 
intellectual aspect of a job and the informal skills (Cavestro W., 1989: 234). New 
tactile element of the automated production become central to an effective 
operator, as when the machine tool operators develop “the ability to discern, 
within a noisy environment, muffled sounds that indicated something was about 
to go wrong” (Attewell P., 1992:  49). “Material and symbolic work cannot be 
completely segregated” – the workers concomitantly work in the material world 
                                       
2 See Attewell P. (1992: 55, 83) 
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and the world of representations. (Barley S., 1996: 417, 418). Working with the 
computerised automation presupposes theoretical knowledge through formal 
training and the empirical knowledge through day-to-day contact with the 
production process. Anticipating and resolving problems are characterised by 
“ad hoc measures,” “improvisation” and “experimental behaviour” at unexpected 
irregularities such as breakdowns (Adler P, 1992: 135; Cavestro W., 1989: 219-
34). 
In short, the above has led to the conclusion that the computer, as an 
automating technology, poses a deskilling tendency towards work practice: the 
workers experience a loss of salience of their traditional skills in the computer-
mediated work environment. However, real-world practice reveals an 
imperfection to this rationale. In the craft industry with a non-standardised 
production process still demands the esoteric skills of the journeymen workers 
that cannot be completely taken over by the technology (Blauner R., 1964: 35-6). 
The paper-making is one of the manufacturing that relies on multi-crafted 
employees (Smith M. R., 1999: 695; Holmes J., 1997: 21). The absence of 
complete explication of the production process, thanks to unmeasurable 
parameters, operation unknowns and variability of raw materials, makes it 
impossible for a complete automatic process control (Zuboff S., 1988: 305-6). 
Yet, evidence of the impact of the computerisation on the paper-making skills 
has been mixed. Reliance on sophisticated instruments that bypass workers’ 
senses takes away the centrality of their traditional skills (Barley S. R., 1996). 
According to Zuboff (1988), the computer capabilities to automate and informate 
have led to more abstract work, programmable intelligence and visible 
organisational memory (Zuboff S., 1988: 390). The intellective skills that emerge 
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mark a shift from sense-making activities based on physical cues, toward 
explicitly constructing meaning from “abstract cues,” “explicit inferential 
reasoning,” and “procedural thinking” (Zuboff S., 1988: 95-6). “Mastery in the 
symbolic medium” is founded upon combined exercises of memory and 
imagination. The ability to create abstract mental images as accurate referents to 
a physical world is the key to accomplish work (Zuboff S., 1988: 87). However, 
Vallas S. P. (2001), Penn R. and Scattergood H. (1985), and Huys et al. (1999) 
concluded that computerisation in the papermaking practice still presupposed 
traditional knowledge and experience of paper manufacturing based on intuition 
and learnt experience.  
Study of literatures revealed that the recent computer systems assisted the 
production workers by 1) automating control and monitoring functions, and 2) by 
aiding their problem-solving by the combined ability for experiential learning, 
adaptive problem-solving, and simultaneously taking into calculation several 
process parameters, their interactions and dynamics .   
This research is interested in the exercise of unique skills in the computer-
mediated paper-making environment. We looked at the workers’ problem-
solving at a critical work phase, by employing an interpretive research 
methodology. Changing of a production grade interrupted an on-going activity 
that causes the subjects to articulate what has been previously taken for granted. 
Research methodology appropriate to Polanyi’s framework applies critical 
incident interviews, an in-depth interviews and an observation technique to 
produce a thick description of the subject’s lived experience, based on narratives 
(Tsoukas H., 2005; Patriotta G., 2004). The subjects articulate what has 
previously been taken for granted at an interruption of the automated process. 
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Focusing on the critical non-routine work phase allows the researcher to study 
the tacit knowledge as their background knowledge appears in the foreground 
(Patriotta G., 2004: 68). The finding revealed the workers’ workaround was 
unique to the modern papermaking process: they workaround the system’s 
limitation to overcome process disturbances and the automatic control to 
improve overall process efficiency. The workaround tends to be temporary: a fix 
that consists of initiating change in one area to affect – or offset – others, whilst 
tolerating certain parametric deviation. The ability to workaround depends upon 
both accumulated experience working with computer-generated symbols and 
traditional physical-sensory cues.
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Chapter 2: Michael Polanyi’s Philosophy of Tacit Knowledge 
Introduction 
The chapter introduces Michael Polanyi’s philosophy of tacit knowledge. 
This is important for two reasons. First, Polanyi has emerged as a key thinker in 
contemporary debates about work, particularly knowledge work. It is hard to find 
literature in the field without reference to a term tacit knowledge (Tsoukas M., 
2005: 142). Second, Polanyi understands tacit knowledge as a necessary and vital 
element of all skill. He requires us to think of skill in a holistic way: individual 
and collective; physical and intellectual; and all dimensions that are necessarily 
part of all work. 
Several key literatures in organisation studies define the tacit knowledge as 
practice-based. For example, Tsoukas H. (2005: 119-23, 128), Cook S. D. C. and 
Brown J. S. (1999: 381-400) define the term as the capability to draw distinctions 
based on an appreciation of context or theory, whilst according to Nonaka I. et 
al. (2002: 42) the tacit knowledge is a context-specific “justified true belief” 
created in “social interactions among individuals and organisations.”  
One of the well-known references to Polanyi is his distinction between the 
tacit and explicit knowledge. Collins H. (1993) and Blackler F. (1995) classify 
knowledge into the embrained, embodied, encultured, embedded and encoded. 
Spender J-C. (2007, 2008) makes a typification of knowledge-as-data, 
knowledge-as-meaning and knowledge-as-practice. Collins H. (1993) and 
Collins H. et al. (1997) defines “behaviour-specific actions” that encompass the 
coordination of apparently uncorrelated behaviours into concerted acts. The fact 
that we live as part of a society presupposes socialisation that underpins tacit 
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knowledge or apprenticeship (Collins H. 1993; Collins H. et al., 1997). 
Johannessen K. S. (1988) stipulates that explicit rules only exist as a link in 
social life. Examples, experience and judgement can only be partially articulated: 
it is only through examples and familiarity of experience that we learn to deal 
with, describe, interpret and learn from new situations (Johannessen K. S., 1988: 
287, 296).  
However, the over reliance on tacit-explicit distinction with little attention 
on process of knowing and organising causes potential separation of theory from 
practice (Patriotta G., 2003: 350). “Organisational knowledge is always the 
outcome of interactive and controversial social process” (Patriotta G., 2001: 
944). Cook S. D. C. and Brown J. S. (1999), Lam A. (2000), Nonaka I. (1994), 
Nonaka I. and Takeuchi H. (1995), Spender J.-C. (1993, 1996) and Tsoukas H. 
(2005) analyses interactions between individual and collective forms of the tacit 
knowledge that guide problem-solving activities and patterns of interactions 
among organisation members. Interactions among individuals and their 
environment allow them to address novel problem situation (Nonaka I. and 
Takeuchi H., 2002: 43).3 We solve problem by engaging in a productive inquiry 
involving interplay among the explicit and tacit knowledge possessed by 
individuals and groups (Cook S. D. C. and Brown J. S., 2002: 89). Indeed, Orr J. 
(1990), Brown J. S. and Duguid P. (1991), Patriotta G. (2004) and Tsoukas H. 
(2005) focus on narratives as carriers of the tacit aspect of knowledge based on 
Polanyi’s framework. The narrative is a form of sensemaking: ways of talking 
about organisations that reflect shared perception (Weick K. E., 1995). To 
engage in the collective is to engage in a discursive practice, sharing narratives 
of the practitioners (Tsoukas M., 2005: 123). Disruptions to routine activities 
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provide an occasion for articulating an ongoing flow of action and sense-making 
as narratives, moves and decisions (Patriorra G., 204: 68).  
Well-known terms in management literature which typify the exercise of 
tacit knowledge include, but are not limited to, “communities of practice” 
(Wenger E., 1997; Brown J. S. and Duguid P., 1991), “core competencies” 
(Hamel G. and Prahalad C. K., 1994), “situated cognition”, “legitimate 
peripheral participation” (Lave J. and Wenger E., 1991), “organisational 
epistemology” (Krogh  G. and Roos J., 1995), “bridging epistemologies” (Cook 
S. D. C. and Brown J. S., 1999) and “knowledge as practice” (Spender J-C., 
2008).  
This chapter has two sections. The first explains the core idea of Polanyi’s 
philosophy of knowledge. Although he uses many conceptions to refer to the 
general notion of tacit knowledge, each with slight changes of emphasis over 
time, this does not reflect confusion on Polanyi’s part. For example, his notion of 
motor skill in bicycle riding depicts the exercise of skill that is made explicit 
through physical content. For interpretation, his conceptions of signs and 
symbols, and sense-giving and sense-reading refer to skill working with 
linguistic content. For scientists, his notion of classification and induction 
addresses skill working with intellectual content. In any case, his philosophy of 
TK is important because its holistic nature views all exercises of skill as rooted 
in tacit knowledge sharing similar structural form. This structural form is what 
Polanyi calls the “logical structure of tacit integration.” An exercise of skill 
results from the integration of its parts. Further, such process can be achieved 
only tacitly, and not all the parts are specifiable. 
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The section also locates Polanyi’s philosophy in the context of wider 
philosophical debate. We examine Merleau-Ponty, Dilthey, and Rothschild, all of 
those who influenced Polanyi. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology underlies 
Polanyi’s notion of tacit integration; we use our body as an instrument to 
interpret environmental cues. Equally, Dilthey’s idea of “lived experience” 
influenced Polanyi’s existential notion of ‘indwelling’ in exercising tacit 
knowledge. Rothschild's thinking provides Polanyi with his notion of language 
and communication, as the basis for embodied meaning-making. The objective 
of this section is to consider the relationship and the uniqueness of Polanyi’s 
philosophy of tacit knowledge. 
The second section reviews Polanyi’s critics, and his defence. Critics such 
as Musgrave, Popper, Harré and Jelfs insist on the objective and explicit nature 
of knowledge, and question the validity of the intangibility of tacit knowledge. 
This section aims to question the justification of his thought in context of 
philosophical debates.       
1 – The logic of tacit integration 
This section explains Polanyi’s key idea: “we know more than we can 
tell”(Polanyi M., 1967b: 4). All knowledge and skills are rooted in a tacit 
dimension. The features and process of tacit knowledge that cannot be made 
wholly explicit in which its applicability is in the physical exercise of skills in 
using a tool and embracing an intellectual framework. The comparability 
between accumulation of the tacit knowledge and experience provides the 
potentiality for adaptive learning and flexible problem-solving. The section also 
describes Polanyi’s different emphasis on the tacit knowledge according to what 
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becomes evident in its expression. This is classified into the physical, semiotic 
and intellectual theme.  
Polanyi sees perception as a paradigm for the logic of tacit integration to 
explain the process. In perception, the work of tacit knowledge is present as we 
perform an act of “tacit integration,” a process which we actively make tacit use 
of clues we are aware only in a subsidiary fashion (Prosch H., 1986: 53-66).  In 
effect, we integrate sensations and feelings into the perceived object that gives 
meaning to these sensations and feelings, without which they do not possess 
(Prosch H., 1986: 53). We are making an “intelligent effort” in order to see the 
objects of which these are the qualities, or else they are merely meaningless 
fragments of sights (Polanyi M., 1958: 98-9; 1969: 169-70). Moreover, 
perceiving an object is a skill of meaningful integration of sensory clues through 
a sustaining conscious effort (Prosch H., 1986: 54).   
Polanyi’s notion of tacit knowledge is based on the Gestalt theory that the 
organised whole is greater than the sum of its parts (Prosch H., 1986: 8, 52-3, 65)   
“[O]ur perceptual experiences do not arise because we 
consciously or unconsciously apply rules or concepts to 
putatively meaningless collections of data gathered at our 
sensory receptors. Rather we have been formed by our 
previous experiences and by our immersion in our present 
perceptual environment to the extent that the information 
taken in by our senses is already, in normal circumstances, 
endowed with meaning"(Smith B., 1988: 2-3).   
 More specifically, “our sensory contents are a matter of holistic structures, 
experienced as being tied intrinsically to certain kinds of surrounding conditions 
and to certain characteristic presuppositions and outcomes” (Smith B., 1988: 2-
3).  Similar to our actions, they are complex wholes, and not mechanical or 
passive responses to stimuli of an equal value. They are “wholes whose elements 
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manifest different degrees of salience. … Human action is … a matter of 
integrated behaviours whose physiological and psychological sides are fused 
together” (Smith B., 1998: 4-5).  Thus, “we have been shaped in certain ways by 
past experiences—the world in which we act is positively and negatively 
charged, in different ways , by a pattern of values,” which attract or repel our 
successive actions. “[C]omplex higher order actions are executed by being 
broken down into constituent, relative routine tasks, each of which may be 
performed without thought or conscious reflection” (Smith B., 1998: 3).4  
For Polanyi, tacit knowing is “the understanding of the comprehensive 
entity in which the two terms—the proximal and distal—together constitute by 
relying on our awareness of its particulars for attending to joint meaning” 
(Polanyi M., 1967b: 13).5 The tacit integration is an act that relies on our 
awareness of the first term for actively and intentionally attending to the second 
term. We are aware of the former only in light of our focus on the latter.   
The structure of the tacit integration is composed of two terms. The tacit 
knowing involves the integration of subsidiary clues. We move from these clues 
to a focal object. There are two kinds of the subsidiary clues (Polanyi M., 1969: 
139-40; Polanyi M., 1958: 55-6, 58). While we cannot directly observe the 
“subliminal” clues as we do with the “marginal” clues, we do not attend to them 
directly whilst focally focusing on the object of attention.6 They are non-focal 
since our awareness of them is only subsidiary to the focal awareness of the 
object (Polanyi M., 1958: 56-7).  In case of perception, the subliminal clues 
consist of events in the body we cannot directly observe, whilst the marginal 
clues are those we could observe directly but do not attend to directly. 
Subliminal clues enter into the focally perceived objects as other non-subliminal 
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feelings, even though we cannot make focal perceptions of them as they function 
in such a way (Prosch H., 1986: 72).  We use subliminal particulars subliminally 
in the personal act of perception–of integration. 
Subsidiary and focal clues are functionally related in a non-reciprocal 
“from-to” fashion. We have the subsidiary awareness of the first term (the 
proximal term); we know them but are unable to tell thoroughly what they are. 
The second distal term is what we focus our attention on. We rely on our 
awareness of the first term for actively and intentionally attending for the second 
term (Polanyi M., 1966: 9-13, 86; Polanyi M., 1968: 31).  In perception, our 
subsidiary awareness of clues or parts participates in our perception by merging 
into our focal awareness of the whole. The subsidiary awareness also participates 
by guiding our action. The deliberateness of our action merges the two kinds of 
our awareness in the act of knowing. It is the integration that involves our active 
and intentional action as part of all knowledge (Polanyi M., 1969: 127-9).   
We are aware of the first term only in light of our focus on the second term. 
That is, we are only subsidiarily aware of the first term with respect to our focal 
awareness of the second term. Our “phenomenal” awareness of the subsidiary or 
proximal terms, when they are subliminal, resides entirely in the appearance of 
the focal or distal term to which we are attending. We are not aware of the 
subsidiary clues by themselves. Our awareness of them and their appearance 
comes from the other thing—the focal term—to which we are attending theory 
Prosch H. (1986: 68). This is because our awareness of the first term arises in 
term of the “semantic” or meaning that it enters into the appearance of the 
second term. The meaning of the first term is grasped or understood and becomes 
signs of the second term (Polanyi M., 1967: 12). The meaning of the subsidiary 
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term operates as clues or signs pointing to something else in an act of an 
intelligent integration (Prosch H., 1986: 68).  The meaning is grasped, seen or 
created by a mind, with the intention of finding or achieving meaning—to 
achieve a comprehensive and intelligible integration. 
The process of “tacit inference” has the pointing quality of meaning where 
a person A makes the word B (by integrating it), meaning the object C (as B 
bears on C); i.e., by endowing B with a meaning that points at C. B is, thus the 
pointer. This is the directive, or vectorial, way of attending to the pointer—our 
subsidiary awareness of the pointer. A meaningful relation of the subsidiary to 
the focal is formed by the action of a person who integrates one to the other, and 
the relation persists as the person keeps up this integration. The recognition of 
pointing makes up the tacit inference (Polanyi M., 1967a: 301-25).   
 Central in the process of knowing is the bodily root of knowledge. Our 
body is the ultimate instruments of all our external knowledge. We use bodies—
by our organs, senses and brains—in the act of knowing. Meaning arises either 
by integrating clues in our own body or by integrating clues outside, and all 
meaning known outside is due to our subsidiary treatment of external things as 
we treat our body. This also applies to the construction of such elements as 
language, theory, and history: they act subsidiarily through which, and by the 
sole means of which, we come to the focal knowledge of reality by sending out 
and receiving back signals which to a greater or lesser degree resonate with the 
reality (Puddefoot J. C., 1993: 32).  Since, “[t]he theory of the body ... is already 
a theory of perception," the embodied mind, the meaning-maker, makes his 
connection to the world by his intentionality (Jha S. R., 2002). 
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In effect, we do interiorise these subsidiary clues. To interiorise means to 
identify ourselves with the objects under questions to make them function as the 
proximal term. By dwelling in them we make them mean something on which 
we focus our attention. They are means of making certain things function as the 
proximal terms in the integration of particulars. By indwelling means we are 
aware of the subsidiary clues in their “bearing on” the comprehensive entity, 
which they constitute. In other words, we cannot logically or theoretically deduce 
externally an actual perception, but we “dwell” in subliminal particulars 
alongside other non-subliminal clues. The joint meaning of the particulars which 
an entity is rooted existentially is not perceived by looking at them but by 
dwelling in them. Thus, we grasp, internalise, and dwell in it. We also interiorise 
external things including tools, probes or instruments of any kind. We know 
what we become aware of only through our actual dwelling in its particulars 
(Prosch H., 1986: 72-3).  We internalise tools as we use them, treating them as 
extension to our body. According to Polanyi, 
“Our subsidiary awareness of tools and problems can be 
regarded now as the act of making them form a part of our 
own body. We pour ourselves out into them and assimilate 
them existentially by dwelling in them” (Polanyi M., 1958: 
59).  
When we make a thing function as the proximal term of tacit knowing, we 
incorporate it in our body or extend our body to include it, so that we can dwell 
in it. Clothes, spectacles, probes and tools, for example, when in use, function 
like our body and resemble our body closely as we rarely know them focally. 
Indeed, whenever we experience an external object subsidiarily, we feel it in a 
way similar to that in which we feel our body. Thus, all the subsidiary elements 
are interior to the body in which we live: i.e., we dwell in all subsidiarily 
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experienced things. Our body submits to the operations of which the particulars 
we are virtually unknown. These largely unspecifiable operations cannot be 
replaced effectively by any focally controlled operations. This example 
evidences our capacity to integrate and endow with meaning those things of 
which we possess only a subsidiary awareness.    
The same is true in understanding between persons sharing the knowledge 
of the same comprehensive entity. When one person produces and the other 
apprehends a skilful performance of the former, the performer co-ordinates his 
moves by dwelling in them as part of his body, whilst the watcher tries to 
correlate these moves by seeking to dwell—or interiorise—in them from the 
outside (Polanyi M., 1961b: 458-70).   
 The objects experienced in perceptions are salient figures against a less 
salient ground (Smith B., 1988: 6). They are not separate items independently 
existing side by side from each other and the subject. The object of experience is 
locked together within larger networks of interrelations, manifesting 
interdependence and mutual involvement (Smith B., 1988: 6).  Any linguistic 
sign that represents the object of experience is linked in parallel networks. The 
signs represent objects not only from their direct empirical association, but they 
also stand in relation to other signs that track the relations of the objects. For 
example, children learn meanings of the words not just from the ostensiveness; 
they can perform cross-checking of contexts (Smith B., 1988: 6).  
Seeing an object against its background in the perception is performed by 
purposive mental act (Jha S. R., 2002: 71-3).  When the background functions 
subsidiarily in terms of the object’s appearance, we are aware of them only in 
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terms of the object’s appearance. Both focal awareness and subsidiary awareness 
that exist functionally is related in a single, purposive act of mental awareness. 
Perception and knowledge is a result of an intentional and purposeful effort 
toward an ideal, which we aspire (Prosch H., 1986: 61).  However, if the factors 
in perception below the focal awareness are not factors we are at least subsidiary, 
or “sublimally,” aware, then perception becomes a caused event, not a single, 
purposive act (Prosch H., 1986: 6).  
In integration, we take into account a host of rapidly changing clues, for 
example, when we perceive moving hands with our eyes. The meaningful, but 
non-explicit, integration transforms what we perceive into a coherence among 
the varied and changing clues in the form of single unchanging object; i.e., the 
hand moving. This can only be achieved by an internal action we are quite 
incapable of controlling or feeling in itself. It is our craving to find strands of 
permanence in the tumult of changing appearances that leads to the integration. It 
is an intention to bring experiences under intellectual control, or an intended 
intellectual coherence towards the goal of attaining meaning (Polanyi M., 1958: 
18, 73, 103-4, 132-3; Polanyi M., 1969: 114; Prosch H., 1986: 60). The logical 
structure of our awareness is unspecifiable. We do not observe these workings in 
themselves, the unspecifiability of clues means that there are many features and 
clues we could not identify: we only understand objects from the particulars from 
which we attend to it.  
We do not need to be aware of all the clues being integrated in the act of 
“tacit integration,” nor are we aware of the process. The process is achieved only 
tacitly and informally. For example, we know a person’s face and can recognise 
it among thousands. We rely on our awareness of the features of human 
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physiognomy for attending to the characteristic appearance of a face, yet we are 
unable to specify all the features (Polanyi M., 1967b: 10).  We also recognise the 
moods of human face, and only are able to tell vaguely by what signs we know. 
Even the descriptive sciences, which studies physiognomies cannot be fully 
described in words or pictures (Polanyi M., 1985: 5).  We know them tacitly and 
assume in all other instances of tacit knowing the correspondence between the 
structure of comprehension and the structure of the comprehensive entity.  
Accumulation of experience 
Since our past experience is a form of marginal clues, our previous 
meaningful integration of clues informs what we have become used to seeing in 
the past (Prosch H., 1986: 57-8).  They slip into the backs of our minds and 
function as part of the subsidiary clues forming the background for a new 
integration of clues with objects (Polanyi M., 1958: 97).  This non-deliberative 
visual mechanisms are primary determination of our perceptual background 
(Prosch H., 1986: 59). The past experience, as marginal clues, only works as 
further specifications of what has already become our perceptual background by 
the operation of our visual mechanisms. It becomes “partial solutions” or “latent 
learning,” which are combinations of acts previously learnt. They are manifested 
in the new problem situation. These prior solutions enable subjects to see 
problem as a whole (the second term), as they interconnect in this whole by 
becoming parts of appropriate routes towards reaching a solution. This process is 
also irreversible. They participate as clues in this new whole, within which is 
born the act of insight. The act towards completion is directed from the 
subsidiary clues, both marginal and subliminal, as partial solutions in forms of 
clues and a hunch.  
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As we know more (i.e., accumulating more clues), our experience expands. 
That is, 
"the subject will acquire, in part through repetition, a 
repertoire of behaviour patterns, a wealth of different 
portmanteau reactions (walking, running, tripping, sliding, 
lifting, pushing, speaking, writing), to which he may resort, 
spontaneously, from occasion to occasion” (Smith B., 
1988: 5).  
We accumulate a repertoire of behaviour patterns as a wealth of different 
“portmanteau reactions” combinations that we spontaneously resort, as if they 
were “written into our muscles” (Smith B. (1988: 5).  In other words, our 
experiences necessarily involves of the gradual building up of aptitudes of 
general powers of responding to a situation type in ways which bring about a 
spontaneous but provisional equilibrium of action and cognition (Merleau-Ponty 
M., 1983: 99, 103, 240).  These can be transferred immediately as the situations 
arise. This is a feature of human learning, which at the same time is adaptive. 
“Since our bodies have acquired a sophisticated repertoire of portmanteau 
reactions in relation to the different words of our language and to the different 
patterns of combination of words, … this allows us to improvise with language, 
to enjoy successful linguistic combinations and to detect unsuccessful 
combinations through the displeasure they may cause" (Smith B., 1988: 5-6).  
As the refinement of languages and formalism follows the acquisition of 
new insights, the crucial element of the level of apprenticeship in learning is to 
deal with how to use bodies, languages, and theories as we acquire the skills 
needed to perform the tacit integration (Puddefoot J. C., 1993: 33).  We use–
dwell in–the constructed language and theories to acquire the understanding of 
that which is not in this same sense constructed, and to which those constructions 
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are alien (Puddefoot J. C., 1993: 33).  Moreover, the subsidiary knowledge may 
be bought into focus and formulated as, following Polanyi, maxims, the explicit 
knowledge. However, such specification cannot be exhaustive (Polanyi M., 
1958: 88).  The skilful use of clues applies to other learning, by "a joining and 
mutual adjustment of information from our sense organs about conditions inside 
and outside our bodies and from our memories” (Jha S. R., 2002: 72).   
There are various illustrations of the logic of tacit integration. Polanyi 
provides many different conceptions of his idea in his several writings. Here we 
will not explain all but offer some of the different emphases. It is possible to 
categorise his illustration as skills that are explicit in their physical content (skill 
in action); semiotic content; and intellectual content. 
Hammering nails 
Polanyi’s explanation of using a hammer to drive a nail provides a fine 
description of skills explicit in its physical expression. He explains the roles of 
the proximal and distal terms in tacit integration as we attend to both nail and 
hammer in a different way. We focus on the object of our attention–wielding the 
hammer effectively–whilst not relying on the nail, hammer or our palm in 
themselves but subsidiarily as tools. 
“We watch the effect of our strokes on the nail and try to 
wield the hammer so as to hit the nail most effectively. 
When we bring down the hammer we do not feel that its 
handle has struck our palm but that its head has struck the 
nail. Yet in a sense we are certainly alert to the feelings in 
our palm and the fingers that hold the hammer” (Polanyi 
M., 1958: 57).   
To illustrate the work of subsidiary term, Polanyi explains that we bring 
down the hammer, we are alert to the feelings in our palm and the fingers that 
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hold the hammer.  
“They guide us in handling it effectively, and the degree of 
attention we give to the nail is given to the same extent but 
in a different way to these feelings. The difference may be 
stated by saying that the latter are not, like the nail, objects 
of our attention, but instruments of it. They are not watched 
in themselves; we watch something else whilst keeping 
intensely aware of them” (Polanyi M., 1958: 57).   
We subsidiarily know the particulars in an instrumental manner but focally 
ignore them (Polanyi M., 1958: 88).  “The subsidiary or instrumental knowledge 
… is not known in itself but is known in terms of something focally known … 
and to this extent it is unspecifiable” (Polanyi M., 1958: 88). We have a 
subsidiary awareness of the feeling of the palm of our hand, which is merged into 
our focal awareness of effectively driving in the nail (Polanyi M., 1969: 145).   
Sense-giving & sense-reading: the semiotic expression 
Polanyi explains skills working with linguistic content through notions of 
sense-reading and sense-giving. They are the key conceptualisation of a semiotic 
property of an articulated language. The articulated language not only refers to 
the language we use like English, but also to signs and symbols that have 
meaning bearing on something else (Polanyi M., 1967b: 7).  Signs, symbols or 
words operate in our awareness differently from what they signify. They function 
as signs of something else; they function subsidiarily as a medium or tool to the 
knowledge of something else in which there is an interest taken whether that is 
known as a sign is consciously known or not. They function as clues that are 
known in a subsidiary way as bearing upon a meaningful integration of 
themselves. The result of this integration, in turn, forms that which is known in a 
focal way (Polanyi M., 1967a: 192-3; Polanyi M. and Prosch H., 1975: 69-70).  
In other words, they are subject to necessary completion or animation through 
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the personal experience of the subjects (Smith B., 1988: 9).  They are 
transparent; when listening, our primary focus (i.e., the focal awareness) is 
directed to the objects the words refer to and not on the words themselves (Smith 
B., 1988: 9).  
Also expressed in the language are values as a cultural form of meaning. 
The values are special expressions of language that play major role in expressing 
interests, directing thought and guiding action toward the consummation of 
existential and experiential meaning. In a descriptive sense, their meaning points 
out features that exist apart from our knowing of them. A statement such as “that 
garden is beautiful” is experiential, expressing an existential meaning. It is a 
cultural form of meaning capable of communicating to others, and a designator 
of a real feature (Gulick W. B., 1999: 30-1).  Another cultural form of meaning 
involves accepting idioms, and conceptual and interpretive framework sustained 
and embodied in that language. The basic beliefs, or premises, are tacitly 
observed. They constitute a whole body of acceptances that are logically prior to 
any particular assertion or piece of knowledge. They cannot be "logically" 
derived from other beliefs (Sanders A. F., 1988: 191). We understand meaning in 
the full context of the experience (Jha S. R., 2002: 75).   
To understand meaning, we control sequences of integrations that alternate 
between sense-reading and sense-giving. Communicating via letter is an example 
of a sequence of three integrations. Polanyi explains that a person composes a 
letter as he travels in a country never visited before requires 1) an intelligent 
understanding of sights and events (i.e., sense reading: immediately experiencing 
the meaning); 2) the composition of verbal account of this experience (i.e., sense-
giving: meaning is only present in thought) and; 3) the interpretation of this 
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verbal account by the reader to reproduce the experience reported (i.e., sense-
reading). On the one hand, the writer’s sense-giving in the use of universal terms 
in language is an act of conceptual subsumption. On the other, the reader’s sense-
reading in the intelligent reading of a description is an act of conceptual 
exemplification. Communication in writing then involves the process of 
consecutive integration of the composer, and reintegration of the receiver 
(Polanyi M., 1967a: 190).  
Induction and classification in skills with logical/intellectual expression 
Polanyi shows in his writings the notion of science as intellectual activities 
are coherent with the notion of tacit knowing. In several writings particularly in 
1947 Personal Knowledge (1958), he rejects the formalisation of scientific 
knowing. His Tacit Dimension (1967) integrates his philosophy of science into a 
general epistemology that accounts for science as an intelligible extension of the 
informal logic that structures perception and cognition in general. “Science, 
argued Polanyi, is “far from being a purely rational enterprise of cognition and 
calculation, involves of necessity a non-formalisable, non-mechanisable, 
characteristically human phenomenon” (Smith B., 1988: 7).  
One might call this phenomenon “judgement”, “intuition,” or, according to 
Polanyi, tacit or personal knowledge (Smith B., 1988: 7). Science is grounded on 
personal judgments. Accepted theories affect the interpretations of observations 
and their acceptance, or rejection, as observations (Prosch H., 1986: 89).  
Scientific knowing results from the integration of part to whole as in the case of 
perception. Current conceptions always affect the recognition (Polanyi M., 1972: 
49).  Theories, languages and interpretive framework are not abstract objects but 
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social formations tied to their practices (Smith B., 1988: 8-9).   
Polanyi explains the work of tacit knowledge behinds the intellectual acts 
of induction and classification, especially in science. He states that there is no 
perception uninfluenced by our conceptual interpretations and no purely 
objective induction as it rests on our perception (Prosch H., 1986: 75-6).  This 
accords with his central idea that all knowledge and exercises of skills are rooted 
in tacit knowledge. Identification of particular instances of kinds apparently does 
always entail a tacit dimension consisting of clues we cannot explicitly tell, but 
that we are aware of in the appearance of the object of our focal awareness 
(Prosch H., 1986: 80).  That is, 
“[It] only operates by making use of tacit dimension that 
depends on personal indwelling [of clues, such as theories] 
and not wholly explicit or objective operations” (Prosch H., 
1986: 75-6).  
Induction and classification make use of the same kind of integrative action 
that perception do, namely, a dwelling in an unspecifiable conglomeration of 
subsidiary clues we bring to bear upon the object of our focal attention (Polanyi 
M., 1969: 167).  This process is based on a similar process as other performances 
of skills in: hammering a nail, the recognition of physiognomies, the mastery of 
tests, the use of tools, verbalisation of experience, and visual perception. “The 
powers of integration which achieve these acts have the same structure 
throughout” (Polanyi M., 1969: 169-70).   
General empirical conceptions are abstract and featureless (Polanyi M., 
1969: 168).  In classification, the knowledge of key feature becomes a maxim for 
identification, but it is useful only to those who possess the art of applying it 
(Polanyi M., 1958: 261-4). All the clues provided by the particulars of that 
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instance, when dwelt in by a person, become integrated by him into a focal 
meaning into which all the in stances he knows of become integrated when dwelt 
in by him as subsidiary clues to the formation of a focal class concept. Students 
in science would then learn to identify and classify entities by a master in order 
to acquire the tacit ability to do so correctly, a process which cannot be told in 
explicit terms (Polanyi M., 1964: 42-5).  These operations have to be understood 
as skills in the same way as the bicycle rider or the swimmer (Polanyi M., 1969: 
123-5).   
Perception and inductive conception also influence each other in reciprocal 
fashion, as a continuous process. The conception of classes is built up from the 
integration of tacitly known instances of this class. The position reached can only 
have a personal character.7 According to Polanyi,  
“[This conception] continues to be built up or modified as 
experience unfolds … by our continually noticing such 
instances” (Prosch H. (1986: 83).  … “The focus of each 
class of things, the concepts of which the class is 
composed, is somewhat modified every time a specimen is 
appraised … to make them approximate more closely to 
what is normal for the species” (Polanyi M., 1958: 349).   
They continue to reinforce and inform each other in the form they have 
achieved. They cannot be reduced to explicit marks, maxims or rules without 
personal appraisal (Prosch H., 1986: 83).   
Scientific instruments work through explicit operationalism (Prosch H., 
1986: 88). Working with them may be regarded as conducting abstract probe in 
forms of instrumentalised, explicit and quantitative knowledge. This process 
requires incorporating personal element into its use or creation. According to 
Polanyi, 
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“[W]e have to accredit it personally to acknowledge it to be 
trustworthy” (Prosch H., 1986: 76-7).   
The way we dwell in this knowledge depends on tacit coefficients as the 
product of unspecifiable skills, not detached and objective information. They are 
meaningful only in terms of the particular theories, and the general notions about 
the nature of things that function as subsidiary clues dwelt in by the minds of 
those scientists who make use of these results (Prosch H., 1986: 89).  “[The] 
theoretical knowledge fuses our subsidiary awareness of the particulars 
belonging to our subject matter with the … background of our knowing” 
(Polanyi M., 1969: 134).   
Problem-solving as a heuristic act 
Polanyi explains that problem-solving is a heuristic act. A heuristic power 
empowers us to identify novel solutions to novel problems. The heuristic act 
explains our adaptive capacity that it allows us to deal with novel experiences in 
a novel manner. It is a creative force that involves “seeing problems and reaching 
out to hidden possibilities for solving them,”whose success depends on our 
capacity for sensing the presence of yet unrevealed logical relations between 
conditions of the problem, background knowledge, and the unknown solution we 
are looking for (Polanyi M., 1957: 93). For “if all knowledge is explicit, … we 
cannot know a problem or look for its solution” (Polanyi M., 1967b: 22). The 
problem-solving is a process achieved through an informal method without 
relying on definite rules as the last resort (Polanyi M., 1964: 21-3). It is an art 
that involves creating an effective tool for interpreting a new subject matter or 
solving new problems, whose mastery relies on an accumulation of concrete 
practical experience. This is what sets apart an expert from a novice. The 
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heuristic act, however, is different from a systematic operation: we could reach 
the solution by employing the latter, but without exercising any heuristic power.  
The problem-solving process as the heuristic act involves an intelligent 
endeavour of “crossing a logical gap on the other side of which lies the unknown, 
fully marked out by our conception of it” (Polanyi M., 1957: 98) The width of 
the logical gap depends on a measure of ingenuity required for solving the 
problem. Our conception serves as a heuristic base to be modified every time we 
experience novel instances. The conceived solution is our projected vision to a 
reality. It is our focally formed conception of the solution of which we are 
subsidiarily aware of all the particulars.   
The visions of problems, discoveries, classes, and performances, etc., result 
from our natural capacity for imagination and intuition (Polanyi M., 1964: 189). 
We exercise our intuition as we look at data as "clues" to the unknown solution; 
it serves us as “pointers to” and as “parts of” the solution as we "gain an 
intimation" of what the unknown solution may be or “the coherence of hitherto 
not comprehended particulars” (Polanyi M., 1985: 22). The intuition senses “the 
presence of a hidden reality toward which our clues are pointing” (Polanyi M., 
1967b: 23-4). It is a product of a spontaneous integration in a specific surmise, 
which anticipates the presence of potential resources.The surmise refers to a 
heuristic probe or a hunch that narrows down an inquiry, but not as well-defined 
as a hypothesis or a formal solution, whose indeterminacy ranges between width 
of the original problem and specificity of the eventual solution (Polanyi M., 
1968: 41).  
The intuition stimulates the imagination in its pursuit of finding the 
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solution (Polanyi M., 1966: 91). The imagination, guided by the intuition, is a 
persistent, deliberate and transitive thrust at each inquiry that directs us to 
articulate ideas (Polanyi M., 1966: 9). When the intuition recognises validity of 
results, the imagination starts pointing to such possible manifestations as the 
conceived solution. The conception may be relatively evident as finding a 
misplaced object, or relatively obscure as solving a crossword puzzle. Forming 
the solution begins with setting out the problem in suitable symbols, reorganising 
its representation to reveal its suggestive aspects. We may come up with the 
conceived solution right after having recognised the problem, or by a tacit 
process of identifying from our memory any similar problem of which the 
solution is known.  
 As the intuition originates the imagination, the latter also induces the 
former. In succession, when we develop an interest in the problem (intuition), we 
begin to speculate about the possible solutions (imagination). And in so doing 
makes us more preoccupied with solving the problem (intuition). 
Each chain of formal reasoning is supported by our tacit affirmation both at 
the beginning and at the end, where an articulation is “an instrument skillfully 
contrived by our inarticulate selves for the purpose of relying on it as our 
external guide,” a tool which disciplines and expands our capacity to reason 
(Polanyi M., 1957: 102).  Practical realisation of the conceived solution takes a 
similar form. Active problem-solving steps involves the symbolic operations 
supported by our informal power. As a mathematician solves the mathematical 
problem by switching his focus between the intuition and formal computation, 
his interpretation of primitive terms and axioms, its expansion and re-
interpretation are mainly an exercise of the inarticulate acts (Polanyi M., 1957: 
 30 
102).  
In a similar tone, the tacit or personal element is manifested: 
“… in the scientist's skill in anticipating the consequences 
of given adjustments of his equipment or in seeing through 
or beyond established conceptual divisions; it is 
spontaneously to recognise the rightness of the pattern 
generated by some axiom or theory or taxonomy or in his 
capacity to distinguish what might be a highly subtle and 
hitherto unacknowledged type of order against a 
background of randomness" (Smith B., 1988: 7).  
The solution that has been discovered at the cost of much effort and 
unsuccessful trials provides us with the additional intellectual power. This 
enables us to deal with the same situation in a routine manner in absence of any 
heuristic act and to perform faster decision-making. The situation once novel 
becomes a routine operation for the expert with the experience built-up over the 
years. “Good mathematicians are usually found capable of carrying out 
computations quickly and reliably, for unless they command this technique they 
may fail to make their ingenuity effective” (Polanyi M., 1957: 102). Although he 
may make more mistakes than the novice, he is able to quickly discover them, as 
though he had drawn “a portrait of his conceptually prefigured conclusions” 
(Polanyi M., 1957: 101).  
Polanyi with Merleau-Ponty, Dilthey and Rothschild 
The following explain how Polanyi’s idea relates to other key thinkers in 
philosophy, notably Merleau-Ponty, Dilthey and Rothschild, whose works 
influence the thinking of Michael Polanyi. Merleau-Ponty’s work on mind and 
body foreshadows Polanyi’s idea on logic of tacit integration. His notion of 
"presence at the moment" and "carrying ourselves to the moment of 
experiencing," contribute to Polanyi’s view on embodied knowledge. Polanyi’s 
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idea of indwelling is substantially influenced by Dilthey’s lived experience. 
Rothschild’s thinking also underlies Polanyi’s idea on semiotic expression of 
tacit knowledge.  
Merleau-Ponty argues our capacities to think and perceive are not separate, 
independent faculties. They are the mutually dependent aspects of psychological 
and physiological whole that embraces the subject’s habits and skills who think 
and perceive (Merleau-Ponty M., 1962: 80). The body is not experienced as 
aggregation of its parts; rather it is in “undivided possession of this body through 
one’s body image (body in the world)” (Jha S. R., 2002: 73-4).  That is, 
"Bodily spatiality is the development of one's bodily being, 
the way in which the body comes into being as a body." … 
"The various parts of my body, its visual, tactile and motor 
aspects are not simply co-ordinated." ... "[All] movements 
are available to us in virtue of their common meaning. That 
is why, in their first attempts at grasping, children look, not 
at their hand, but at the object: the various parts of the body 
are known to us through their functional value only, and 
their co-ordination is not learnt" (Merleau-Ponty M., 1962: 
149).  
In understanding, “the apprehension of the whole makes possible and 
determines the interpretation of the particular part” (Hodges H. A., 1944: 135-6). 
For Merleau-Ponty, what we perceive is “our presence at the moment when 
things, truths, values are constituted for us,”whilst for Polanyi, it is past 
experience that performs as subsidiary clues during an integration by affecting 
what we perceive (Merleau-Ponty M., 1962: 71-2).  According to Dilthey, 
“[W]e start from the system of the whole, which given to 
us as living reality (der uns lebendig gegeben ist), to make 
the particular intelligible to ourselves in terms of it.” … 
“The fact that we live in the consciousness of the system of 
the whole is what enables us to understand a particular 
statement, gesture or action” (Hodges H. A., 1944: 135-6).  
This relationship between part and whole constitute the gestalt perception: 
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his notion of the whole mind in apprehension, and the part, of which the whole 
makes the particular intelligible as in apprehending the meaning of an expression 
of a sign.  
“[W]e understand by means of the co-operation of all the 
powers of the mind in apprehension. … [W]e start from the 
system of the whole, which given to us as living reality … 
to make the particular intelligible to ourselves in terms of 
it. The fact that we live in the consciousness of the system 
of the whole is what enables us to understand a particular 
statement, a particular gesture or a particular action. ... 
[T]he apprehension of the whole makes possible and 
determines the interpretation of the particular part” 
(Hodges H. A., 1944: 135-6).  
The lived experience is also reflected in Merleau-Ponty’s mind-body 
integration, and Polanyi’s idea of integration in tacit knowing (Jha S. R., 2002: 
79-80).  The lived experience refers to inner states, process, and activities of 
which we are aware, whilst we concentrate on objective contents of 
consciousness (Hodges H. A., 1944: 158-60).  “The experienced system of 
mental life must be grounded on the lived experience” (Hodges H. A., 1944: 
135-6).  Knowing is grounded in one’s body, which serve as a mean for action 
directed towards the meaningful world. This is a matter of connecting the person 
with his environment through body and mind as instruments; that is, “knowing as 
a presence at the moment” (Merleau-Ponty M., 1962: 71-2).  
“The body is known to us through its functional value; its 
parts engaged in the performance of our actions are 
available to us in virtue of their common meaning” 
(Merleau-Ponty M., 1962: 149; Polanyi M., 1969: 222).   
For Polanyi, these are embodied mind and integration of subsidiary clues 
directed towardsfocal object, which extends to use of tools and probe. We 
interact with the world by dwelling in our body and/or tools as instruments. To 
interpret environmental clues involves “skilful use of clues, a joining and mutual 
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adjustment of information from our sense organs about conditions inside and 
outside our bodies and from our memories” (Jha S. R., 2002: 72).  Or with tools, 
“our subsidiary awareness of tools and probes can be regarded now as the act of 
making them form a part of our own body” (Polanyi M., 1958: 59).    
In an integration, a person treats parts of body and/or tool in subsidiary 
fashion, or as potentialities.  
“[W]hen put in front of scissors, needle and familiar tasks, 
[he] does not need to look of his hands and fingers because 
they are not objects to be discovered in space: bones, 
muscles and nerves, but potentialities already mobilised by 
the perception of scissors or needle, the central end of 
those “intentional threads” which link him to the objects 
given” (Merleau-Ponty M., 1962: 110).  
The body and tools function as subsidiary clues–as potentialities–in an 
intentional act of integration. The body is “the potentiality that surges toward 
objects to be grasped and perceives them” (Merleau-Ponty M., 1962: 110).  
Moreover, as we rely on our awareness of the first term for actively and 
intentionally attending for the second term in an integration, the notion of 
intentional action is an aspect of consciousness, something which is active in an 
unspecifiable sense (Merleau-Ponty M., 1962: 121). Intentionality is a pointing 
outward from the knower toward an object. This “active directedness” provides 
the starting point for Polanyi’s dynamic concept of tacit integration (Jha S. R., 
2002: 121).  Intentionality of the subject also allows for the “intersubjectivity,” 
which “enables the organisms to interpret the meaning of signs within inner 
communication systems as experiences, and eventually to express their meaning 
in forms created by the organism itself, culture and language, for instance" 
(Rothschild F. S., 1962: 778).  It is this intentionality that bridges the meaning of 
signs and our experience both on receiving and sending messages.8 
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“Understanding” refers to both “apprehending the meaning of a portion of 
mental life” and “apprehending the meaning of an expression of a sign” (Hodges 
H. A., 1944: 158-60). “[T]he apprehension of mental states arises out of lived 
experience … [where] the whole mind work together” in a systematic connection 
(Hodges H. A., 1944: 135-6).  Any abstract thought—the explicit in mental 
life—needs to have tacit underpinning, in this case, the of the lived experience. 
The "lived experience" causes the interpretation of it in term of abstract thought. 
When we observe objects, we observe the conditions given to us by sensory 
impressions, and the relation of cause and effect arises through a synthesis from 
within us, by abstraction (Hodges H. A., 1944: 13-4).  Without it, a person 
cannot convert the thought of a movement into actual movement by merely 
following explicit instruction (Merleau-Ponty M., 1962: 110). For Merleau-
Ponty, this involves relationship to experience. 
“The phonetic ‘gesture’ brings about, both for the speaking 
subject and for his hearers, a certain structural conscious-
ordination of experience, a certain modulation of existence, 
exactly as a pattern of my bodily behaviour endows the 
objects around me with a certain significance both for me 
and for others” (Merleau-Ponty M., 1962: 193).   
The explicit, resulting from the lived experience, is interpreted afterward 
(after the understanding has taken place) by the abstract thought. In other words, 
this relation is a derivative of the living experience, intellectually interpreted 
afterward by abstract thought (Hodges H. A., 1944: 13-4). "We continually 
experience in terms of combinations and connections in ourselves, while we have 
to read combination and connection into the stimuli of sense" (Hodges H. A., 
1944: 13-4).  
Making-sense of articulated language involves personal accreditation. 
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Meaning-making is in context; the meaning maker is an inextricable part of this 
world (Jha S. R., 2002: 264).  
"The link between the word and its living meaning is not 
an external link of association, the meaning inhabits the 
word, and language 'is not an external accompaniment to 
intellectual processes.' We are therefore led to recognize a 
gestural or existential significance in speech, as we have 
already said. Language certainly has an inner content, but 
this is not self-subsistent and self-conscious thought. ... 
[Our] body expresses meaning, but language does not 
express though … It presents or rather it is the subject's 
taking up of a position in the world of his meanings” 
(Merleau-Ponty M., 1962: 193; Polanyi M., 1969: 222)9  
Speech is not the ‘sign’ of thought. Speech and thought are not externally 
related, but are interrelated by the sense held within word (Merleau-Ponty M., 
1962: 182). It is thus the “gestural and existential significance of speech” we 
recognise that lies beneath their conceptual meaning. “The process of expression, 
when it is successful, does not merely leave for the reader and the writer himself 
a kind of reminder, it brings the meaning into existence as a thing at the very 
heart of the text” (Merleau-Ponty M., 1962: 182). In Polanyi’s term, sense-
reading involves reception of message, deciding whether certain regularities 
should be taken to be significant. Sense-giving conveys, or reproduces, an 
experience for the purpose of communication. It refers to the verbalisation of an 
idea, memory, or the performance of a skill. Education, for example, is a 
consequence of consecutive integrations of these two processes (Polanyi M., 
1985: 49).  
Polanyi is not alone to address the tacit dimension in his epistemology. 
These thinkers supports his view on the wholeness of tacit knowledge. The view 
the“experienced system of mental life must be grounded on the lived 
experience”confirms the gestalt view (Hodges H. A., 1944). Since the whole is 
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greater than the sum of its parts, our apprehension of the whole makes possible 
and determines the interpretation of the parts. That our capacity to think, and 
perceive comes from psychological and physiological whole confirms the notion 
of embodied mind that knowing is grounded in one’s body and mind. When we 
actively direct our undivided attention towards the focal object of integration, our 
body as potentiality allows us to dwell in them as instruments.”This extends our 
physical exercise of skills to use of tools and probe, and our mind to abstract and 
interpersonal understanding.  
2 – Critical Assessment of Michael Polanyi’s Epistemology 
Polanyi’s philosophy of knowledge is criticised on two grounds. The first 
asserts that personal knowledge is invalid–it is mere subjective and 
psychological phenomenon. The second argues there is the tacit knowledge, but 
in order to become meaningful and useful, it must be explicable. Addressing to 
these charges are critical because if there is only the articulated knowledge, or 
that the knowledge must fully become descriptive to be useful, then there is no 
room for experience in a heuristic process of learning and problem-solving. We 
perform these acts only by following rules. Beliefs, intuition, imagination, and 
ability to see a problem then become irrelevant. We are incapable of learning 
anything new, delivering novel solutions to problems, or solving non-routine 
problems. 
There are four critics in this part. The first views tacit knowledge as 
psychological fact, and, as a result, become relative. The next view asserts that 
the tacit knowledge must be explicable. Perception and cognitive understanding 
are different kinds of tacit knowledge: there are different method to describe into 
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logical and analogical relations. Another view gives primacy to purpose and 
conception of skill, which necessitate exhaustive explicit statements to convey 
practice. Accordingly, Polanyi neglects the primacy of descriptive knowledge as 
being critical for performing action. The last view points to scientific knowledge. 
This is important because any practice that requires a degree of rigour in formal 
method can be considered along side scientific practice. The critic dismisses the 
role of scientist’s experience and belief in practice of verifying scientific 
statement. 
Tacit knowledge is subjective 
According to the first view, Polanyi’s personal knowledge is a subjective 
entity as it is a psychological and relative phenomenon(Sanders A. F., 1988: 
159).  His epistemology relies too much on sensations as a mean to which one 
accesses the real entities (Mullins P., 1999: 48). The position and theory of the 
external world, which includes other knowing subjects, has no interdependence 
of the knower. As a result, a person possesses knowledge only in his mind.  
Belief as a form of tacit knowledge is criticised under this category. The 
belief is a mean by which a person attempts to find means to reach at the 
objective truth. It is one of the subjective entity that results in knowledge being 
psychological and relative. To prove the objective truth by belief leads to the 
establishment of test statement, eventually leading to infinite regress of proofs. 
At certain arbitrary point he necessarily resorts to the subjectivism to stop the 
infinite regress at some privileged beliefs to guarantee or define the objective 
truth of what is believed (Musgrave A. E., 1968: 562-3). The person resorts to 
certain indubitable truths; some psychological attitude to justify reality. This 
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mental facts are supposed to guarantee truth or that the truth is identified with 
certain psychological state (Sanders A. F., 1989: 44). Some can go as far as to 
argue that man knows nothing: there is no belief to be called “knowledge.” There 
are only subjective beliefs or opinions (Musgrave A. E., 1968: 561-3). 
Knowledge merely becomes a representation in the mind of a particular knowing 
subject. Certain privileged beliefs are justified, which denies reality independent 
of human knower, and the scientific knowledge as real. This limitation on reality 
consequently results in relativism in the nature of knowledge that “no person can 
prove to the others who does not share his framework” (Musgrave A. E., 1968: 
564).   
To illustrate that belief and tacit knowledge in general are not subjective 
entity involves answering two questions. First, does Polanyi’s epistemology 
involve any attempt to settle questions of validity by considerations of 
psychological fact? Second, are men’s beliefs relativistic? That is, are they not 
on par with each other and there exists no objective standards? Are beliefs self-
evident and incorrigible? Are they sharable among persons? 
1) Does Polanyi’s epistemology involve any attempt to settle questions of 
validity by considerations of psychological fact? 
The role of a subject is crucial in knowing process. Polanyi introduces 
psychological factors in his epistemology as methodologically relevant in the 
validation. Polanyi’s epistemology requires one’s own judgement in confirming 
validity of assertion, based on his background tacit knowledge (Prosch H., 1986: 
220-1). However, one’s psychological property never guarantees truth nor can 
subjective theory justify truth. 
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Logical validity of a deduction of proof can be supported only by logical 
reasons, not psychological observations. Yet, the validity is not separated from 
psychological fact. It is the psychological fact that accounts for tacit knowledge 
of the knower. Polanyi equates psychological fact as belief, and as a form of 
personal knowledge, based on tacit dimension. 
“… psychology may account for the factual conditions 
under which understanding and operation of logical 
reasoning may develop, and it may explain errors 
associated with it” (Polanyi M., 1958: 334).  
The speaker’s point of view is equivalent to the belief that certain entity is 
true (Sanders A. F., 1989: 166-8).  
“A person can speak of truth only with the universal intent 
in a position that sets against the rest of the public world“ 
(Polanyi M., 1958: 334).  
Beliefs are fallible. They only refer to the intended meaning (Sanders A. F., 
1989: 215). A truth seeking person acknowledges the universal and ideal 
standards over himself as he holds himself responsible for the pursuit of 
knowledge (Polanyi M., 1958: 308). In other words, a person’s tacit knowledge 
is in constant interactions with the external world. Every person “has the 
possibility of exercising some measure of choice between degrees of conformity 
and dissent” (Polanyi M., 1958: 208). This results in beliefs held in the form of 
conceptual framework and the network of tacit integrations, both in forms of 
articulate manifestations and the inarticulate—tacit—coefficients. 
One’s belief system derives from, and dependent on, the culture—
language, traditions, and practices—within which one is born, brought up and 
educated. “Human body is the ultimate instrument of all our external 
knowledge,”the tacit know-how embodied in skilful performance, implicit 
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beliefs, stances and attitudes of the background function at an instrumental—
subsidiary—level (Polanyi M., 1967b: 15) . This applies to learning, 
understanding, applying and modifying the articulate contents of the cultural 
systems (Sanders A. F., 1989: 180).    
2) Are men’s beliefs relativistic? Are they not on par with each other and 
there exists no objective standards? Are beliefs self-evident and incorrigible? 
Are they sharable among persons? 
According to Polanyi, we constantly struggle to achieve objective 
knowledge. For instance,  
“There is only one [universal] truth, though our [personal] 
knowledge is essentially incomplete and the truth is an 
unattainable ideal.” 
The result is what believed is always opened to correction and 
improvement. Every person may believe something different to be true (Sanders 
A. F., 1989: 185-7).  The possibility of error is a necessary element of any belief 
bearing on reality as the knowing process. Every factual assertion is capable of 
being mistaken and corrigible (Sanders A. F., 1989: 314-5).   
Not all beliefs are refutable nor provable, though it does not mean they are 
subjective. “Proofs may conceivably be incomplete” (Polanyi M., 1958: 285). 
Some of them necessarily remain tacit. They cannot be rejected by a set of 
wholly explicit rules that seeks to reject them when any single explicit piece of 
evidence contradictions them or proved— logically derived—from facts of 
purely unbiased observation whether on theoretical or psychological grounds (as 
perceptual experience) (Sanders A. F.,1989: 195). Rules or theories are maxims, 
whose guiding function integrates into know-how, or practical knowledge 
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(Polanyi M., 1958: 50). The rules of an art never completely determine its 
practice, nor can they replace the know-how embodied in that practice (Sanders 
A. F., 1989: 194). The application of rules in weighting the evidence cannot be a 
matter of universal statue law. A decision can only be determined with 
considerable hindsight. One should stick to one’s theories as long as it is 
reasonably possible (Sanders A. F., 1989: 191-5).  
Thanks to the objectivity of language and human mental capacity, tacit 
coefficients are to some extent sharable. It is possible, but difficult, to intelligibly 
translate between different conceptual schemes: to understand, criticise and the 
like, whose process may be depicted as follows (Polanyi M. and Prosch H., 1975: 
139-44).  
“Against adverse evidence on one’s conceptual schemes, 
one constantly reinforces a framework, suppresses the 
development of rival views and contributes to stability. 
Disparate schemes of interpretation can be criticised in the 
light of one’s own local standards and ideals. The tasks of 
commitment as a mode of responsible and sincere belief is 
the openness to criticism, … held in due consideration of 
evidence and of the fallibility of beliefs” (Polanyi M., 
1964: 70).   
People operating with conceptual schemes different from our own may act 
and argue completely intelligibly and rationally in terms of their view of the 
world (Sanders A. F., 1989: 20). A large-scale scheme of interpretation can be 
made possible as being sensible, stable, coherent and comprehensive, even 
though there is no guarantee of its bearing on truth (Sanders A. F., 1989: 20). It 
is a result of  commitment to a particular approach as personal involvement in a 
particular cultural practice, but not to a set of specific propositions (Sanders A. 
F., 1989: 207). Therefore, different conceptual or cultural domains, which 
depend on their particular and relative internal standards, need not lead to 
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epistemological corollary that what is right is irredeemably relative (Sanders A. 
F., 1989: 209). 
Different kinds of tacit knowledge 
To emphasise articulated form of knowledge, some writers go as far to call 
for different kinds of tacit knowledge (Harré R., 1977: 172-3). Harré argues the 
knowledge must be propositional and descriptive to be meaningful and valid. 
The tacit knowledge must refer to: 
“… the proposition which would describe that the 
knowledge we are able to bring it out, … to reveal the tacit 
knowledge” (Harré R. (1977: 174-5).  
That is, for the tacit knowledge to be validated as knowledge, it must be 
explicable. The knowledge remains tacit only because we voluntarily choose to 
attend to them subsidiarily in integration. 
There is difference between two kinds of knowledge–perception and 
understanding (of theories, concepts and "knowledge-by-description"). The 
former refers to perceptual sensory elements of empirical experience, whilst the 
latter refers to theoretical or cognitive conditions of experience. Each requires 
different forms of subsidiary elements in integration. Perception is knowledge by 
acquaintance or experience, which is non-propositional, and, hence, not tacit 
knowledge. Its subsidiary term is the "object" of tacit knowledge. It is not the 
tacit knowledge unless it can be described. Both the subsidiary and focal 
elements are "that of which we cannot tell", not only because it is not 
propositional, but also because "one is not able to formulate propositionally that 
which is being known" (Harré R., 1977: 173).  
Understanding of theories, concepts and "knowledge-by-description" 
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involves both proximal and distal terms that are propositional. The proximal 
consists of theories, understandings that are conceptual. We cannot tell the 
proximal only because we attend to it subsidiarily. Understanding meaning of a 
sentence or work of arts stands in-between the two forms (Harré R., 1977: 172). 
We attend from non-propositional perceptual knowledge to meaning, which is 
propositional. We attend, for example, from written or spoken words, or 
paintings, that are perceived, to the propositional meaning like a concept. We go 
from “perceptual items” to what is propositional (Harré R., 1977: 173). 
Each form of tacit knowledge requires different methods to reveal 
subsidiary elements so that they qualify as tacit knowledge: i.e., by being 
descriptive. What is subsidiary in the case of perception is not properly called the 
tacit knowledge, until it becomes propositional and described. What matters is to 
reveal the tacit knowledge present in the “from-to” schema, by making clear in 
experience to describe what elements are subsidiary to the perception as a 
perceptual, psychological and analytical process. The subsidiary elements for the 
case of theoretical understanding are already the knowledge, since they 
themselves are propositional and related to knowledge by experience by logical 
and analogical relations.What is relevant involves exploring and revealing 
analogical interrelations among the components of theoretical knowledge we 
tacitly subscribe, by the use of analytical schema built around notion of multiple 
analogies, because the analysis of this of situation cannot be given in terms of the 
from-to schema. 
To reveal all content of tacit knowledge contradicts Polanyi’s notion 
especially in the Personal Knowledge that all explicit knowledge; i.e., the 
propositional, descriptive knowledge, rests upon various kinds of non-critical, 
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pre-linguistic knowledge capacities. To regard, knowledge which can be 
described as the only valid form is to claim “we know only what we can tell,” 
rather than “we can know more than we can tell” (Polanyi M., 1967b: 4).  
Revealing tacit elements we used subsidiarily by making them completely 
explicit is not what Polanyi tries to do. This is logically impossible as “we can 
know more than we can tell,” and we dwell in something else in a subsidiary way 
when we make anything explicit and focal (Polanyi M., 1967b: 4; Prosch H., 
1986: 212). In fact, Polanyi recognises that many, not all, of the subsidiary 
elements involved in any instance of tacit knowing could be discovered (without 
disintegrating our central focal meaning beyond repair), and so become objects 
of our focal attention. Our knowledge is increased and expanded by a continual 
journey back and forth between analysis and synthesis. Nonetheless, it would be 
difficult to maintain that his overriding purpose in developing his theory of the 
subsidiary-focal distinction was that of rendering the tacit explicit” (Harré R., 
1977: 175).10 
Polanyi’s intention is to take both cases of perception and understanding as 
product of the “from-to” integration (subsidiary dwelling-in to focal meaning or 
comprehensive entity), established by our own imaginative and integrative 
capacities. He uses the case of perception to illustrate the same integrative 
process that underlies all forms of knowledge, including the cognitive 
understanding of experience, though the subsidiary content of each case is 
different. 
Difference exists between what is meant to be “logical” for Polanyi and 
Harré. Harré’s logic accepts only explicit logic; i.e., formal rules of symbolic 
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logic in a way duplicable by explicit operationalism. “Everything our knowledge 
is based we can dig it out and focalise it” (Harré R., 1977: 175). In contrast, 
Polanyi is adamant that the “from-to" relation is a logical one, despite being tacit, 
and not merely a psychological explanation of the dynamics of theory 
construction (Prosch H., 1986: 214-5). What is logical is a ‘logic of tacit 
inference’ as “the way in which a mind dwelled in subsidiary clues to reach 
correctly a focal meaning across an explicitly logical gap” (Prosch H., 1986: 
214-5). We need a mind to synthesise subsidiary elements into focal entity or 
meaning. We do so in perception, scientific discoveries, and in our justification 
of them. 
There are many indeterminacies in our understanding of a proposition, 
which stand as grounds for our conclusions from it. We cannot render explicit 
our understanding of the ‘necessary conditions’ when it is that these are satisfied. 
We cannot reduce our need for a mind in making judgement to a complete, finite 
set of criteria. Yet, we do not make our judgements illogically, or alogically—
only subjectively. They may or may not be sound, and correctly or incorrectly 
structured by us (Prosch H., 1986: 215-6). Our judgements have a logic, its 
function in correctly assessing what is implied by something else. It is the 
process of tacit inference: only can we acquire a tacit awareness of the correct 
rules, an awareness becomes implicitly more right as we become connoisseurs, 
resting upon many indeterminants, subsidiary elements we dwell. The same 
applies to analogy. What is involved is not simply noticing two things are the 
same, but determining they have a significant similarity, i.e., in respect to 
something. It is the product of many tacit notions and feelings, by reference to 
the complex of tacitly held notions we have in mind. They cannot be reduced to a 
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neat set of operational rules (Prosch H., 1986: 216). 
Purposes and conception of Skills 
Since knowledge has to be explicable to be valid, in case of tacit 
knowledge of physical expression–a skilful performance–Jelfs questions 
Polanyi's nature and structure of skills (Jelfs B., 1982: 177-99). Jelfs also 
questions his analogical analysis between skills of swimming and bicycle riding 
and of science by asking if “mechanical and physiological process 
descriptions”—physiological events such as ‘regulating the respiration’ and 
‘balancing’—“are identical to statements about a person’s knowing and 
awareness” (Jelfs B., 1982: 179-84). 
In a skilful performance, as we focus on the whole (objects of focal 
awareness such as purposes), we are necessarily subsidiarily aware of the ‘skills’ 
through this process, according to the process of tacit integration (Jelfs B., 1982: 
186-7). The focal awareness equates explicit knowledge, the “knowing that,” or 
description, of concepts, goals and purposes, whilst the subsidiary awareness 
corresponds to skills and tacit knowledge. The conception of a particular action 
is integral to the person performing that action. 
“In performing action, are we not focusing on directing our 
efforts at such performance, rather than explicitly aware of 
knowledge—concept—of purposes, … [which] is the 
object of our attention and it ‘runs ahead’ of our action?” 
(Jelfs B., 1982: 186-7)  
This is evident as, an example: 
“The conception of a Sonata pianist has will enter into 
what he does when he plays the musical score” (Jelfs B., 
1982: 186).   
This necessitates exhaustive explicit statements that sufficiently convey 
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practice. The importance is the way we employ language in describing human 
activities relates to the notion of tacit integration. Language is the only vital 
element in the tacit integration, as evidenced in the following, 
“The connoisseurship can [only] be communicated by 
precept” (Jelfs B., 1982: 192-3). 
 Polanyi neglects the role of descriptive knowledge in our performing 
action, though description of action in our memory constitutes to a crucial part of 
the integration. These concepts fail to be mentioned in an act of problem solving, 
as he “did not give attention to those concepts we ordinarily associate with 
descriptions and explanations of action” (Jelfs B., 1982: 190). For instance, 
Polanyi does not provide any example of the criteria or reasons in making 
judgements about the skills. 
“[He] fails to notice” … “that in evaluating a pianist’s 
performance as ‘skilful’, the employment of a criterion 
such as ‘touch’ does not permit Polanyi to ask about the 
existence of ‘touch’ as if it were some property or 
particular movement of the pianist’s hands” (Jelfs B., 1982: 
185). 
This is equivalent to asking in what respect does Polanyi’s analysis of skill 
provide an intelligible answer to the question of “What did he do?” (Jelfs B., 
1982: 186). Moreover, the unspecifiability and inexplicability of particulars or 
skills, though some can be made aware, eventually lead to the notion that 
“nothing could be said and no question could be asked,”thus, viewing tacit 
knowledge as subjective entity (Jelfs B., 1982: 195-6). 
However, concepts and descriptions are, to Polanyi, “maxims,”or explicit 
rules of action. As they only serve as a guide to perform action correctly, they do 
not necessarily lead to successful performance. Memory is particulars–subsidiary 
clues–we rely on in problem solving. Language, which allows for production of 
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descriptive knowledge, is an articulated product of shared culture based on the 
tacit co-efficient, which enables communication and common understandings 
among people. 
Scientific objective knowledge 
Scientific objective knowledge must be independent of personal and 
psychological facts to be valid. The objective knowledge includes theoretical and 
explicit knowledge, whilst the personal and psychological knowledge conforms 
with the subjective knowledge. Logical contribution of science and 
psychological contribution of scientists are separate entities (Musgrave A. E., 
1974: 567-8). That is, 
“A scientist analyses and evaluates contributions to science 
independently of personal or psychological facts about the 
scientist who produce it, or … anybody else” (Musgrave A. 
E., 1974: 568). 
Truth of a statement is not established by experience nor belief. It is only 
justified by objective and logical analysis, which concerns with logical or 
objective features. This involves truth and falsehood, deducibility, 
contradictoriness, deductive explanation, explanatory power or empirical 
content, simplicity and verisimilitude (Musgrave A. E., 1974: 573).That is, 
“The objective standards in the light of which critical 
appraisal of that knowledge may take place … are 
interpersonal or impersonal ones” (Musgrave A. E., 1974: 
570).   
To prove a theory, scientists only work at the level of formal and explicit 
knowledge. They constantly operate with “theories”:  
“They constantly ‘accept’ or ‘choose’ or ‘prefer’ one 
theory over some others … and they may use the degrees 
of corroboration of the various theories to guide their 
choices” (Musgrave A. E., 1974: 854). 
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The truth consists of “those easily testable experimental statements about 
whose truth or falsehood the community of scientists happens to agree at some 
time” (Musgrave A. E., 1974: 568). “Statements can be justified only by other 
scientifically accepted statements; the truth of an observation statement cannot 
be established by appealing to the psychological fact that you have had certain 
perceptual experiences” (Musgrave A. E., 1974: 568). 
Working at the theoretical level involves the use of language to create a 
body of objective knowledge. This, in Popper’s term, is the “third world of the 
objective knowledge” produced by linguistic behaviour to produce descriptions 
and arguments (Musgrave A. E., 1974: 586). The language is an explication of 
the subjective knowledge. The objective feature of language (based on the 
subject’s personal knowledge) is distinct from the objective knowledge (in 
theories or scientific knowledge). The language reflects human knowledge as 
approached from the point of view of the subject who produces it. In this regard, 
Popper is consistent with Polanyi on the crucial role of the person in the knowing 
process. However, this process only operates at the articulated level as in the case 
of language, not at the tacit level in Polanyi’s. The knowing subject, as an 
autonomous entity, expands his knowledge by constant feedback with the 
objective knowledge. The growth of knowledge depends on the activities of 
human subjects as long as they who produce it recognise its objective aspects, 
and utilise them as common standards they conform (Musgrave A. E., 1974: 
587). 
The capability of an explanation which conforms to them does not depend 
on any personal or psychological facts. Popper refuses as reasonable the belief 
that a theory is true, and the commitment to the truth of a theory (Musgrave A. 
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E., 1974: 583).  Instead,  
“the scientist need not believe; [they merely] need to … 
choose a theory as the best one available” (Musgrave A. E., 
1974: 583). 
 It is not rational to believe that a theory is true when we can never prove it 
(Musgrave A. E., 1974: 583). A scientist proposes an autonomous and 
impersonal structure when he purposes an explanation or seeks to explain in the 
objective sense of that term. Others who try to assess this contribution would do 
so in the light of objective or impersonal standards. 
Psychological factor merely serves as motivator to pursuit of knowledge 
that itself alone bears no relationship to reality. The commitment as a 
psychological attitude plays minor roles only to motivate scientists, but not to 
guarantee results they may obtain from an experiment. Further, there are risks of 
subjectivism attached to the psychological factor that  
“[A]n experimenter may be motivated by a dogmatic 
commitment to some theory. … [T]he public 
argumentative status of an experimental investigation is 
independent of the private psychological motivation for 
undertaking it. Private motivations are therefore less 
important than they might appear to be” (Musgrave A. E., 
1974: 583).  
The question is whether the objective knowledge and psychological factor 
are two completely distinct processes. Is Polanyi’s personal and tacit coefficient 
merely a psychological factor and thus should be eliminated? Popper gives clear 
distinction between the objective and psychological/subjective knowledge and 
proposes a third world of the objective knowledge based on the subject’s point of 
view to produce and describe the real objective knowledge. The knowledge from 
the subject’s perspective in Polanyi’s term, however, is the personal knowledge. 
The personal knowledge is distinct from the knowledge as in Popper’s third 
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world of the objective knowledge purely based on language and description. One 
cannot divorce from the tacit element in the personal knowledge. As stated 
above, one’s belief system is derived from his background knowledge. 
Therefore, Popper’s account of objective scientific knowledge neglects the 
“states of mind” among scientists (Musgrave A. E., 1974: 575). According to 
Polanyi, even the scientific knowledge cannot be the “epistemology with a 
knowing subject” (Musgrave A. E., 1974: 576). 
Tacit knowledge is indispensable in all cases. Even though tacit knowledge 
is inseparable from psychological fact, there is universal objective standard over 
the tacit knowledge as we interact with the external world. As a result, personal 
beliefs are prone to error. Since the tacit knowledge rests on non-critical and pre-
linguistic knowledge capacities, it is logically impossible to reveal all elements 
that form subsidiary parts of the tacit knowledge. Moreover, there are same 
imaginative and integrative capacities underly exercise of all knowledge. Also, 
as Polanyi stresses the importance of descriptive knowledge only as good as a 
guide or rules of action;i.e., maxim, the description alone is far from sufficient 
for delivering successful performance.  In science, though it relies on formal 
method for verifying scientific statements, scientists’ exercise of scientific 
judgement operates from their own experience that is prone to error. For Polanyi, 
scientific knowledge does not differ from the tacit knowledge. 
Conclusion 
The first section explained the core idea of Michael Polanyi's philosophy of 
tacit knowledge that all exercises of knowledge and skill were rooted in a tacit 
dimension. It illustrated an informal process of a tacit integration of clues. It then 
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contributed classification of skills based on their explicit expressions–into the 
physical, semiotic and intellectual–to an understanding of how his thought may 
be applied. The chapter also identified the tacit knowledge as closely related to 
experience. Problem-solving is a heuristic act, which enables us to deal with a 
novel situation in a novel manner. It is essentially tacit, despite an interplay 
between the articulate and the inarticulate. A problem-solving capability is 
positively related to a level of experience, an accumulation of which forms a 
repertoire of portmanteau reactions as behaviour patterns, which immediately 
became part of appropriate routes toward a solution. It transforms once the novel 
situation to a routine operation in eyes of an expert; his experience is transformed 
into a wealth of resource ready to deal with occurrences with increasing subtlety. 
He possesses the superior problem-solving skill compared to a novice. Although 
the expert may be as prone to making mistakes as other relatively inexperienced 
person, he is better able at identifying and rectifying errors. His problem-solving 
approach becomes increasingly non-routine, adaptive and does not follow a 
strictly logical pattern. A close inspection reveals an ability to improvise: to 
make a quick and reliable decision without prior stipulation (Weick E., 1998: 
544). It is a process where by a fresh contingency is mixed with previously learnt 
lessons, guided by patterns discovered retrospectively (Berliner P., 1994: 546-7). 
We are said to improvise as we thrust our intuition-guided efforts towards 
problem solving in an extemporaneous fashion. 
The section also explained how Polanyi's philosophy was influenced by 
others, notably Merleau-Ponty, Dilthey, and Rothschild. Merleau-Ponty's and 
Dilthey's philosophy provided several grounds for Polanyi's philosophy; most 
notably on a gestalt view of the tacit knowledge and instrumental involvement of 
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body and mind. This explained extension of physical exercise of skills to use of 
tools and probe, and exercise of mind to abstract and interpersonal 
understanding. Rothschild provided Polanyi with the notion of bodily 
involvement in the interpersonal communication process. 
The second section contributed to a general debate on Michael Polanyi's 
philosophy by reviewing his critics and presenting defence. The arguments here 
were based on surrounding philosophical literature. Critics who dismissed a 
personal coefficient in beliefs, experience, and scientific practice as valid or 
necessary were evident in the work of Karl Popper and Alan Musgrave. Another 
view placed primacy on the explicit knowledge, such as that of Rom Harré and 
Brian Jelfs. Harré viewed perception and cognition as two distinct processes of 
the tacit integration and claimed the tacit knowledge was only valid providing 
what we knew could be cognitively and theoretically described. Jelfs asserted on 
the necessary explication of the subsidiary and focal clues in the act of 
integration. Their implications are important. For without the tacit knowledge, 
there is no room for the heuristic process. However, it was clearly illustrated it 
was impossible to deny a presence of the tacit knowledge. The personal 
knowledge was as inseparable from psychological fact as it was impossible to 
fully reveal its elements and process. There was a universal objective standard, 
which made the personal knowledge fallible. And despite a utility of the 
descriptive knowledge as a guide or a rule of action, it is far from being 
sufficient for mobilising a skilful performance. Even a formal method of 
verifying scientific statements still involves exercises of scientists’ personal 
experience and belief.  
Notwithstanding, our focus on Polanyi literature was limited only to 
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relevant aspects of this research and could not represent a complete review and 
critics of Michael Polanyi’s philosophy. Polanyi also authored substantial 
amount of work, to name but a few, in arts, politics, and religion. Similarly, this 
is not to say those thinkers who influence Polanyi’s idea are limited to a number 
of scholars discussed above, for they are the most influential to Polanyi’s idea 
presented in this chapter.11 
It is suffice to confirm the tacit knowledge is central to all kinds of skilful 
performance. Michael Polanyi's philosophy of tacit knowledge is philosophically 
valid and provides sufficient ground for an interpretation of a real-world 
phenomenon. 
                                       
1
 See, for example, Collins H. (1993), Cook S. D. C. and Brown J. S.  (1999), 
Lam A. (2000). 
2
 For studies on the impact of technology on work process, see, for example, 
Adler P. (1992); Attewell P. (1987); Cockburn C. (1993); Hodson R. (1988); 
Hirschhorn L. (1984); Zuboff S. (1988). 
3 This is termed “the spiral of knowledge creation” (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995). However, this view is subject to some criticisms. See, for example, 
Spender J-C (1993, 2007 and 2008) and Tsoukas M. (2005). 
4 He points further that “complex higher order actions are executed by being 
broken down into constituent, relative routine tasks, each of which may be 
performed without thought or conscious reflection. Given higher order action is 
then itself able to be carried out more or less automatically in virtues of the fact 
that the objects whose successive realisation is aimed at in the given constituent 
micro-actions have become, in different ways, stamped with value in their own 
right. 
5 Polanyi explains further the structure of tacit knowledge that the focal object 
then becomes subsidiary to the next integration. Levels of knowing are stacked 
on top of one another in such a way that the focal object of the first level 
becomes the subsidiary to the next. He terms this property as the ‘ontological 
hierarchies’ of tacit knowledge. This is evident in his example of ‘latent learning’ 
or ‘partial solutions’ and ‘past experience’ shown below. 
6 Past experience is a form of the marginal clues: they are our previous 
meaningful integration of clues we have become used to seeing in the past. 
7 This corresponds to Polanyi’s view of the ontological hierarchy of knowledge 
8 According to Rothschild, the intra-organismic information/semiotic systems 
consist of 1) semantics—the relation of signs to their meaning; 2) syntax—the 
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physical form of signs and rules of their arrangement; and 3) pragmatics—the 
concrete communication process. There are rules of the syntax of each 
communication: the biological and linguistic, for simultaneous utilisation of 
different communication systems. If these rules are not followed, the 
consequences are meaninglessness, or the misinterpretations of signals.; See 
Rothschild F. S. (1962: 781) and Polanyi M. (1969: 222) for an investigation of 
how the communication process of life that convey meaning in analogy to 
semiotics of language supports Polanyi’s conception of theory of meaning and 
indwelling in a biological and objective way. 
9 Merleau-Ponty (1962: 193) defines the term 'world' not as "a manner of 
speaking,” rather, “it means that the 'mental' or cultural life borrows its structures 
from natural life and that the thinking subject must have its basis in the subject 
incarnate. The phonetic 'gesture' brings about, both for the speaking subject and 
for his hearers, a certain structural co-ordination of experience, a certain 
modulation of existence, exactly as a pattern of my bodily behaviour endows the 
objects around me with a certain significance both for me and for others." 
10 This is “the device by which tacit knowledge could be systematically explored, 
though not exhausted.” See Harré R. (1977: 175), Polanyi M. (1968: 1311), and 
Polanyi M. (1961b: 237-47) 
11 Other researchers who wish to review Polanyi’s thought from an alternative 
perspective would soon discover his idea were related to a greater sphere of 
authors. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines research methodology to a study tacit knowledge that 
is consistent with Michael Polanyi’s philosophy of knowledge. The chapter 
proposes that a study of tacit knowledge be approached by the study of 
experience.  
The first section explains how the interpretive method makes it possible to 
understand the meaning of others’ experience. The aim is to take the subject’s 
perspective, by projecting oneself into the experience of others and getting as 
close as possible to seeing the other’s experience from their point of view. It also 
proposes that the qualitative research methods employing “human instrument” 
allows the researcher to describe experience from a first-person view based on 
his experiential and propositional knowledge (Lincoln Y. S. and Guba E. G., 
1985: 187-9).  
The section that follows proposes that “thick description” is an appropriate 
method to capture in detail the tacit knowledge embedded with the phenomenon. 
To generate thick description is to create interpretive structure by capturing and 
determining subjects’ multiple meanings attributed to their actions and their own 
interpretations in problematic situations.  
The subsequent part deals with data collection. Both the knowledge that 
experience and description contribute to the researcher’s understanding of the 
phenomenon. This research thus comprises both secondary and primary research. 
Consistent with thick description, identifying situation for research interest 
involves critical incident technique. Key to an in-depth understanding of the 
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critical incidents involves securing multiple narratives from interviews and 
observation, collecting instances of interactions, and reviewing existing 
literature. To interpret meaningful experience requires the study of recurring 
terms, and the experiential units. Active coding and categorising is the process of 
creating interpretive structure that establishes linkages and connections of 
meanings. Triangulated sources of data, research method and verisimilitude of 
the thick description addresses the issue of validity of this interpretive research. 
1 – Interpretive research and tacit knowledge 
This study asks a question of how tacit knowledge is exercised and what 
knowledge is embedded when people, as an individual or as a group, perform 
action. It addresses the “how” question by interpreting a relevant set of 
experience from within. Since people attribute meaning to events and 
environments, this research needs a methodology that focuses primarily on the 
human interpretations and meanings, allowing the researcher to view events and 
the social world through eyes of the people he studies (Bryman A. and Bell., 
2003: 93). The interpretive research produces meaningful description and 
interpretation of how certain conditions come into experience and persist 
(Denzin N. K., 1989: 23). 
  A process of interpreting, knowing and comprehending meaning of 
experience, lays a groundwork for understanding (Denzin N. K., 1989: 62) The 
meaning refers to a signification, purpose and sequences of the set of experience 
(Denzin N. K., 1989: 104). To interpret is to explain the meaning of a term; it is 
to set forth, or clarify, the meaning of an experience or event. Since people create 
and maintain meaningful worlds through dialectical processes of conferring the 
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meaning on their realities and acting within them, the interpretation brings out 
“the meaning embedded in a text or slice of interaction” (Ricoeur P., 1979: 96).  
To interpret a phenomenon is to look for similarities and compare 
differences: it is the work of thought, which consists in “deciphering hidden 
meaning in the apparent meaning“ (Ricoeur P., 1974: 13). It clarifies the 
meaning that is “felt, intended, and expressed by another” by “the description of 
another person’s action within a framework that is meaningful to that person” 
(Denzin N. K., 1989: 104). A researcher “makes recognisable visible slice of 
human experience that has been captured” (Denzin N. K., 1989: 26).  To 
investigate, make visible and interpret how the others interpret and make sense of 
what happens to them is equivalent to asking what people really say when they 
say something, or what they really do when they do things. The interpretation 
focuses on understanding human meaning-making where the issue of causality 
must be contextualised (Schwartz-Shea P., 2004: 12-3). Categories, concepts, 
and theoretical level of an analysis emerge from the researcher’s interaction 
within the field and questions about data (Charmaz K., 2000: 521). 
In an interpretive study, truth depends on perspective taken (Sandberg J., 
1995: 156-64). Meaning is embedded in an expression of experience in 
interactive situation. This involves an interaction between (1) people; (2) objects, 
events, or processes; and (3) actions taken toward those objects, events or 
processes (Denzin N. K., 1989: 104-9; Blumer, 1969: 9). The meaning is 
obtained by projecting oneself into the experience of others, i.e., seeing their 
experience from their point of view. The researcher becomes a reflective subject 
who can tell his and the others’ stories (Denzin N. K., 1989: 81, 121). Since tacit 
dimension of knowledge resides with the experience, to study it is to take the 
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subject’s perspective on the issue (Denzin N. K., 1989: 111). The tacit 
knowledge is situational, context-dependent and expressed through people’s 
experience of work. It is grounded in the “lived experience.”1 They possess the 
Polanyi’s tacit dimension (Sandberg J., 2000: 12).  
Since people inextricably relate to the world through their lived experience, 
the way it supports apprehension is consistent with Polanyi’s notion of past 
experience in an integrative act (Sandberg J., 2000: 4, 7). Primary focus of an 
interpretive method is on meaning structure of the lived experience; i.e., an 
aspect of reality people assume or “people’s ways of experiencing or making 
sense of the world” (Sandberg J., 2000: 12). To study experience from within is 
to capture the “lived experience” of the subject, and to produce meaningful 
descriptions and interpretations of how certain conditions come into existence 
and persist.  
The hermeneutic process of studying meaning 
 To explore human experience requires a method that describes the 
experience as it is “lived” or emerged from contexts from a first-person 
perspective. The world of lived experience does not always correspond with the 
world of objective description since events cannot be explained separately from 
its context. “Experts live their knowledge in a way that is not fully representable 
by a set of decontextualised rules and statements” (Thompson C. J., Locander W. 
B. and Pollio H. R., 1989: 135-6) His professional experience enables him to 
anticipate an event differently from others (Lincoln Y. S. and Guba E. G., 1985: 
196) “Since reality constructions cannot be separated from the lived-world in 
which they are experienced, the meaning of an experience is always situated in 
 60 
the current experiential context and is coherently related to the ongoing project 
of the life world” (Thompson C. J., Locander W. B. and Pollio H. R., 1989: 135-
6). The experience is personal knowledge: “[it] cannot be located “inside” the 
person as complete subjectivity nor “outside” the person as subject-free 
objectivity” (Thompson C. J., Locander W. B. and Pollio H. R., 1989: 136). To 
explore the meaning is to apprehend a pattern as it emerges by relating 
descriptions of specific experiences to each other to the overall context of the life 
world (Thompson C. J., Locander W. B. and Pollio H. R., 1989: 137). 
 Tacit knowledge functions against a practical background that is 
transparent to native users. “Experience is conceptualised as dynamic process in 
which certain events become figural (standout) in the individual’s life-world 
while others recede into background” (Thompson C. J., Locander W. B. and 
Pollio H. R., 1989: 136). The background knowledge is a human construction. It 
is a product of their everyday coping with the world, which incorporates “a 
history of experience, consolidated habits and structural repertoires,” that provide 
successful responses to difficult situations. It servers as both sources and 
outcomes of the knowing activity. The background knowledge has to be made 
accessible to an inquirer. 
A “human instrument” is required for a study of meaning, as a tool to take 
the meaning from subjects and context of a phenomenon. The human instrument 
refers to normal human activities such as reading, listening, speaking and looking 
that builds upon researcher’s propositional and tacit knowledge. Its extension 
towards studying documents or records, interviewing, observing unobtrusive 
clues is more consistent with a qualitative methodology (Lincoln Y. S. and Guba 
E. G., 1985: 198-9).2 Its unchangeable nature provides potentiality for the 
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researcher to learn unexpected things, for example, in observing informants’ 
choice of behaviours (Yow V. R., 1994: 7). The researcher’s own world of 
experience is a proper subject matter of inquiry. His experience in the social 
world contributes to an understanding of an expression of its emergent properties 
and features (Denzin N. K., 1989: 25). 
This approach allows the researcher to grasp the subjects’ underlying 
conceptual theories of interpretation or conceptual structures (Denzin N. K., 
1989: 20-1). He captures multiple meanings and contradictions through subject’s 
expression of experience (Denzin N. K., 1989: 24-5). The expression of meaning 
of the experience is given in symbolically meaningful ways as narratives and 
slices of interactions. The study of meaning behind human action is based on a 
symbolic realm , which relates to that meaningful action. This is based on the 
study of the expression, and interpretation of subjective human experience 
(Denzin N. K., 1989: 24). This is the study of how events and situations are 
interpreted through an individual “sense-making” process (Prasad P., 1993: 
1404).  
Since human subjects know more than they can say, they may not be fully 
aware of taken-for-granted assumptions underlying their meaning-making 
activities. Attuning to this meaning-making involves sensitivity to ambiguity. 
The researcher investigates efforts to promulgate or resist particular meanings as 
well as the variation of meanings across context (Polanyi M., 1967: 4; Schwartz-
Shea P., 2004: 12-3). All forms of data reflect and encode human practice, 
though much of it is articulated as in interviews, documents, and field notes. 
Because people convey as much tacitly as they do through words, information a 
sender and receiver respond without the propositional knowledge are nonverbal 
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cues obtained from unobtrusive measures. We make inferences into the tacit 
meaning by examining the context in addition to text by getting as close as 
possible to the subjects who possess and actively use the knowledge (Hansen H., 
2006: 1055; Denzin N. K., 1989: 20-1).To empirically research requires some 
degree of the experiential, or tacit, knowledge of an entity of interest–including 
person, place, thing, or process–through “sustained acquaintance” of the 
researcher (Heron J., 1981: 27). Meanings conveyed by words, phrases and 
gestures are grasped and understood, through participation into the context, 
producing interpretation through research experience that seeks to capture 
understanding of a sense-making process (Denzin N. K., 1989: 126; Hansen H., 
2006: 1056).  
Since understanding is grounded in tacit knowing, the researcher’s own 
tacit knowledge “intrudes into every inquiry whether or not the investigator 
recognises that fact or [is] willing to own it” (Lincoln Y. S. and Guba E. G., 
1985: 197). Every researcher brings along his preconceptions and interpretations 
(Heidegger M., 1962; Gadamer H. G., 1975; Denzin N. K., 1989: 23, 43). Pre-
understanding is a resource for fieldwork that covers knowledge, insights and 
personal experience, as essential elements in collecting and analysing 
information. It refers to both the knowledge of theories and social patterns. The 
former includes concepts, models, and approaches that help us “identify, 
diagnose, define, and analyse major factors and relationships” or “to provide 
structure to a given situation and convey this understanding to others” 
(Gummesson E., 1995: 63-4). The latter is based on the experience that helps the 
researcher develop receptivity to signals to social environment and behaviour 
patterns, enabling him to interpret, for example, the “silence at the meeting” 
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(Gummesson E., 1995: 67)  In addition, the “interpretation must engulf what is 
learnt about the phenomenon and incorporate prior understanding while always 
remaining incomplete and unfinished.”3Spending time in the field is the only 
mean to develop his acquaintance of social patterns (Gummesson E., 1995: 64-
5).  
The researcher develops his understanding directly from his own 
experience and indirectly from experience of others through knowledge by 
description–intermediaries such as textbooks, or research papers. Prior 
understanding include background information and knowledge on a subject, 
concepts, hypotheses, and propositions contained in research literature, 
previously acquired information about the subject and his direct experience. How 
one judges the phenomenon from the outset of an investigation also contributes 
to the prior understanding. “[B]ecause prior understandings shape what is seen, 
heard, written about, and interpreted … [they] are part of what is interpreted” 
(Denzin N. K., 1989: 63-5). However, knowledge gained from research mainly 
by description poses a weakness. Although the descriptive knowledge enables us 
to transcend limit of private experience, it carries greater risks of false 
information and misunderstanding. A comprehensive and rich piece of the 
descriptive knowledge still cannot replace the direct experiential knowledge. 
Studies of literature provide an opportunity for understanding, but they are 
subject to diminishing marginal utility without  the knowledge gained from the 
experience (Gummesson E., 1995: 59-60, 70).  
 Notwithstanding, the value of fieldwork is positively related to researcher’s 
level of prior knowledge. Greater understanding permits better use of concepts 
and theories in data collection. The foreknowledge endows him with receptivity 
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to signals, a propensity to perceive parts of reality, analyse and interpret others’ 
experience (Gummesson E., 1995: 56). The more he engages with fieldwork, the 
greater repository of tacit knowledge he accumulates through data obtained from 
his human instrument. This is a hermeneutic circle as “an iterative process 
whereby each stage of our research provides us with knowledge. … [W]e take a 
different level of pre-understanding to each stage of the research” (Gummesson 
E., 1995: 61; Denzin N. K., 1989: 22). A research conclusion necessarily rests on 
the researcher’s experiential and practical knowledge of the subject of inquiry. 
This experiential knowledge becomes an empirical foundation where the 
presentational construction is based. The tacit knowledge is a base a human 
instrument builds many of the insights and hypotheses that eventually develop, 
and are to be cast in propositional form (Lincoln Y. S. and Guba E. G., 1985: 
198). This is possible only when the researcher and the subject are fully present 
to each other in a relationship of reciprocal and open inquiry when each is open 
to construe how the other manifests (Heron J., 1981: 31).The tacit knowledge 
must then be converted to the explicit knowledge in order to be reported 
propositionally (Lincoln Y. S. and Guba E. G., 1985: 198). 
 2 – Thick description 
 The phenomenon, once captured, is illuminated in a thickly contextualised 
manner. The thickly descriptive method employs the human instruments to 
secure meaning embedded in an expression of experience to reveal its features. 
Here we describe meaning of the thick description and methodology apposite to 
an inquiry of tacit knowledge (Denzin N. K., 1989: 30).   
The thick description is a method to infer a relationship between an action 
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and a socially established structure of meaning as a way people do things (Geertz 
C., 1973: 12). It approaches an interpretation “from the direction of exceedingly 
extended acquaintances with extremely small matters” (Geertz C., 1973: 21). The 
thick description describes the world as “a web of references”–or “web of 
signification”–through: 
“… a reference game of something referring to something 
else that relationships are constructed, pictures emerge 
from backgrounds, and small matters speak to grand 
realities, … [by [a]] establishing linkages and connections 
within situations and between situations [and [b]] creating 
a perspective by locating action in space and time [i.e., 
context] … [c] bringing observed phenomenon to life … 
through sequencing and punctuating events. … Generating 
the thick description is to weave the web of signification as 
a process of creating interpretive structures” (Patriotta G., 
2004: 58). 
The thickly descriptive method establishes significance of an experience 
and sequence of events” (Denzin N. K., 1989: 83-4). It provides context of an act 
by stating intention and meaning, which organise that action, tracing its evolution 
and development, and presents the action as text(Denzin N. K., 1989: 32). It 
attempts to rescue and secure meanings, actions, and feelings that are present in 
an interactional experience by capturing and determining the meaning of “the 
actual flow of experience of individuals and collectivities in a social situation” 
(Geertz C., 1973: 20; Denzin N. K., 1989: 101-2). Moreover, it uncovers the 
meaning that informs and structures such experiences by capturing “the 
interpretations persons bring to the events” (Denzin N. K., 1989: 52, 116, 118). 
The thick description aims at uncovering “conceptual structures  that inform the 
subject’s acts” or “theories often told in form of stories, that structure the 
experiences of the persons,” by allowing the reader to “experience vicariously 
the essential features of the experiences” being described and interpreted (Geertz 
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C., 1973: 18; Denzin N. K., 1989: 101-2). 
Thick description produces truth-like statements of actions. It provides a 
rich holistic picture of broader phenomena in which small fact is inscribed by 
presenting detail, context, and the webs of social relationships that join persons 
to one another (Patriotta G., 2004: 77). This verisimilitude rests on the 
researcher’s ability to clarify what goes on within the community of study, 
producing for readers the feeling that they have experienced, or could 
experience, described events that could be confirmed and substantiated (Patriotta 
G., 2004: 76; Denzin N. K., 1989: 100, 140). The thickly contextualised 
description encourages embodiment of tacit knowledge to the readers: it helps 
them “adopt a broader, more systemic frame of reference” (Folger R. and Turillo 
C. J., 1999: 746). It encourages a “heuristic embodiment” on both the researcher 
and reader, providing an access to the tacit knowledge and experience. It is a 
“depth examination of an instance”–e.g., issues and events–that presents “a 
holistic and lifelike description … that the readers normally encounter in their 
experiencing of the world, rather than being mere symbolic abstractions of such” 
(Lincoln Y. S. and Guba E. G., 1985: 359-60). The tacit knowledge once 
assessed encourages vicarious participation–the vicarious experience–into the 
scenario in question, recalling actual events or imagining variations on them 
(Folger R. and Turillo C. J., 1999: 747).  
Revealing the tacit knowledge involves capturing the meanings and 
experiences of interacting individuals at problematic situations. It works to the 
conditions that move them to take or experience actions, and their conclusion 
(Denzin N. K., 1989: 20-1). Cognitive dimension of tacit knowledge is made 
explicit at these problematic situations. Focusing on particular slices of 
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problematic experience contributes to an understanding of how people frame and 
solve problems within context (Barzelay M., 1993: 310-1). There are several 
ways to generate a thick description, though the good one need not incorporate 
all the following aspects. It may “focus on the slice of interaction, experience or 
action and records its occurrence in thick detail,” describing in detail a person in 
a situation or phenomenon or interactions among individuals. These slice contain 
“dialogue and interaction, taking the reader into the situation and tell how the 
subject reacts to the situation, connecting a turning point experience to its 
moments of occurrence.” Alternatively, the thick description may focus on the 
reconstructed account of individual’s prior experience, or relationship among 
them. It connects them to the situation by presenting it “in terms of the point of 
view of the persons being studied … [by allowing] entry into the situation of 
experience” by re-creating the “sights, sounds, and feelings of persons and 
places.” It records interpretations that occur within the experience as it is lived, 
by having the subject reflecting on “their experience as it occurs” (Denzin N. K., 
1989: 95-8). 
 The thick description mobilises multiple triangulated methods at the 
problematic situation that reveals a turning point experience uncovering what has 
been taken for granted. The fundamental is researcher’s thorough understanding 
of the phenomenon. His knowledge is developed directly from experiential 
understanding or indirectly from experience of others. it is critical that the 
researcher gains prior understanding of the phenomenon by researching into an 
existing body of literature. This precedes an ability to identify the problematic 
situation. The research applied the critical incident technique as a classification 
method to facilitate an investigation of significant occurrences. Then, the in-
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depth technique employed qualitative in-depth interview and observation to 
capture expression of experience from narratives and field-notes (Denzin N. K., 
1989: 62; Prasad P., 1993: 1404).  
Secondary research  
An interpretation requires the researcher to do “everything within his 
power to make himself informed. … by making [his] mind the repository of the 
(potential) responses a given text might call out” (Fish S. E., 1980: 48-9). Prior 
understanding include background information and knowledge on subjects, 
concepts, hypotheses, propositions contained in research literature, and 
previously acquired information about the subjects and their experience. 
“[B]ecause prior understanding shapes what is seen, heard, written about, and 
interpreted.” It is a part interpretation. It affects how one judges the phenomenon 
at the outset of an investigation (Denzin N. K., 1989: 63-5).  
The preliminary research refers to a secondary research that involves 
critical analysis and interpretation of prior studies (Denzin N. K., 1989: 7). The 
researcher performs critical reviews of prior literature how it has been presented, 
studied and analysed (Heidegger M., 1962: 23). The aim is to lay bare prior 
conceptions of the phenomenon in question, how it has been defined, observed 
and analysed. It then critically reviews prior definitions, observations and 
analysis to reveal preconception surrounding existing understanding (Denzin N. 
K., 1989: 51).  
Focus on narratives  
A study of narratives is pertinent to the study of tacit knowledge. 
Narratives are sense-making device of the narrator. Experience is articulated 
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through the narratives. They “allow actors to articulate knowledge through 
discourse, and … [allow] access to tacit stocks of knowledge that have been 
externalised in a text-like form” (Patriotta G., 2004: 72; Patriotta G., 2003: 353). 
They point to the meanings that people have taken for granted.  
A “narrative” is a story that tells a sequence of events significant to a 
narrator and his or her audiences. The story has a plot—the sequentiality—that 
comprises a beginning, a middle and an end, with its own logic that makes sense 
to the narrator (Wilkins A. L. and Thompson M. P., 1991: 20). It relates events in 
a temporal, and causal sequence (Denzin N. K., 1989: 37-8). The narratives also 
relate a self of the teller to a significant set of personal experience. They also 
create and interpret a structure of experience of the problematic occurrences as 
the narrator frames his experience in the narratives (Denzin N. K., 1989: 37-8). 
Actions are expressed as stories without which we cannot make sense of the 
social experience (Wilkins A. L. and Thompson M. P., 1991: 20). 
Stories or narratives are contextually embedded; it is through the 
storytelling of a performance event that their meaning unfolds. They act as 
“repositories of accumulated wisdom.” The storytelling preserves knowledge 
(Brown J. S. and Duguid P., 1991: 45-6). Our personal experience–the personal 
knowledge–merges with what we hear and see as we listen to stories. This is “an 
embedded and fragmented process” in which we use our imaginations to “fill in 
the blanks and gaps between the lines with our own experience” (Boje M., 
1991a: 107, 110). They have power in fostering belief, recall and commitments. 
Stories full of vivid details and organisational significance “allow us to 
experience events vicariously and therefore to believe and remember what we 
hear” (Wilkins A. L. and Thompson M. P., 1991: 20). Stories can be justifiably 
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interpreted in as much as the researcher understands it in situ (Boje M., 1991a: 
190-10). They are material traces of learning and collective remembering 
process, social imprints of a meaningful course of events, documents, and 
records of human action (Patriotta G., 2003: 354). Stories also refer to an 
“exchange between two or more persons during which a past or anticipated 
experience was being referenced, recounted, interpreted or challenged. The 
meaning of the story is in the unique circumstances of each particular 
performance” (Boje M., 1991b: 8).  
People “process information and manage collective memory of the 
organisation through storytelling” (Boje M., 1991b: 9). The narratives grant 
researcher an insight into how organisational actors represent and make sense of 
the problematic situations, by piecing together of evidence and clues of a 
reconstruction of experience. “A principle way we get a sense of what occurs and 
how things “really work” in organisations is through the stories we hear from 
others” (Wilkins A. L. and Thompson M. P., 1991: 20). Stories pass on central 
ideas of an organisation and common practices by giving concrete examples of 
ideas or by illustration of way things are done (Wilkins A. L. and Thompson M. 
P., 1991: 21). Organisation members become more aware of “the constructed 
nature of the narratives that guide their actions” as the narration helps them 
become more reflexive and multiple in perspectives (Wilkins A. L. and 
Thompson M. P., 1991: 22).  
Creating and exchanging stories helps diagnosing state of trouble, keeping 
track of sequences of behaviour and theories, and working towards coherent 
understanding of the situation by imposing coherence on random sequence of 
events (Brown J. S. and Duguid P., 1991: 45). They “reflect the complex social 
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web within which work takes place and the relationship of the narrative, narrator, 
and audience to the specific events of practice” (Brown J. S. and Duguid P., 
1991: 44-5). Insight accumulated from the shared narratives is socially 
constructed and distributed (Brown J. S. and Duguid P., 1991: 46). In making 
decision, people face a process of confirming new data and new interpretations 
as part of an unfolding story line. The old stories are recounted and compared to 
unfolding story lines to prevent repeating past mistakes and increase the 
likelihood of success (Boje M., 1991a: 106). 
 People tell stories to “make sense of an equivocal situation.” “Although … 
each [individual] retains a part of the story line, a bit of interpretation, story 
performance practices, and some facts that confirm a line of reasoning, its and 
pieces of organisation experience are recounted socially to formulate 
recognisable, cogent, defensible, and seemingly rational collective accounts that 
will serve as precedent for individual assumption, decision, and action” (Boje 
M., 1991a: 106). In other words, “[s]tories are created, old stories are 
remembered, some are revised, and stories about the future are performed in the 
collective dialogue among organisational stakeholders” (Boje M., 1991b: 9). 
“They function … as a usefully unconstrained means to interpret  each new 
situation in the light of accumulated wisdom and constantly changing 
circumstances” (Brown J. S. and Duguid P., 1991: 44-5). 
The above explains meaning of narratives as stories. They form a mean by 
which meaning of experience is expressed. At problematic situations, tacit 
knowledge is articulated. This opportunity provides researcher with the 
opportunity to use qualitative interview and observation techniques to collect the 
narratives, which normally remain tacit at routine circumstances. 
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The critical incident technique  
The CIT is a classification method that helps a researcher focus on themes 
and issues identified by respondents. It is suitable for generating knowledge and 
understanding based on thorough understanding of respondents’ description of 
real-world phenomenon. The CIT focuses on events, incidents, and process of 
the problematic situation the way they are managed, and their perceived 
outcomes (Chell E., 1998, 2004: 45). A critical incident interview provides the 
researcher with retrospective account of experience. By being critical means that 
the respondents have good recall and the focus to probe, making the interview 
rich in context (Chell E., 1998, 2004: 45). 
An incident is defined as observable human activity complete enough in 
itself to permit inferences and predictions to be made about a performer. The CIs 
refer to events and behaviours that have been described or observed to lead to 
success or failure in accomplishing a specific task–ones that contribute or 
detracts from a general aim of an activity, a smooth functioning of everyday 
practice, in a significant way (Bitner et al., 1990: 73). They interrupt ongoing 
routine sense-making activity, where cognitive dimensions of organisational 
knowledge is articulated (Patriotta G., 2004: 68). Certain features of the 
experience become figural or standout in the life-world whilst the other recede 
into background (Thompson C. J., Locander W. B. and Pollio H. R., 1989: 136). 
The CIs are remembered problematic situations that have been reconstructed and 
interpreted that are not limited to an individual but extend to a group and 
interactional phenomenon. They are given multiple meanings by different 
persons, whose meaning may change over time (Denzin N. K., 1989: 40). 
Moreover, the CIT could yield accurate and consistent interpretations of the 
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respondents by allowing focus on specific issues and situations, narrowing down 
the incidents to what the respondent considers as important (Bitner et al., 1990: 
73). Covering incidents in considerable detail enhances the completeness of data. 
It allows the respondents to reveal details of their experience from their own 
value, rather than the researchers’ (Chell E. and Pittaway L., 1998: 26). 
Focusing on the CIs helps the researcher to identify tacit knowledge. Tacit 
knowledge, deeply internalised or institutionalised, is mobilised in an almost 
automatic and irreflexive way. Non-routine activities, “breakdown or 
disruptions” refer to discontinuities in action that provides a possibility to 
“disentangle knowledge from consolidated work practices and routines.” Tacit 
know-how is clearly expressed as “present-at-hand” as it is applied in a 
deliberate way. The ongoing flow of action and sense-making is articulated as 
narratives, moves, and decisions. It points to specific learning or knowledge 
requirements and reveals stocks of knowledge not embodied in organisational 
artefacts. Analysis of the critical non-routine activity “opens up the possibility of 
deconstructing the meanings embodied in organisational artefacts, routines, and 
other knowledge-based activities” (Patriotta G., 2004: 65-7). People explicitly 
interact with the tacit background against which the knowledge is used. This 
process reveals knowledge references to the context visible to the researcher 
(Patriotta G., 2004: 68). The researcher looks for disruptive events conceived as 
turning points in an ongoing flow of activities in order to study how 
organisations create, use and disseminate knowledge (Patriotta G., 2004: 68).  
 The researcher starts by securing multiple cases and personal stories that 
embody phenomenon in question. This follows by locating the critical incidents 
of the subjects within a set of personal story the problematic experience to be 
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studied to discover content of the identified experience  (Denzin N. K., 1989: 
49). Interview questions ask the respondents to list and describe phase of work, 
which, from their recent experience, is a challenge in accomplishing tasks. It is 
vital to probe with follow-up questions to ensure that the respondents have given 
both comprehensive and detailed account (Edvardsson B., 1992: 18-21). The 
interviewer may ask: “Can you think of anything (else) …?”, “How did it 
happen?”, “How did you feel and why?”, or “And then?” (Snell R., 1992: 13).   
Ensuring sufficient depth of a critical indent poses some challenges. 
Reconstruction of past events may not fully reflect the experience, as the 
respondents’ thoughts, feelings, and perception could have been modified or 
reinterpreted in light of certain future event (Cope J. and Watts G., 2000: 116; 
Johnston R., 1995: 59). To assure a fair and thorough consideration requires 
triangulation of data to extend generalisability of finding. By checking 
documentary sources, or interviewing other respondents, the researcher is in a 
better position to identify commonalities of themes and visibility of recurring 
patterns (Bitner et al., 1990: 73; Chell E., 1998, 2004: 45). Since the researcher 
typically obtains a lot of complex and dramatic CIs, it is important that the 
interviewer becomes fully conversant with the interviewee to avoid risks of 
trivialising their diverse experiences (Edvardsson B., 1992: 18-21; Cope J. and 
Watts G., 2000: 112).  
The critical incident interview helps the researcher focus on problematic 
phase of the phenomenon. The critical incident refers to non-routine events and 
behaviours critical to success or failure of work task, which disrupt a routine 
ongoing activity. Tacit knowledge is articulated as people make-sense of the 
situation and apply what has been taken for granted in a deliberate way as 
 75 
narratives, moves and decisions. Once identified, the research applied in-depth 
data collection method to interpret meaning embedded in those expression. 
In-depth techniques 
An in-depth data collection aims at understanding meaning from 
individual’s lived experience at a critical incident. This phase applies qualitative 
interviews and observation techniques. The importance of narratives cannot be 
over-emphasised as  a mean to convey the meaning embedded in experience. A 
researcher asks for respondents’ stories of their experience and records the 
narratives in work process. His field note also records details of the phenomenon 
and reflections on methods and findings.  
Qualitative interviews 
Generating a thick description from interviewing involves collecting a 
larger number of testimonies that provides variety of detail of a phenomenon 
(Yow V. R., 1994: 7). Multiple in-depth personal stories of an incident from 
different individuals are collected (Denzin N. K., 1989: 39). They permit a 
researcher to compare and contrast the stories of different subjects at different 
phase of experience of a phenomenon in order to identify convergence (Denzin 
N. K., 1989: 54-5). It is a parallel inquiry that helps clarify observations (Prasad 
P., 1993: 1407-8).  
 An interview gives a researcher the best access to participants’ 
interpretation on past and current actions and events. “[It] is a powerful tool for 
attaining an in-depth meaning of another person’s experience” (Yow V. R., 
1994: 10). He can “learn about a way of life by studying the people who live it 
and asking them how they think about their experience” (Yow V. R., 1994: 7). 
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Moreover, the interview allows questioning of witnesses to take advantage of 
interaction in verbal evidence. The researcher is not left alone with documentary 
evidence to reflect and interpret a source of facts and contents because the 
interview reveals several facts behind ordinary lives of individuals and 
community. It renders more understandable, for example, underlying reasons for 
a decision, meaning of documents or artefacts, images and symbols people use to 
make sense of experience. It reveals various dimensions of life within a 
community or psychological reality–daily life at work, habitual thinking, 
informal rules on personal relationships at work (Yow V. R., 1994: 10). Further, 
factually untrue statements obtained from the interview may be psychologically 
true, which reveals imagination, symbolism or desire underlying such divergence 
(Yow V. R., 1994: 22-3). 
Interviewing refers to a method of having “the first-person description of 
some specified domain of experience” by inspiring narrators to engage in acts of 
remembering, jogging memory and records, and presenting their world 
(Thompson C. J., Locander W. B. and Pollio H. R., 1989: 138; Yow V. R., 1994: 
2). Doing so requires a course of dialogue to be largely set by the respondents, 
with an exception of opening question, in which their own terms lead to follow-
up questions. The interview format begins with “short descriptive questions … 
[that opens] for the respondents’ lengthier and detailed description” (Thompson 
C. J. et al., 1989: 139). “The dialogue tends to be circular rather than linear; the 
descriptive questions employed by the interviewer flow from the course of the 
dialogue, not from a pre-determined path.” The interviewer is a “non-directive 
listener,” who provides a context that the respondents freely describe their 
experience in detail (Thompson C. J., Locander W. B. and Pollio H. R., 1989: 
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138). In order to see the world from their experience, the relationship between 
the interviewer and the interviewee must be an equal one; i.e., of “subject to 
subject,” not “subject to object” (Yow V. R., 1994: 2).  
Encouraging the interviewee to tell stories is an appropriate way to study 
tacit skills because people frame their experience in the narratives (Wilkins A. L. 
and Thompson M. P., 1991: 20). Some tacit skills may be uncovered as the 
respondents express what is done in an organisation (Ambrosini and Bowman, 
2001: 820). Focusing on specific events enables them to “bring about 
descriptions of experience,” by providing a full detailed description of the lived 
experience (Thompson C. J., Locander W. B. and Pollio H. R., 1989: 138). This 
allows the researcher to gain an “experientially based understanding” pertaining 
to particular incidents (Thompson C. J., Locander W. B. and Pollio H. R., 1989: 
138-9). The researcher discover the interviewees’ tacit knowledge and skill by 
focusing on narrated accounts of their action in terms of what they do, how they 
do it and in what context. Asking for the action stories involves asking: “Can you 
describe a time when …?” Further probing for further involves asking: “How 
does that happen?”, “what causes that?”, “Who is involved?”, “What influences 
that?” Questions such as “What did you think?” or “What did you know?” helps 
identifying past integrations or partial solutions – beliefs, imagination and an 
articulate form of knowledge – as subsidiary cues the respondents’ dwell in as 
they engage in actions. Asking “What was X like?” or “How did you feel when 
…?” allow the respondents to describe what they understand based on their own 
experience, and allow the research to identify intuition and hunches. Questions 
related to the respondents’ use of formal guidance in their tasks, such as 
instruction manuals, allows the researcher to identify the extent formal rules of 
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action is mobilised. 
The researcher then encourages them to think of examples of how they 
have performed in those experience stories, telling stories about their key 
experiential units. Questions include: “Could you tell us an example about …?”, 
and “Could you narrate a story about the occurrence of …?” (Ambrosini and 
Bowman, 2001: 822-3). The stories should be explained as their actions or active 
involvement (Ambrosini and Bowman, 2001: 822). Relying on their own terms 
also prevents the researcher from conceptual predilections (Thompson C. J., 
Locander W. B. and Pollio H. R., 1989: 138). The interviewer follows-up by 
asking the respondents for their actual account of experience and meanings that 
give substance to glossed statements–a superficial, partial, and sparse account of 
complex meaningful events. Follow-up questions include: “What is outside the 
frame of the story?”, “What is highlighted in the story?” and “What aspects are 
ignored or downplayed during the time frame of the story?” (Wilkins A. L. and 
Thompson M. P., 1991: 22).  
The qualitative interviews asks the respondents to tell stories of their own 
experience. The first-person experience facing the problematic situation uncover 
knowledge that normally remains tacit. The researcher gains further details by 
asking for examples of how the interviewees performed in the experience by 
describing their action.  
Observation 
Capturing tacit knowledge involves taking field notes of an observed 
phenomenon and researcher’s personal reflection. Geertz suggests the researcher 
make sense of “the initially enigmatical actions they observe when studying 
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foreign cultures in making sense of the observations” (Geertz C., 1973: 5). He 
should structure his observation by using conceptual resources from theories, 
specific concepts and secondary research (Barzelay M., 1993: 312).  
To observe is to constantly search for “points of references, signposts, and 
regularities” that allow an observer to make sense of surroundings (Patriotta G., 
2004: 58). The observed sequences are occasions for telling of stories. The 
interactional episodes illuminate unique features of the subject’s life and reveals 
commonalities shared with others (Denzin N. K., 1989: 21). To take the subject’s 
perspective on issues requires careful recording through field notes of the 
situation for recurring structural, interactional, and meaning patterns (Denzin N. 
K., 1989: 40-2). Since tacit skills are picked up by “osmosis”: they develop 
overtime, and are acquired through experience, the observation allows one to 
learn about context (Spender J. C., 1996: 68). For one of the most effective way 
to learn tacit skills is through personal contact and discussion, the researcher 
seeks to become “a knowledgeable member” of the group, by being “a regular in 
the situations where group members of the group routinely interact” (Pavitt K., 
1991: 46; Ambrosini and Bowman, 2001: 824; Denzin N. K., 1989: 80).  
Recording experiences from observation involves field-note taking. A 
researcher records detailed portrait of the situations (Burgess R. G., (2000: 166-
74). The notes consist of personal reflection on the methods in dealing with 
problems, impressions, feelings, and hunches. They may reflect on process and 
procedures of the fieldwork, the way in which methods can be adopted, adapted 
and developed in particular settings. They may also cover preliminary analysis 
that provides framework for subsequent inquiries (Burgess R. G., 2000: 166-74). 
The researcher takes mental and briefly-jotted notes whenever it is impossible to 
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take full field-notes (Bryman A. and Bell E., 2003: 331-3).  
Analysing  
Collected data is processed into codes and categories to produce 
meaningful interpretations of sequence of actions as an analytical process. The 
researcher interprets by doing “everything within his power to make himself 
informed … by making [his] mind the repository of the (potential) responses a 
given text might call out” (Fish S. E., 1980: 48-9). By analysing, he understands 
how individuals articulate tacit knowledge by “weaving webs of signification” 
(Geertz C., 1973; Patriotta G., 2004: 78). 
The analysis dissects units of experience into relevant and meaningful 
order of statements, sequences and actions (Denzin N. K., 1989: 120). To 
understand subjects’ experience from their point of view, the researcher unfolds 
meanings embedded in their experience both from narratives and field-notes. 
Collecting multiple stories allows the researcher to compare and contrast these 
stories from different phases of experience to identify convergence (Denzin N. 
K., 1989: 54-5). The researcher dissects the phenomenon to uncover, define and 
analyse essential structures, recurring forms of conduct, experience, and meaning 
(Denzin N. K., 1989: 55). Text is displayed and subdivided into key action units 
to reveal recurring features of key terms and phrases (Denzin N. K., 1989: 44-6). 
In this research, the units of experience and actions are dissected in order to 
identify subsidiary clues, and modes – or types – of integration, and to be coded 
and categorised in steps that follow.  
To read the “meaning of words and signs within narrative and interactional 
texts,” the researcher directs attention to the key terms in narratives. “[T]hese 
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terms (signs) are organised by a code, or a system of larger meanings (Denzin N. 
K., 1989: 57: Tsouskas H., 1991: 571, 581)4 The process is operationalised by 
coding, categorising and classifying. Coding is a process of reading through sets 
of transcripts, field-notes, or documents, reviewing codes, considering more 
general theoretical ideas in relation to codes and data. As a unitising process, 
“raw data are systemically transformed and aggregated into units which permit 
precise description of relevant content characteristics … [that] involves defining 
units, separating them along their boundaries, and identifying them for 
subsequent analysis” (Lincoln Y. S. and Guba E. G., 1985: 203).5 Here, the 
coding identifies subjects’ key action units performing under each discrete event: 
they “are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to … information 
compiled during a study” (Miles M. B. and Huberman A. M., 1994: 56; Lofland 
and Lofland, 1995: 187). By providing a link between the data collection and 
conceptual rendering, the coding becomes fundamental means of developing 
analysis (Charmaz K., 1983: 111-2; Lofland and Lofland, 1995: 186).  
In categorising or classifying, the unitised codes are organised into 
categories that provide “descriptive or inferential information about context or 
setting.” It involves “sorting units into provisional categories on the basis of 
“look-alike” characteristics, which may … initially be only tacitly understood” 
(Lincoln Y. S. and Guba E. G., 1985: 203). To categorise is a process of 
repeated, careful readings and sorting of the incidents into groups and categories 
according to similarities in the reported experiences that precede articulating or 
identifying exact nature of similarity. The data is sorted, combined and resorted 
following these categories (Bitner et al., 1990: 74). On the one hand, the 
incidents are classified based on impacts, people involved and what respondents 
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perceive to be critical. On the other, the action units are organised into different 
skill categories. 
However, coding data into discrete units could result in a loss of context 
and narrative flow (Bryman A. and Bell E., 2003: 434). Keeping coding and data 
in perspective is achieved by constant comparison, a process of maintaining a 
close connection between data and conceptualisation, a correspondence between 
concepts, categories and their indicators, or between phenomena being coded and 
categorised (Charmaz K., 2000: 515; Bryman A. and Bell E., 2003: 435-7). To 
actively coding and categorising, or classifying, preserve images of experience, 
since both processes sharpen the researcher’s ability to ask questions about the 
data (Charmaz K., 2000: 525-6). The classification involves viewing each 
interview transcript as a whole and relates separate passages of the transcript to 
its overall content. These are then related to each other and “patterns of 
commonalities” are identified. This process improves interpretive vision as the 
researcher seeks to describe common patterns in experiences, by “continuously 
referring back to individual transcripts to ensure that the patterns of 
commonalities are not rendered in abstract terms removed from respondent 
experience” (Thompson C. J et al., 1989: 142). Further, memoing is an aid to the 
generation of concepts and categories that helps keeping the code active. It 
consists of notes the researcher write to himself on elements as coding or 
concepts as reminders about what the terms mean as points of reflections. It 
helps the researcher crystallising ideas, and not losing track of thoughts (Bryman 
A. and Bell E., 2003: 432).  
An analysis begins with having subject’s experience broken down into 
action sequences, and with having events under which these action perform 
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identified. Meaning of experience emerges as the actions units are classified into 
different skill sets, and the critical incident is identified based on common 
characteristics and respondents’ perception.  
Reliability & validity 
Specific nature of this research contributes a rich insight to the case, though 
challenges are present in generalising its findings across different research 
context (Walsham G., 1995: 79).  
As a methodological choice, this research employs a “sophisticated rigour,” 
which refers to any research “employing multiple methods, seeking out diverse 
empirical situations and developing interpretations … in the worlds of lived 
experience” (Denzin N. K., 1978: 167). Yet, reconstruction of past events may 
not fully reflect the experience, thoughts and feelings at present time, as the 
respondents’ perception could have been modified or reinterpreted in light of 
some future event (Cope J. and Watts G., 2000: 116; Johnston R., 1995: 59). 
Covering critical incidents in considerable detail by triangulating data sources 
and multiple research methods supports the validity of findings.6 It provides an 
opportunity for confirming that researcher’s interpretation and understanding of 
the subject’s experience is consistent with that of the subject and others who 
share similar experience. The research employs interview, observation and 
secondary research to obtain meaning of multiple subjects’ lived experience of 
the critical incidents. He makes his interpretation “seeable by others” (Thompson 
C. J., et al., 1989: 140). It helps identifying commonality in themes, and 
enhancing generalisability and repetition in patterns among experiences. The 
multiple sources of data, both primary and secondary, also confirm the 
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researcher’s correct understanding of the phenomenon under investigation by 
allowing the cross-checking and making himself an informed reader. Further, 
weaving the “web of signification” as an interpretive process generates several 
references into any form of activity. It successfully addresses to the problem of 
rhetorical representation by the verisimilitude of thick description, ensuring that 
any description produced are sound, adequate, and able to be confirmed and 
sustained (Patriotta G., 2004: 76; Denzin N. K., 1989: 83). 
As a result, the interpretive method affords its own justification (Thompson 
C. J. et al., 1989: 143). Verification as an internal process that capitalises on the 
tacit knowledge, insight and intuition of the researcher is based on his seeing 
“things-in-the-world.” His understanding of the case allows them to see 
meaningful pattern in the subjects’ experience. Interpretation based on 
researcher’s understanding is based in-the-world, as its correctness is verified by 
the experienced insight. 
Research Site 
The fieldwork was conducted at two papermills: Curtis Fine Papers, and 
Tullis Russell Papermakers, during 4-10.2007 and 3-5.2009. Different teams of 
production workers were interviewed.  At each mill, the production workers 
work with specific machinery, team and shift, for which they have experience 
working together for an extended amount of time, ranging from 1-16 years, 
according to interviewees. The key workers of each team are the machineman, 
beaterman, drierman, and machine assistant. The beaterman and machineman are 
among the most experienced in each team for they perform the most 
comprehensive roles covering respectively stock preparation and papermachine 
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areas.  Their roles involves working at the computer control interface, which is 
usually the starting point of their interaction with the actual production process. 
In some cases, the researcher interviewed production managers about their 
responsibility for production at the mill level, and software engineers who look 
after the control system. The early phase of the fieldwork involves with 
interviewing production workers of various teams/shifts, across different paper 
machines, whilst the later phase involves spending extended period of time with 
single production team/shift at the same machine. 
As a piece of interpretive research, this study applies in-depth interview 
and observation techniques to take the subject’s perspective of phenomenon in 
question, by the researcher developing his tacit knowledge of meaning embedded 
in text or slices of human action. The inquiry focuses on critical incidents at 
breakdowns of the work routines. At the critical incidents, the researcher could 
study the tacit knowledge, as reflected by the subjects. Early in the fieldwork, the 
interview questions asked the respondents for overview of the papermaking 
process, their roles and involvement. In the later stage, the researcher asked 
probing questions based on the incident: how respondents perform the task, 
whom they interact with, what the process involves, the way they work with 
control system and, any challenging issues. Greater emphasis has been placed 
alongside the in-depth interview, however.  The granted level of access based on 
the health & safety regulation allowed live observation to be conducted entirely 
alongside the interview taken place in the control room. 
                                       
1
 See, for example, Sandberg J. (2000: 9-25); Dreyfus H. L. & Dreyfus S. E.  
(1986); Schön D. A. (1983); Benner P. E. (1984); Atkinson P. (1988: 441-65); 
Barley S. R. (1996: 404-41); Brown J. S.  & Duguid P. (1991: 40-57); Garfinkel 
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H. (1986); Kusterer K. C. (1978); Livingston E. (1987); and Tyre M. J. & Von 
Hippel E. (1997: 71-83). 
2
 Although a quantitative method may also be used, the qualitative method is 
more suitable. 
3
 Denzin N. K. (1989: 30-1) 
4
 In addition, the narrative texts may include terms that signify differently from 
their surface meanings, such as metaphor, metonymy, similes, or analogy, which, 
in some cases, are better able at expressing the continuous flow of experience 
than literal terms. 
5
 Moreover, the data may be coded in more than one way. See Bryman A. and 
Bell E. (2003: 435-7) for further detail. 
6
 More generally, the triangulation refers to a use of more than one method of 
inquiry or source of data, multiple observers or theoretical perspectives. See 
Bryman A. and Bell E. (2003: 291) and Denzin, N. K. (1970: 310) 
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 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the methodological choice for the current study 
of tacit knowledge. The first section highlights the importance of researcher’s 
own understanding into the subject’s experience, by the use of his own human 
instrument. In the thick description, the verisimilitude of the critical incidents 
helps the researcher describe what and how the tacit knowledge embedded in the 
context is articulated and exercised. Treating data as experiential units helps 
discovering what the tacit knowledge of the person in performing tasks. The last 
section addresses the issues of validity. The verisimilitude of the thick 
description, the multiple techniques, sources of data, and respondents confirms 
the validity of research. 
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Chapter 4: Impact of computer technology in paper production process 
Introduction 
The use of computer in the paper production process as a continuous 
process industry involves the automation, or substitution, of tasks performed by 
men. This chapter examines what impact on knowledge and skills the 
computerised production process entails. This chapter is divided into four 
sections. The first explores nature of work in the paper production process. The 
second section considers computer impact on work process and skills in general 
and paper production contexts. The third section describes development of 
computerised control and monitoring systems and nature of work from their first 
application in the 1960s. Modern control systems automates control and 
monitoring tasks in paper making and serve as decision-support tools to the 
operators in dealing with process-related problems. The fourth section identifies 
knowledge and skills required in working with the computer-mediated work 
process.  
The term ‘computer technology’ (CT) shall be used to denote the 
microprocessor-based technology that performs information processing. The 
term ‘system’ also refers to similar meaning. ‘Computerisation’ refers to the use 
of computer in the work process. Its major application is to automate, or 
substitute for, tasks normally performed by men (both physical and mental 
knowledge; however, they share the same tacit root and structure). Possibilities 
include process control and monitoring tasks in the continuous manufacturing or, 
for example, handling of data transaction in white-collar service contexts. 
Further, related terms as skill and knowledge are often used interchangeably. 
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This is because, according to the basis of tacit knowledge considered in the 
earlier chapter, they share similar meaning. They are based on the notion of tacit 
knowledge.  
1 – Work in the paper production process 
Modern paper production seeks to improve economic performance of 
increasing productivity and lowering unit production costs. The gain is achieved 
mainly through process innovations. These are technological change that centres 
on use of computerised process control and monitoring systems, and 
reorganisation of labour practices to foster teamwork, individual employee 
involvement and flexibility. Technological innovation in process machinery have 
focused on raising output through higher speeds, in addition to creating wider 
machinery through major investment into new machinery or rebuilding, 
modernising, existing machines. Maximising operating capacity and increasing 
paper machine output are achieved by increasing machine speed to reduce 
production costs per unit (Vallas S. P., 2001: 13; Holmes J., 1997: 21-2).1 
Moreover, demand for most kinds of mill labour is quite inelastic: i.e., demand 
for labour does not vary as much as changing demand for products. The process 
is a continuous process and adjustments to fluctuating product demand are met 
by varying machine speed, rather than reducing the number of workers in the 
mill (Holmes J., 1997: 20). 
Paper and board machines are large continuous-process machines and 
paper chemistry is very complex. The machine operator must be flexible in 
problem-solving behaviour, using all sorts of knowledge. Their diagnostic 
performance increases with experience (Leppänen A., 2001: 579). Paper 
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manufacturer requires a highly skilled, experienced, full-time labour force that 
can operate advanced machinery continuously (Holmes J., 1997: 21). A modern 
papermaking machine is enormous, and most mills have at most two or three 
machines (Holmes J., 1997: 13-4).2 It is also vital to avoid machine breakdowns. 
Like other capital-intensive industries, the paper industry contains two 
main sorts of manual jobs: production workers (operators) and maintenance 
workers. The maintenance workers are responsible for the upkeep of the plant 
and equipment, electricians, pipe fitters, millwrights, welders, carpenters and so 
forth, in order to maintain the machine and the process-monitoring system 
(Smith M. R., 1999: 694).3 Machine maintenance skills are acquired through 
lengthy training, through apprenticeships in skilled trades such as electrician, 
pipefitter, or millwright. The acquired skills enable the worker to maintain all 
kinds of machinery, and hence are portable and transferable. They can also be 
recruited into the paper industry from other sectors (Holmes J., 1997: 14). 
Production workers run paper machines, pulping, bleaching, and power 
control process; whose function, in other words, is required to keep the pulp 
flowing and sheet running. Production skills are embodied in several key 
occupations; the senior pulp operator (traditionally called the beater engineer or 
beaterman) in the pulp room, and, on the paper machine, the positions of 
machine tender and back tender. The senior pulp operator is responsible for the 
preparation of the pulp 'furnish' to be fed to the paper machines. The machine 
tender and back tender control the paper-making machine and now act on 
information supplied by the sophisticated computerised process-monitoring 
system to adjust the thickness, wetness, or tensility of the sheet within the 
various stages of the machine itself. Pulp operators and machine tenders do not 
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serve formal craft apprenticeships; their route into skilled work involves the 
gradual ascent of internal career ladders, and their skills are acquired from 
'experience'. Machine operators often work for long periods in lesser-skilled 
positions, working their way up the line of progression on the paper machine, 
watching actions of more skilled machinemen (progressively the winderman, the 
back tender, and the machine tender). Over time, they acquire the detailed 
knowledge and experience required to control the papermaking machine. These 
acquired skills are industry specific and sometimes, given the temperamental 
nature of paper machines, mill or even machine specific (Holmes J., 1997: 14). 
Even so, there is significant variation in education and experience, and in 
environment and organisation support for individual learning. Educational 
background typically ranges from no vocational training to around three years 
(Leppänen A., 2001: 581).  
There are different degrees of technological inclination, for example, 
between the US and the UK paper-makers. In the US, a greater scale of the 
industry, a relatively higher degree of production intensity and product 
standardisation, and a relatively more open attitude towards investment and 
innovation provide the manufacturers with greater incentive to stay current with 
the most up-to-date machinery (Magee G. B., 2009: 42). This explains the higher 
degree of formal training to the US workforce, and a relative eminence of craft 
practice in the UK paper-makers.  
The subject of paper production is broader than one crew. Paper-making 
involves not one single worker but a group of workers or a crew working on a 
paper machine. The crews must have an effective mean of information 
transmission and a joint understanding of paper-making concepts (Leppänen A., 
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2001: 579-80). Work requires that all workers of one paper machine observe the 
process both though the Visual Display Units (VDUs) of the automatic operation 
system and beside the paper machine itself, make hypotheses about state of the 
process and actions required, and communicate their observations, decisions or 
past actions to other group members. The paper-making is a rapid process; yet, 
delays are typical. It can take a number of hours for an impact of change made in 
one area to become visible in the subsequent process, as adjustment in mass 
concentration at the head box at wet end only becomes evident as changing 
parameters of paper quality at dry end.  
In such a complex process involving not only one person, but a group of 
people, co-operation and communication requires accurate, and mutually 
accepted understanding to be able to exchange information in the critical phrases 
of work process (e.g., during production disturbances). Accurate concepts and 
sufficient knowledge of the work process are also prerequisites for learning from 
the process events and for sharing experiences and knowledge in the work 
community to improve the work process further (Leppänen A., 2001: 581). 
Flexibility and interchangeability are essential in modern paper production. 
They require workers to be multi-skilled. Craft employees take on a broader 
range of tasks (e.g., one or another less demanding skill–standard welding, 
oiling–may be assigned to the more demanding crafts; such as, pipe fitter, and 
millwright). Multi-crafting involves elaborate programmes in which craft 
employees are trained in a range of skills (Smith M. R., 1999: 695). In the 
reorganisation of the maintenance work undertaken by the skilled trades, given 
the high maintenance costs associated with the capital-intensive nature of 
continuous production, bargaining has focused on reducing number of job 
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classifications, jurisdictional restrictions, and number of workers in maintenance. 
Programmes designed to encourage skilled tradesworkers to become multi-
crafted or multi-skilled further accentuate this trend (Holmes J., 1997: 21). The 
definition of production jobs has also been broadened by, for example, asking 
machine operators to do some of the paper testing, to absorb the work of the 
stock preparation person, or to help with non-routine maintenance and repair 
work (Holmes J., 1997: 21). Workers are required to perform mutual assistance, 
meaning the craft employees are required to assist each other in completing 
tasks. Operators are also required to perform minor maintenance in some mills. 
Pay and progression has been tied to skills acquisition, work rotation and 
teamwork (Smith M. R., 1999: 695).  
2 – Impact of computer as an automation technology on work and 
skills 
An automated technology changes a nature of work. It substitutes human’s 
tasks with automatic operations. These can be physical, mental or both 
(Parasuraman R. and Riley V., 1997: 230-54). A general idea is that as the 
relatively simpler tasks are automated, and as the newer technologies are 
increasingly capable of performing more sophisticated functions, a human is 
responsible for work content that lies beyond the technology’s capability. The 
work becomes more mental; his role involves monitoring an automated work 
process and intervening in a situation the technology cannot handle. In 
manufacturing, this often results in a machine operator performing as an 
intermittent machine feeder or loader, who monitors and controls process 
machinery and a whole manufacturing process. He becomes a proprietor of the 
system who makes decisions as he controls the process, rather than merely 
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executing tasks (Huys R. et al., 1999: 67).  
An early automated technology in manufacturing assumes a form of 
process mechanisation. In a chemical industry, for example, “practically all 
physical production and material-handling is done by the automated process 
regulated by automatic controls” (Nichols T. and Beynon H., 1977: xiii). This 
results in an elimination of traditional work skills (deskilling) and an emergence 
of new skills (reskilling) and new responsibilities. Yet, the evidence reveals 
different conclusion across different industries. The distinction is an extent of 
which the unique craft skills apply. In the craft industry, a high proportion of 
workers maintain their traditional skills; the work depends on “the special skills 
of journeymen workers … [whose] essential feature is a lack of standardisation 
of the product.” Constantly changing nature of the product “inhibits the 
standardization, or “rationalization” of the work process” (Blauner R., 1964: 35-
6).  
Early evidence of the automation suggests a separation of the theoretical 
and practical skills, where the former assume a more prominent  role and the 
latter becomes “debased.” The traditional activities are superseded by monitoring 
the automatic processes that involves making sense of observed dials and gauges 
of key parameters, such as temperature, pressure and flows, and logging these 
readings (Nichols T. and Beynon H., 1977: 24).They improvise an adjustment to 
the process by moving a lever or a knob, then observing and listening to 
responses (Nichols T. and Beynon H., 1977: 19). These new activities are the 
tacit skills that “cannot be taught.” It take years to “get to know” knowledge 
specific to plants and equipments (Nichols T. and Beynon H., 1977: 23). 
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The automation creates a physical as well as a psychic distance between 
the operators and the process, as they work from the control room. They work 
mainly with symbolic representations or “abstraction” and directly engage the 
machines only when they are down (Zuboff S., 1988: 58-96; Vallas S. P. and 
Beck J. P., 1996: 346-7).  
Operators’ distance from the actual process places even greater reliance on 
the human operators in order to realise full potential of the technology in 
ensuring stable operation and the best product quality (Fischer M. and Röben P., 
2002: 25-9; Burris B. H., 1998: 141-57; Vallas S. P., 2001: 17; Holmes J., 1997: 
11). The automation in continuous process industries also leads to the process 
that is stochastic and continuous in nature. The technology alters operators’ roles 
in industries such as paper, chemicals, autos, and machine tools production 
towards “system regulator” who steers machines as they operate autonomously 
and continuously (Huys R., et al., 1999: 67-9). The stochastic process consists of 
routine operations punctuated with periods of non-routine variances 
accompanying high attentiveness and activity (Gerwin D. and Kolodny H., 1992: 
188-9). Stochastic events cannot be predicted or planned for in advance (Gerwin 
D. and Kolodny H., 1992: 188-9). The stochastic incidents; e.g., break downs or 
product faults, are unpredictable and random, which cannot be handled, or 
automated, by the system. The stochastic and continuous process is “integrative 
by nature and demands corresponding levels of integration and co-ordination 
from the social and support systems” (Gerwin D. and Kolodny H., 1992: 187). 
Although the automation eases the workers’ physical burden, it takes high levels 
of attentiveness to deal with this high variability in workload consisting of long 
period of relative inactivity and occasional periods of extremely arduous activity 
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(Huys R. et al., 1999: 67-93; Blauner R., 1968).   
A computer is another form of the automation technology. The term 
“computer” refers to a microprocessor-based technology that performs 
information processing. It substitutes for human’s mental task in a sense-making 
activity. The computer-controlled process machinery and sensory equipments 
make possible the substitution of physical-sensory tasks and convert physical-
sensory data into computer-generated information. These are, for example, 
process control and monitoring systems in manufacturing or data handling 
systems in white-collar service industries.  
The computer raises threshold of skills required in performing work (Burris 
B. H., 1998: 141). It eliminates low-level jobs and shifts employment towards 
the more highly skilled and often technical occupations (Barley. S. R., 1996: 
404). For example, the use of sales-supporting system at the bank’s customer 
service representative (CSR) to aid judgement by guiding interaction with 
customers results in higher skills required and higher pay. The IT system 
installed, intertwined with customer interaction, “requires higher levels of 
education, experience and cognitive ability to be used effectively especially 
when the financial product set … is complex and varied.” It is also difficult to 
script unpredictable customer interactions into the sales-supporting technology 
(Hunter L. W. and Lafkas. J. J., 2003: 239). Interacting with customers using the 
sales-supporting system requires two layers of skill. First, the CSR needs to 
acquire the traditional customer service experience to deliver good service, as 
well as the technical knowledge of product and services that match customer 
needs. Second, they needs skills to follow the guideline provided by the system, 
whilst being able to personally service the customers. 
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The nature of work becomes more complex as computer eliminates simpler 
errors. Only the more complex part of work remains for the workers. For 
example, for bank accountants the computer automates routine manual and 
repetitive processes in data transfer, data entry and several computations 
(Murnane, R. J., and Levy, F., 1996). It frees humans to spend more time on 
more difficult aspects of their job that involve problem-solving, analysing, and 
communicating with other staffs. It allows the accountants more time on 
performing analysis and higher-level problem-solving (i.e., data rework, 
valuation and analysis), which forms the more difficult part of their job. Yet, it 
did not eliminate the need for knowledge underlying routine work. The computer 
cannot handle the process involved in building a base of analogies, or reasoning 
by analogy, that takes place in data rework, valuation and analysing jobs. Nor 
can it conduct searches or communicate, and negotiate, with other persons 
(Murnane, R. J. and Levy, F. (1996).  
 Confusion arises for impacts on skills as a result of the computerisation. A 
“skill bifurcation” refers to a co-existence of “occupational upgrading and 
deskilling” caused by the computerisation (Diprete T. A., 1988: 725-46). A 
general tendency is that the computer causes people to become responsible for 
more complex work instead of the routine one, as they move towards an upper 
functional hierarchy. Any occupational study that focuses on a performance of 
tasks in a static way often reports deskilling as an empirical finding. In the 
semiconductor industry, for example, the computerisation requires the additional 
mental skills needed to cope with the abstract work content, whilst lowering 
reliance on the operators’ physical involvement. Greater reliance is placed on 
their supervision and decisive intervention at a stochastic circumstance. The 
 98 
process reliance on the traditional operators diminishes as technicians and 
engineers assume their role and responsibility in controlling the automated 
production process. The industry witnesses less dependency on the operators 
unique skills when their operators have been unable to catch up with the 
increasing skill requirement (Brown and Campbell, 2001: 450-65).  
In paper-making, an application of the computerised control and 
monitoring technology is the automation–or substitution–of tasks performed by 
men. Technological development has produced modern control system that is 
capable of handling increasingly complex and less routine tasks. An introduction 
of the automated process control interposes symbolic, computer-mediated 
representations between machine tenders and the production process (Vallas S. 
P. and Beck J. P., 1996: 346). The increasingly sophisticated sensory equipments 
that replace manual methods of collecting process data alter the decision-making 
methods and procedures within the production area  (Vallas S. P. and Beck J. P. 
(1996: 346). The integrated system opens possibilities of connecting various 
computer systems in the mill, thanks to the computer’s capability to link and 
integrate with other mechanical, sensory or other microprocessor-based 
equipment performing diverse tasks (Halle D., 1984: 101-2).  
Working with the computer technology calls for operators’ handling of an 
abstract thought process. It combines an ability to work with abstract symbolism 
and an ability to perform explicit inferences and procedural reasoning (Zuboff S., 
1988: 73).4 Various forms of the abstract representation include numerical and 
visual cues, such as diagrams, graphs, or maps. In their interactions with work, 
options are considered and choices are made that is translated into the terms of 
the information system (Zuboff S., 1988: 71). The operators interact with the 
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process through computer interfaces, using keyboards and touch screen monitors, 
to monitor and adjust various details of the process, key parameters, and changes, 
such as acidity, fibre length, pulp, brightness, thickness, weight and tensile 
strength. 
3 – Development of computerisation in paper production 
The development of computerised automation in manufacturing begins 
with the early programmable numerically control systems from the late 1960s, in 
the production of machine tools. This allows for standardised production of 
larger product varieties at lower set-up costs and costs of switching among 
different productions. In paper industry, computer helps ensuring consistent 
operations by continuously regulating process variables in routine situations. Its 
earliest form is the conventional control loop, which is later developed into 
sequential control and multivariable control. The conventional control system 
takes the form of control loop feedback, or, in other words, the proportional–
integral–derivative controller (PID controller). Major discrete control units both 
take the form of the proportional-integral derivative (PID) controller. Numerous 
contemporary industrial settings employ the control unit in this form. An 
apparent benefit is the ability for controls to function in identical fashion, 
lowering the need for application-related expertise, or the system-related 
knowledge in fine-tuning and maintenance (Pulkkinen M. (2005: 62-3). 
The conventional control system correlates production data to shorten 
action-feedback loop of controlled variables, by continuously analysing and 
comparing these variables to target values or setpoints stored in the memory, or 
set by the papermaker. Any significant change of controlled variables is 
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automatically logged and reported to the operators. The system alerts the 
operators when faults arise to avoid potential failures and expensive downtime. 
Any deviation can be dealt with by adjusting the operation variables to return 
them to its setpoint (Caie A. and Mulders P., 1980: 22). 
The paper production process employs separate control loops, with one 
loop per parameter; each loop is modular in design (for example, moisture and 
weight loops) that can be turned on and off separately. Internal algorithm is 
inflexible and only allows for low tolerance of errors in contemporary standards. 
It relies on empirically driven decoupling coefficients to address process 
interactions with decoupling normally performed at two loops at a time, which 
does not account for process dynamics in the feed-forward control calculations. 
Control are often erratic when the parameters go out of range at non-routine 
situations, requiring full operators’ manual involvement during critical phases of 
work, for example, in paper grade change, when the feedback control needs to be 
temporarily suspended (McQuillin D. and Huizinga P. W., 1994: 26). Early 
digital paper quality control system by Measurex and Accuray by early 70s 
requires a “baby-sitter” or a team on site in its operations (International Paper 
World, 2005a: 44-50).  
The conventional control loop has developed into the sequential automatic 
PID control programming by the mid-80s to simplify the execution of routine 
papermaking tasks. This enhances capacity of the conventional control scheme 
by integrating separate conventional control loops. The operator activates control 
at workstation, and a recipe display, to automatically prepare for new formulas, 
at automatic and orderly machine start-up, shut-down, and grade changing 
(Paper, 1987a: 27). Their direct involvement is needed only in the case of 
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problems with process or equipment malfunction, notified by alarm. The 
sequential program stops with alarming, when the process does not match proper 
condition for proceeding to the next step in a series of actions. However, this 
could not replace the operator’s involvement. Controlling the process requires 
work and knowledge based on actual operational experience. Familiar operators 
are better at running the process more effectively (Kaminaga H., 1994: 16). 
Subsequent multivariable control technology allows the control system to 
simultaneously handle multiple control variables and their interactions by 
integrating several single-loop controllers that do not necessarily have one-to-one 
relationship. This control scheme provides better control of interacting process as 
it simultaneously manipulates multiple actuators to maintain multiple process 
variables at setpoints or within defined limits and autonomously calculate for 
new setpoints that adapt to current process conditions (McQuillin D. and 
Huizinga P. W., 1994: 26; Paper Technology, 1994b: 43). Major forms of 
multivariate control embrace fuzzy logic and artificial neural network algorithm. 
The multivariate PID controllers have incorporated fuzzy logic into paper 
making since early 80s for further flexible and adaptive process control 
(Pulkkinen M., 2005: 62-3). Recent systems also significantly benefit from more 
powerful computing capacity (Pulkkinen M., 2005: 62-3). The fuzzy logic-based 
algorithms provide benefits where the control target is other than direct tuning of 
a setpoint value; i.e., the control target, when the process controlled is non-linear 
and must be controlled in various ways. This control logic allows accuracy and 
speed targets to vary within control range, and the capability to simultaneously 
fine-tune and react to major disturbances (Tarhonen P., 2005: 14). Moreover, 
control level of the fuzzy PI controller can be divided into several zones, 
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providing extra flexibility (Tarhonen P., 2005: 14). Likewise, an artificial neural 
network (ANN) approaches information processing method of biological nervous 
systems; i.e., brain. The ANN mobilises a large number of highly interconnected 
processing elements working in unison in solving problems. It learns by 
example, just like people, and is configurable for specific application through a 
learning process: the system can be trained using a range of input data with any 
disturbances or fundamental changes. Recent increase in computing power gives 
sufficient capacity for fast paper machine control (Pulkkinen M., 2005: 62-3). 
Like the fuzzy logic, the ANN control identifies sources of problems that may 
arise from multiple causes.   
Computerised control equipment not only substitutes for operators’ control 
of the process but also makes visible process data and provides a basis for 
integration of control and information systems across distinctive parts of the 
papermaking process.Interest in the system integration began in the early 1970s 
with attempts to merge “islands of computers” within papermills (Paper, 1980: 
9). There is rapid diffusion of computer technologies during the period of late 
1970s towards mid-80 taking the forms of, for example, computer-aided design, 
computer-aided manufacturing, robotics, artificial intelligence and flexible 
manufacturing systems. In manufacturing, the attempt reflects in the 
decentralised, but integrated, computerisation of production process. 
Millwide networks for communication and control in early-1970s provided 
a set of communications, storage and analytic functions to employees across 
functional divisions, bringing appropriate information wherever and whenever 
needed, whilst supplementing process automation (Land D. and Kaunonen A., 
2000: 47; Vallas S. P. and Beck J. P., 1996: 348-9).5 This provided 
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comprehensive and transparent views of the operations to the workers and 
managers (Vallas S. P. and Beck J. P., 1996: 348-9). Early development allowed 
users to establish a common database covering  an entire mill’s operations. 
Production management were able to obtain current and comparative information 
on numerous aspects of the mills, to improve decision-making, efficiencies and 
control costs (Paper, 1980: 12).  
Subsequent developments performed converted process data into 
production and business information, processing data as information clusters that 
incorporated repertoires of stored knowledge such as as real-time online 
production or quality reporting presented to the operators for direct feedback 
control (Paper, 1987: 17). Between mid and late 1980s, embedded computer-
based intelligence laid the foundation for greater control flexibility in a 
standardised production process, by integrating real-time production data and 
control system (Paper, 1987b: 17). Integrated systems were able to perform tasks 
traditionally handled by separate discrete automation systems, leading to easier 
and more economic supervision of the process. Several control loops were 
monitored simultaneously and were programmed to maintain key variables at 
target, and alert operators to exceptional process conditions (Paper, 1987a: 27). 
The distributed control system (DCS) consists of decentralised control units 
integrated through communication network. The DCS provides the operators 
with a wealth of production data, as a tool to track the operations of automated 
processes. The millwide information systems (MIS) facilitated efficient 
management of production process and centralise information reporting from 
computers and control systems throughout the mill (Lidhamn I., 1994: 24). At 
the Howe Sound mill in Canada, for instance, the MIS integrated production and 
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quality information of all processes from the DCS all over the mill, including 
paper machine computer system, automated tracking system, pulp quality 
monitor and laboratory data. The MIS provides distributed operator stations 
providing same information throughout the production site (Kaminaga H., 1994: 
16).  
The 1990s development aimed towards more efficient integration of 
control and information system (Paper Technology, 1994a: 42). The elimination 
of external interfaces enabled faster data processing, and integration of controls 
for different processes on a single control platform (World Paper, 1995: 23; 
Lidhamn I., 1994: 24).Simultaneous processing of data enabled quicker 
identification of faults (McQuillin D. and Huizinga P. W., 1994: 26). It is also 
possible to integrate existing distributed control, with new control, a new 
scanning gauge system, real-time millwide process information and lab quality 
system into one control scheme (McQuillin D. and Huizinga P. W., 1994: 26). 
Discrete control units become more autonomous, being self-adaptive to process 
conditions, and integrable with the existing control equipments. Most machines 
start to have complete digital control system to handle control directly 
(International Paper World, 2005a: 44-50). 
Since then, rapid increase in computing power and system openness in 
forms of commodified communication hardware and software allows for 
cooperation among applications on different hardware and software vintages 
(Land D. and Kaunonen A., 2000: 47). Powerful microprocessors combined with 
sophisticated control modelling enable control strategies for tighter co-ordination 
among production areas. Systems such as the Millenium System in 2000 
mobilised open architecture for flexible expansion to integrate process control 
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and information systems in the mill that do not share common platform (Paper 
Technology, 2000b: 13). The ABB Industrial Systems function as central control 
unit by integrating different microprocessor-embedded devices to work as single 
control system.The system links various speed drives to the open control system 
where they are controlled by central process controllers. The operators control all 
drive functions from operating station or PC, controlling remotely such 
parameters as speed, torque, interlocking drives and reading drive status. They 
are also alerted by central reporting alarms (Paper Technology, 1997: 20).  
Decision-support features of the modern computerised systems 
Such developments have created modern sophisticated control and 
monitoring systems that simultaneously take into account process parameters, 
their interactions and dynamics across various areas of the papermaking process, 
whose capability approaches the exercise of tacit knowledge by accounting for 
experience-based learning and problem-solving, and being adaptive to various 
process conditions.6 They also support operator’s problem-solving by providing 
an articulated trigger to their tacit knowledge as process visibility, diagnosis and 
troubleshooting information, and knowledge resources. At non-stochastic events, 
the system provides automated process control, whilst providing process 
visibility as system-generated abstract information. At the stochastic situations, 
however, the system alerts the operators typically by prompts or alarms, and 
provides a) symbolic representation of the process as numerical data and charts, 
b) interpretation as process diagnosis and troubleshoot, outcome prediction, 
interactive process simulation, and corrective advice, and c) prompting 
knowledge resources as consultative and reference materials defined by both 
mills and suppliers.   
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The control system provides process visibility through the traditional form 
of the distributed control system (DCS). The Statistical Process Control (SPC) 
installed at the Nashua Corporation in 1979, for instance, conducts statistical 
interpretation of fluctuations between random and systematic variations in the 
production parameters by probability theories (Berger R. W. and Hart T., 1986: 
4). The operators see whether key process parameters deviate from the target 
values, set by engineers, and decisively intervene at statistical deviation (Vallas 
S. P. and Beck J. P., 1996: 347-8;  Karlsson M. and Ståhl C. W., 2000: 25).  
Process diagnosis and troubleshooting provides up-to-date information of a 
current process state, whilst identifying and tracing causes, and automatically 
correcting process problems. Most modern control systems possess this 
capability. For instance, the Energy Monitoring and Targeting software at 
Cladwells mill in 1997 highlights trends and estimates costs of energy use, 
detects unaccountable consumption increase, diagnoses causes of increase from 
various sources across different time periods, and performs automatic routine 
maintenance (Watson K., 1997: 29). The Valmet and Neles Automation system 
installed at the paper machine in 2000 provides detailed views of the production 
process to support the operator’s identification of mechanical faults (e.g., faulty 
pumps). It displays interlock windows and key information relating to faults, 
such as loop description, operating procedures, common causes and solutions 
drawn from stored knowledge (Land D. and Kaunonen A., 2000: 47). The Conex 
fault inspection system and the Parsytec web inspection system in 2003 
mobilises cameras and image processing softwares to assist the operators’ 
detection and troubleshoot of faulty sheets and web breaks, based on its 
extensive library of different fault characteristics. The operators are able to 
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categorise different types of faults (e.g., watermarks, oil marks, edge and 
material faults) and the causes by consulting the documentation with respect to 
each fault type (International Paper World, 2003a: 14-6; International Paper 
World, 2003b: 38-40). At the wet end, the IQInsight in 2005 supports the 
operators’ monitoring of the wet end area by describing its dynamic conditions, 
whilst automatically controlling and balancing chemical impacts of the stock 
flows (e.g., water quality, chemicals, stock quality, pulp). It helps the operators 
visualise and identify disturbances and faults at process start-ups by isolating 
causes of wet-end problems depicted on multi-dimensional display (Nuyan S., 
2005: 15). The SKF Machine Analyst similarly facilitates the operators viewing 
the operation at a press section by identifying key changes detected 
(International Paper World, 2005b: 64-6). 
Another key feature is a system-generated prediction of possible process-
related outcomes given course of action. The automated pulp preparation system 
by the Metso Automation in 1992 captures human experience and knowledge 
into decision rules by learning the beatermans’ control action. It identifies likely 
problems that can arise from a number of causes, and takes successive steps to 
rectify the process (Tarhonen P., 2005: 14; Forestier P. and Lang D., 2003: 26). 
Similarly, the broke predictive system in 1997 compares particular features of 
web profiles (e.g., profile defects and significant profile deviation) up the stream 
with other similar cases from its stored library to identify possible web break. 
The case library contains combinations of cases with descriptive features of past 
problems and relationships between solutions and outcomes. The system 
performs knowledge-guided induction by inferring general principles from 
specific examples and deviating rules based on features of past cases in forms of 
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decision/cluster tree. In order to learn, it separates a cluster of deviated reels from 
the good reels by analysing key features and clustering them into groups. 
Operators can train the system to look at specific case features, by his guidance 
through the interface in order to specify what factors affect what outcomes of the 
model (Gillies L., 1997: 35). The predictive control for pH optimisation in 2005 
observes and identifies possible causes of pH fluctuation from meter reading and 
incoming chemicals (Taylor M. et al., 2005: 37). The WinGEMS process 
simulation by the Metso Automation in 2000 not just provides a graphical 
representation of the process. The simulator also evaluates both overall and 
specific process modifications and modes of operations based on the stored 
knowledge (Joore L. P. A. A. et al., 2000: 55). The Factnet and SimAudit 
software performs a predictive troubleshoot of quality disturbance of a pulp 
screening process and a paper profile by simulating interrelationships between 
process and quality variables. The simulation conducts comparative analyses 
across time ranges and incorporates customisable pattern recognition on 
historical data in order to reflect mill-specific experience and the operators’ 
expertise (Paper Technology, 2000c: 16). 
The advisory decision-support system provides the operators with 
corrective advice towards process problems. The ABB Smart advisor system 
alerts the operators at existing or impending adverse condition detected once it 
identifies root causes of the problems associated with the products and the 
mechanics. It then provides the corrective advice and records the operators’ 
actions. This eliminates the need for an extensive analysis of the process (Paper 
Technology, 2000a: 5). Likewise, the @ptitude Decision Support System from 
the SKF substitutes labour-intensive data collection and analysis effort with the 
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automated analysis. The operation takes place from identifying faults and 
appropriate solutions, prescribing appropriate action, capturing and retaining 
knowledge of the experts/professionals. By integrating data from multiple 
sources into a single application, the system mobilises a structured approach to 
capture and apply the knowledge, which enables the users to make quick 
decisions based on meaningful information and a pre-determined set of 
procedures and priorities (International Paper World, 2005b: 64-6).  
4 – Operators’ skills a in contemporary papermaking work 
environment 
  Working with modern computerised process demands the operators’ tacit 
knowledge to work both in traditional fashion and at the computer interface. 
These include traditional physical skill, skill to deal with abstract information 
generated by the system, ability to relate process in procedural/logical fashion, 
and skills to work interpersonally with other production crews and system-
related knowledge. 
 Work is mediated and its content consists of higher abstract content. This 
relies on conceptual skills and cognitive understanding of work process and 
content (Gerwin D. and Kolodny H., 1992: 195). Computerisation replaces some 
manual skill and efforts but makes demands on human information processing 
and decision-making capabilities, which calls for anticipatory control action 
(Buchanan D. A. and Bessant J., 1985: 292-308). The impact of computerised 
automation in making certain amount of work disappeared into machines 
requires the operators’ “abstract understanding” of work, and their corresponding 
cognitive demands for inference, imagination, integration, problem solving, and 
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mental maps to monitor and understand the process out of sight, as its 
embeddedness into equipments beyond the operators concrete view requires an 
ability to manipulate mental patterns, or by comparing the abstract system with 
concrete production steps (Weick K. E., 2000: 789-819; Gerwin D. and Kolodny 
H., 1992: 195; Baba M. L., 1991: 8-9). Moreover, the workers need to acquire 
procedural thinking skill, which refers to an ability to conceptually think through 
the process (Zuboff S., 1988: 73-6). “Workers select and reconcile right 
procedures out of sets of procedures,”for example, in an event of system-related 
anomalies and contingencies such as the lack of data, irregularity in the system, 
or system malfunctions (Adler P., 1986: 9-28). 
 The nature of work and problems encountered become more complex 
require familiarity with computer-generated medium in forms of information, 
codes or artificial language in the operations (Adler P., 1986: 9-28). Exercise of 
conceptual skills entails exercising of judgement rather than application of fixed 
rules (Hunter L. W. and Lafkas. J. J., 2003: 226). In other words, people need the 
tacit knowledge in working with this new degree of computer-generated abstract 
content. They need to become a connoisseur of abstract work. In case of an 
unexpected but critical event of machine breakdowns, for instance, the operators 
need to provide process control through computer interface when the automatic 
control is, at least, partially absent. The operators rely most on “relational 
information” in action, since relatively few points can their mental representation 
be checked against, and corrected by the actual process ( Weick K. E., 2000: 
789-819). 
In papermaking, computerisation tends to promote the abstraction of work 
as workers increasingly interact with symbolic objects; i.e., the computer-
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mediated representations of the production process (Zuboff S., 1988: 62; Barley. 
S. R., 1996: 418). Advanced forms of computer automation in control and 
monitoring functions in pulp and paper production process places workers at 
greater distance from the production process. Nature of work alters: “whence 
workers rely on their senses to monitor the production, now monitoring is 
performed largely through intermediary of the machine. Once the traditional 
‘beater man’ in charge of the pulp department of the machine tender in charge of 
the paper machine listened to the sounds of the machinery, touched and smelled 
the pulp.” Experience in an advanced mills since the mid 80s witnesses the 
operators working mainly out of control rooms where they monitor the 
production process on banks of computer screens (Zuboff S., 1988: 34). 
Computerised work still requires operators’ exercise of traditional manual 
and sensory skills in direct process interaction, for example, when a field 
operator walks through the chemical production facility, checking the actual 
process running outside control room (Fischer M. and Röben P., 2002: 26-30). 
There is no total replacement of conceptual skills on traditional ones. As data-
based reasoning is needed to diagnose the system-generated information and 
abstract reasoning skills perform the integration of diagnosis with both visual 
data and conceptual appreciation of the technology’s functioning, the operators 
draw as much from their previous experience and intuition as much as the 
conceptual and abstract understanding working with the computerised system 
(Zuboff S., 1985: 427;Gerwin D. and Kolodny H., 1992: 195). They mobilise 
abstract and sensory cues in performing anticipatory control action from distant 
and mediated monitoring from the actual equipment, for example, by identifying 
performance trends that indicate potential future problems (Buchanan D. A. and 
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Bessant J., 1985: 292-308). In other words, they rely on their ability to connect 
between direct observation and the control interface, which requires an ability to 
visualise the relationships in the operators mind (Gerwin D. and Kolodny H., 
1992: 195).  
In the paper industry, production workers preserve a residue of valuable 
informal, manual and experiential knowledge vital to the production process, 
though their traditional skills loses some of their centrality, as many mills begin 
to rely on sophisticated instruments that bypass workers’ sensory methods of 
detection (Barley S. R., 1996). They lose their collective grip on production 
controls.7 “The knowledge stays, but in the cracks. We like to keep it hidden” 
(Halle D., 1984; Hodson R., 1991a; Hodson R., 1991b). Although jobs working 
with fully automatic papermaking machine require far less manual activity, the 
computerisation does not lead to fully automatic production: the machinemen 
still act upon computer-generated information. The computer provides them with 
continuous information on the state of paper being produced, such as weight, 
wetness and thickness, but working with this information requires the workers to 
learn to interpret its readings and manipulate the production process (Penn R. and 
Scattergood H., 1985: 620-1). Though they press buttons more often than turning 
valves (some valves still need to be adjusted manually), their actions still 
presuppose knowledge and experience of paper manufacturing in order to make a 
correct judgement of appropriate action (Penn R. and Scattergood H., 1985: 618, 
624). Intuition based on learned experience that used to support manual 
diagnostic skills now serves as basis to the interpretation of computer-generated 
representations on controls or the visual display units (VDUs) (Penn R. and 
Scattergood H., 1985: 619, 623). Computer assists, rather than fully controls the 
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production process. 
Operators’ intervention into such incidence is guided by their “feeling” of 
the running of the process (Huys R. et al., 1999: 67-9). They also need to 
respond to potential and actual problems quickly (Majchrzak A., 1988: 99). As 
the stochastic events also cannot be pre-planned, responding to the process 
requires a large repertoire of skills the operators draw from whilst paying 
attention to, for example, the start-up process, monitoring the process, evaluating 
the process performance, trying to anticipate faults, or diagnosing the process 
problems (Gerwin D. and Kolodny H., 1992: 188-9). A number of 
interdependencies and speed of events of the integrated process means faults 
developed at a particular part of the process quickly escalate to the other parts 
(Buchanan D. A. and Bessant J., 1985: 292-308). The operators place premium 
on process reliability to keep it continue as much as possible. Skills and process 
sensitivities based on experience and intuition are needed in ensuring continuity 
and reliability (Weick K. E., 2000: 789-819). 
 Working with the automated systems involves knowing the system itself. 
This does not necessarily mean knowing system in a technical sense, but 
knowing the way to effectively interact with the systems, knowing how it works 
and why, and knowing when to use or not to use it. An operator in the continuous 
process plant has to know whether to accept computer readings of the process 
parameters.  
Computer-mediated information makes available a wealth of process data 
that is distinct from workers’ traditional methods of detection (Vallas S. P. and 
Beck J. P., 1996: 353). Since they have to learn to use the computer system to 
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cope with the wealth of available process information, new set skills emerge as 
they need to know when to accept the computer-generated information and 
guiding directions, or when to intervene. New kinds of system-related problems 
such as system irregularity and malfunctionsor system not giving accurate 
process information emerge (Adler P., 1986: 9-28; Weick K. E., 2000: 789-819). 
Working with computer technology requires knowledge dealing with the 
systems. The operators “know the system,” at a particular moment, by knowing 
what it is doing, why it does that, and able to assess whether it is operating 
properly, intervening or overriding is needed (Buchanan D. A. and Bessant J., 
1985: 292-308). They need to understand how the system functions in order to 
identify the source of deviance (Gerwin D. and Kolodny H., 1992: 18-9). 
Knowledge about systems integrates formal and informal understandings about 
the abstract rules of automated production systems on the one hand, together 
with experiential understandings about concrete steps in the production process 
on the other (Baba M. L., 1991: 8-9).  
Moreover, the workers’ system-related knowledge of plants and 
equipments can even become contextual and idiosyncratic (Heyes J., 2001: 555). 
It can take years to get to know one of the plants (Blauner R., 1968). This may 
consist of knowledge about the ‘quirks and peculiarities’ of the machinery, the 
grey area between normal operations and catastrophe, and operation shortcuts as 
in the chemical production process (Halle D., 1984). The workers have to 
mobilise these system-related skills, based on experience and intuition, in dealing 
with routine operations and stochastic events such as downtime. In some cases, 
the operators do not necessarily follow a set of instructions and procedures 
(Halle D., 1984). For example, the operators at a computer control interface at a 
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pigment manufacturing plant choose between setting the process parameter 
setpoints or override them when the controlled parameter strays beyond its preset 
tolerance limit, if they know that faulty sensors activates the automatic alarm 
(Buchanan D. A. and Bessant J., 1985). 
Communication, interpersonal, and processual skills: Computerised work 
is more interpersonal. Computerisation of the chemical production process 
requires staffs’ better technical understanding of the production process, 
alongside their ability to communicate with colleagues (Mason and Wagner, 
1994: 65). Advanced computer systems place higher responsibility on workers, 
as they place higher reliance on human intervention, interdependency, 
cooperation and shared responsibility in dealing with the integrated process 
(Fischer M. and Röben P., 2002). that has become speedier and more 
interdependent (Buchanan and Bessant, 1985).Although the computer reduces 
total number of errors in the work process, its ability to speed up work pace and 
integrate with other computerised process lead to potentially higher cost of errors 
(Adler P., 1986: 9-28). The automatic process optimiser at a chemical steam 
cracker plant in early 2000s, for example, places human operators at greater 
distance from the actual process running by reducing the need for direct process 
involvement; yet, the stochastic events associated with it tend to be more 
complex and require higher level of operators’ skills to deal with (Fischer M. and 
Röben P., 2002). Computerisation often leads to decentralisation and work teams 
of multi-skilled workers to understand the total operation of the plant (Burris B. 
H., 1998: 147). People need to relate their process with others. “Reliance on 
common databases, for example, calls for bank clerk’s data input accuracy and 
the social skills for effective teamwork” The stochastic and continuous nature is 
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“integrative by nature and demands corresponding level of integration and co-
ordination from the social and support systems” (Adler P., 1986: 9-28; Gerwin 
D. and Kolodny H., 1992: 187). Its demand for fast and effective rectifying 
response leads to, for example, the organisation of operators’ roles to include 
team arrangements to benefit from their variously distributed experience and 
capabilities, and decentralised decision-making structure for local discretion and 
quicker response. (Gerwin D. and Kolodny H., 1992: 188). Teams or workgroups 
use formal and informal knowledge and experience to deal with complex 
problems that arise from discrepancy between automated process and actual 
production process (Baba M. L., 1991: 8-9). This requires the operators’ social 
and communication skills to communicate with other staffs in explaining, 
identifying, tracing, or diagnosing process problems (Buchanan D. A. and 
Bessant J., 1985: 292-308).  
Conclusion 
The first section describes nature of work of production crews in paper-
making process. Work content is complex and continuous: ie, the nature of 
challenges is often non-routine and work covers various continuous parts from 
pulping to producing paper sheet. The production is under responsibilities of 
multiple production personnels in production team. Each is responsible for 
specific process that requires specific tacit knowledge. 
The next section explains impacts of computer technology on work and 
skills in broader and paper-making contexts. The computer raises threshold of 
skills required in performing work as it eliminates lower-level jobs, routine and 
repetitive process and simpler errors. Humans workers focus attention on more 
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difficult aspects of their jobs–higher-level problem solving and communication 
with other workers, whereas the computer does not eliminate the need for 
knowledge underlying the routine work. There is the case for skill bifurcation. 
As the technological impact leads to upskilling, focus on performance of specific 
task in a static way has resulted in deskilling.  
In papermaking, the computer automates control and monitoring tasks 
performed by operation workers, freeing them from physical and mental tasks. 
Their roles involve supervising the automated process through control interface, 
and solving problems that are beyond the system’s capability. Consequently, the 
technology creates distance between the operators and process, and process that 
is stochastic and continuous. The workers work from control room at control 
interface mainly with system-generated information, supervising routine 
operations punctuated with unpredictable disturbances that demands full 
attention, such as break downs and product faults. 
This section explained the development of computerised automation in 
paper making. Early control loop and sequential automatic programming posed 
limited control feature as they lacked adaptive and learning capabilities and 
ability to account for process dynamics of later multivariable controls. Interests 
to merge islands of computer led to early integration of control systems to create 
database of production data across mill’s divisions. Subsequent technology 
cultivated the modern multivariable controls to integrate real-time process 
information and controls, whilst later development has focused on efficient 
integration and expandability. 
Modern control systems have led to information processing that approaches 
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exercise of tacit knowledge. The automation has increasingly been capable of 
higher-level and non-routine problem-solving experiential-based learning and 
adapting to various forms of disturbances. An application to support decision-
making has been to assist operators’ identifying and solving process issues by 
providing process diagnosis, troubleshoot, prediction, simulation and corrective 
advice, in addition to providing referential and consultative resources. As a 
result, operators exercise their skills in working on top of these smarter tools. 
In addition to mastery of work with system-generated abstract information 
at control interface, modern paper making requires operators’ traditional 
physical–sensory skills and logical understanding of process. Operators also 
possess behavioural understanding of the system. The entire production process 
under team responsibility necessitates effective communication with other 
production crews. 
                                       
1
 These are phenomenon that took place since early 1980s. 
2 This is typically 200m long, 30m high, and 20m wide. 
3
 The difference between production and maintenance skills is reflected in both 
the manner of skill acquisition and inter-skill pay differentials. See Penn and 
Scattergood (1988). 
4 Zuboff (1988) calls this an intellective skill. It is distinctive from the action-
centred skill, which relies on the physical-sensory capability. 
5
 This is based on an empirical study of paper-mills in the U.S. context. 
6 This is a feature called “soft sensors” by industrial practitioners. 
7
 Computer also opens the way to inter-occupational conflict over expanding 
analytical functions between production workers, process engineers and 
technically trained supervisors. See Vallas S. P. (2001; 17); Holmes J. (1997; 
11); and Blauner R. (1964): The judgement in interpreting computer-generated 
information and the capability in writing and maintaining software 
configurations of the latter has become increasingly important. 
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Chapter 5: Mobilising Tacit Knowledge 
Introduction 
This chapter reports empirical findings of a study of paper making of what 
tacit knowledge there is and how the TK is exercised at critical phase of 
production. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first starts with brief 
introduction to the nature of papermaking, and it describe grade changing as a 
critical incident. We then describe the computerised technology that controls the 
papermaking process, and specifically supervises grade changing. What follows 
is the operators’ involvement with the grade-changing process, the nature of 
activities and skills involved. 
The second part looks into the roles and activities of key grades of 
production workers, the beaterman and the machineman, at various stages of 
grade changing. There are four stages: preparation for the change; manual start to 
the change; supervision of the automated process; and manual intervention at 
process disturbance. This section explores what the critical operators’ action is 
with the process and the corresponding skill content. 
Instead of having the control system take responsibility away from the 
operators, which happens for lower-level tasks, the finding reveals that the 
operators possess a hierarchy of skills ranging from their background knowledge 
of the process to skills in working with the system. This is consistent with 
Polanyi's notion that it is important to think of skills holistically.  
1 – Papermaking, technology and tacit knowledge  
This first part of the chapter outlines the characteristics of paper-making 
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process and grade changing as a critical incident. It introduces the control 
technology involved with the part of the production process responsible for the 
grade change. 
Paper making is operated in a continuous real-time environment with 
several uncontrollable variables external to the control strategy that disturb a web 
of interacting process parameters. According to one respondent, the paper 
industry is “one of the most difficult to implement a fully-functioning 
computerised process control system.” This results in the control and monitoring 
system being capable of substituting for the operators’ physical and mental 
involvement with lower-level process control and supervisory tasks. “The 
computer does a good job, but not the right job,” according to a machineman. 
Successfully deploying the computerised automatic process control system 
mandatorily requires integrating the users’ “internal experience,” or, in other 
words, their tacit knowledge to work with the system. 
Changing the production grade is critical to the papermaking. This involves 
work at stock preparation and at the paper machine. Grade changing is a major 
cause of process and product variation: it disturbs automatic production flows, 
breaking down production routines, requiring the production workers’ tacit skills 
to cope with. Nor is grade changing a rare event. Mills can change grade 42-46 
times a week. Each change can take 45 minutes to an hour. Some grades may be 
made for no more than an hour until the next change is needed.  
The grade change is the focus of this inquiry. Implementing a quick change 
through the process control system is critical to making money for paper mills. It 
is the task of papermakers to meet the production goal of producing acceptable 
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paper at the greatest speed and the lowest costs, time and waste.1 They have to 
ensure the automated production process is working properly, by being “eyes and 
ears of the process” looking for disturbances that are beyond the system’s 
supervisory capacity, and making judgement where to carry out manual 
interventions. The operators make inferences from the control interface – textual, 
numeric and graphical representations of current process state on computer 
screens – and interact through generic input methods using computer keyboards 
and mice. These visual representations serve as their “windows to the process,” 
according to one respondent. They act as a starting point for the operators’ 
involvement with an actual production run.  
One key success element of grade changing is to make it as simple as 
possible, with min imal change to the previous grade profile, whilst producing 
acceptable paper. As a machineman has put it:  
“Anything that can be fixed, … we will keep it the same. 
We don’t need to change them. … I am not going to move 
anything that doesn’t have to be moved. There are more 
things on moving on the machine on the change. It doesn’t 
need to be moved.“  
(interview with the machineman) 
The continuous-process nature of papermaking has caused the production 
of previous grade to result in the paper machine at given production state (e.g., 
profiles, chemical flows, left-overs, attributes of physical/mechanical condition). 
Different products have different furnish, stocks, and pulps. Changing different 
types of dyes and chemicals to shift from producing one grade to the next cause 
changes to a whole set of interacting production parameters. The operators have 
to take into consideration a given state of the machine settings, chemical flows, 
left-overs and mechanical conditions, etc., in making a new grade. 
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At the control room, process control technology takes a form of the 
distributed control system (DCS). See Appendix 1 for pictures of the computer 
interface in the control room. The MeasureX DaVinci is the smart integrated 
control system for the paper machine. The DaVinci was introduced to the market 
in 2004. The control is customarily tailored to meet the mill’s and fine-tuned to 
the machineman’s personal needs. At the stock preparation, there are the early 
1990s ALCONT and the 1980s E-Vision process visibility counterpart. The 
control room consists of computer screens, keyboards, and other non-
computerised gauges. These consist of a display devoted to the DaVinci; two 
displays for the ALCONT or a display for the E-Vision at some control rooms 
without the ALCONT; a display showing the Quality Information System (QIS), 
which logs all the profile settings of the previous grades; and another display for 
the fault detection system at the end of paper machine. The Appendix 2 shows 
screenshots of the ALCONT and the DaVinci control systems. The control 
rooms are tidy and quiet, though the equipments are not new or necessarily clean. 
The machineman and the beaterman are among the most present in the room 
thanks to their direct responsibility. They also communicate with other 
production crews. These are usually the drierman, the machine assistant and the 
production manager. They would engage in telephone conversations and face-to-
face discussions at the control room in order to obtain shared understanding of 
the process and the problems. The other crews occasionally visit the control 
room to check by themselves the process information displayed at the computer 
screens.  
The stock preparation area is the “pre-wet end” or pre-paper machine 
activity, which involves pulping, recycling, blending and refining. The focus is 
 123 
on the beaterman’s responsibility in blending (cooking) before the stock is sent 
to the headbox onto the wire at the paper machine. This then becomes the 
machineman’s responsibility. At the paper machine, grade changing marks the 
transition from one production stage to the next. This leads to variation in 
process parameters, and paper profiles, especially with colours. The 
machineman’s responsibility is then to steer through this change in order to meet 
the production targets. 
The beaterman and machineman steer the production process by working at 
the control interface in conjunction to the actual process behind it. They often 
commented that “This is a mental job. … There is so much ground to cover.” 
The process includes preparing for the grade change, and the operators’ 
supervising the automated process. It also requires their manual intervention as 
they spot a problem and decide to take the automatic control off to manually 
intervene in the process. It is likely for the changing production grade to produce 
an interval of waste paper. As the system is incapable of adequately responding 
to contingencies external to its capability, the consequence is the paper that does 
not match any desirable specification. This is where the machineman finds his 
manual steering skill delivering more efficient and effective performance.  
Steering the production process is a heuristic process of meeting the 
production goal of making acceptable paper at the greatest speed and the lowest 
cost, and spotting process anomaly to address problems and intervene (Polanyi 
M., 1964: 21-31). As there are many factors that affect the quality of paper, the 
production workers have to be able to steer the process through these sets of 
interacting variables. The production process, as their object of experience, is 
locked within networks of interrelations and mutual involvement (Smith B., 
 124 
1988: 6). The system-generated information works as “signs,” which  represent 
that object . The operators “take into account a host of rapidly changing clues” in 
responding to process issues (Polanyi M., 1969b: 114; Polanyi M., 1958: 18, 73, 
103-4, 132-3). 
The operators make inferences from the system-generated information–
abstract cue–to the actual production process. Since we rely on our awareness of 
the first term for actively and intentionally attending to the second term, the 
operators rely on their awareness of the process “behind it” (the first term) to 
steer the production process (the second term), by dwelling in an unspecifiable 
conglomeration of subsidiary clues to bear upon the object of focal attention 
(Polanyi M., 1966: 86; Polanyi M., 1968b: 23; Polanyi M., 1967c: 9-13; Polanyi 
M., 1969d: 167). The information works as signs to actual physical process. With 
subsidiary awareness that supports an interpretation of these signs (i.e., 
background knowledge and experience) allows the operators to grasp their 
meaning. They make the “tacit inference” as they interpret this information to 
make-sense of the real-world phenomenon (Polanyi M., 1967b: 301-25). The 
interpreted account is then subsidiarily relied upon, among other subsidiary 
clues, as pointers in an integrative act towards the focal object of running the 
papermaking process (Polanyi M., 1967c: 12, 24-5).  
The information is the operators’ marginal clues in various modes of 
integration: preparing for grade recipe, supervising the automatic process, 
making judgement before manual intervention, identifying faults, fault finding, 
etc. According to one respondent, the typical way he makes use of the 
information is as follows:  
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“The trend that I’ve shown you earlier, whatever is away 
from the target I can find it. I can find out where it is away 
from the target, and how far it has been away from the 
target. Then we will see the range of the target, how far it 
can make mistake, or just stay away from the target as 
expected. We will see whether the variable goes away in 
the way that we have expected or not. Now we have to 
explore the reason why.”  
 (interview with the machineman) 
It is worth nothing that the recent technology has further facilitated the 
users’ ability to make inference from the abstract data to the real process. It 
facilitates the machineman’s better imagination of the production state. The 
“ALCONT” as a DCS is the computerised control and monitoring for the pre-wet 
end process of blending and refining, which allows the users to see a graphical 
representation of the process. This includes, but is not limited to, machine chest 
level, refiners, and furnishing. The system also allows them to control the 
process. To look at the production trends or paper profiles: such as, weight and 
moisture, or to change the production set point can be done by button control at 
the computer interface.   
“If they want to change to a set point, they just go in and 
drag through. You’ve got to bring the stuff down, and drag 
it, and then, put the set point that you key them all in and 
put the other ones.”  
(interview with the software engineer)  
Or to provide a representation, a viewing of the process, 
“… for the ALCONT, you can move around where you 
want to go to choose them. So, you go quicker. You can go 
click on whatever there is. Just click a button and it will 
bring a level on that loop. I can take it off the control for 
one or two. I can look at trends. … It shows you a level of 
where you are. I could take that out, and change the valve. 
Put the valve to 20% and do whatever you know, it’s 
there.”  
(interview with the software engineer) 
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In Polanyi’s term, the system-generated abstract information is a product of 
an explicit operation, as a result of system’s calculation based on its programmed 
code, or algorithm (Prosch H., 1986: 88).  It requires incorporating our personal 
element into its use, the tacit coefficients, in order to find it meaningful (Prosch 
H., 1986: 76-7).  
The subsidiary clues of these abstract signs are the operators’ background 
knowledge of the actual process and the system-related knowledge. The 
operators combine direct experience with the physical process (sensory) and 
understanding of the production process (logical) to form their knowledge of the 
actual process. Its significance cannot be over-emphasised, and is often echoed 
by the following: 
“Because that’s on the wire, you’ve got to go up there and 
feel it, and look at it, things like that.”  
“[in changing the setpoint myself] I could make manual 
move on that and go up and have a look, have a feel of 
what it looks like at that end and control it that way, you 
know.”  
(interview with the machineman) 
“You need the understanding of the process. And that 
allows you to apply that understanding and logic to solve 
any problem. And if you don’t understand the process of 
what you’re trying to do, then you’ll struggle.” 
(interview with the production manager) 
  Moreover, at older mills, this process knowledge has been handed down 
generation to generation.  
Without the actual process knowledge that performs in the background, the 
operators only rely on their interpretation of abstract information. This is often 
the case for the relatively less experienced production workers, who get along by 
consulting instruction manuals. The operators then only rely on articulated rules. 
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Although this involves some degree of tacit knowledge, this TK reflects their 
being proficient merely at applying these rules: their understanding is still 
detached from the real process. Several of the cues that make sense to the 
experienced operators appear abstract and featureless to relative novices (Polanyi 
M., 1969d: 168). In most cases, they can only handle the process in absence of 
stochastic events.  
“I think you’ll find that people who don’t know 
[understand the actual process running] are ok when 
everything is working. But when things go wrong, because 
they’re used to the computer doing it for them, if you don’t 
have the experience to understand what the process is 
doing, you can get into trouble. So, you need both [the 
process knowledge and skills working with the computer].”  
(interview with the production manager) 
“Some people get started and they don’t know what they 
are doing, just follow numbers. … If you don’t know what 
you are doing, you still could get it done by just follow the 
ABCD. You wouldn’t know what you are doing. But you’ll 
get it to work. …The manual said, “Press this button, and 
that button.” I think you can do it from the manual. It gives 
instructions. … He doesn’t need to know what the pipe 
goes to where, or what’s doing what. If you have the basic 
idea like what I’m showing you … [like] this line goes in 
here and here; that’s the blend to maintain the level. That’s 
enough to understand. You have a manual telling you to 
start this and that button. That’s enough. … All started by 
pressing one button there.” 
(interview with the machineman) 
Further, steering the process requires the operators’ acquaintance with the 
behavioural aspect of the control system  (system-related knowledge). They have 
to be able to notice malfunctions in any part of the system, and not to take 
information cues generated by the system for granted. Papermaking skills can 
even become  machine-specific. Only by direct experience working with a 
particular system or machine can the operators learn the system’s behaviour. 
This is related to the direct experience at a particular control system. Familiar 
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system’s behaviour, knowing what works and what does not, is part of the 
operators’ accumulated cues of the system’s behaviour patterns associated with 
their reactions. The skilled operators know where the automatic control system 
falls short, and are able to take short-cut to the system (Smith B., 1988: 5). 
Steering the process also involves co-ordinating with other production 
crews, the operators relate the process under their supervision with those of 
others’. Their common understanding is facilitated by possessing knowledge of 
the same comprehensive entity–i.e., the knowledge of how one part of the 
production process relates to the others (Polanyi M., 1961b: 458-70).  
Co-ordination also involves the production workers communicating with 
one another. Sequences of integration–sense-giving and sense-reading–take place 
in this communication process. The sender first sense-reads by experiencing 
meaning of the particular issue, then sense-gives to the receiver by composing a 
verbal account of his experience. The receiver sense-reads, or interprets, this 
verbal account to reproduce the experience (Polanyi M., 1969a: 186). The 
subsidiary knowledge is brought into focus and formulated as explicit 
knowledge, which requires the tacit knowledge of the receiver’s part for joint 
comprehension (Polanyi M., 1958: 261-4). That is, only by possessing the 
process understanding  (of the actual process knowledge) can the operators make 
sense of what has been verbalised and so communicate with others.  
The operators exercise steering skills in dealing with production issues the 
system is incapable of tackling by working around the problem. Given several 
process disturbances that could take place during the grade change, the operators 
often have to “workaround” the control system in order to satisfy, or to get as 
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close as possible to, the production goals. It is the machineman’s skilful steering 
that allows a quick and smooth grade changing and the beaterman’s skilful 
mixing of ingredients and his provision of the appropriate furnish required to 
match production state at the machineman’s paper machine. This helps minimise 
costs associated with downtime, and waste paper.  
Working around is the “knack” of papermaking. It involves delivering 
novel solutions to process problems, by taking alternative routes from the 
standard. It is built on an ability to improvise. By working around, the operators 
do whatever it takes to produce the paper with acceptable quality at the lowest 
cost. It takes various combinations of subsidiary cues and their integration to 
arrive at the focal cues to overcome contingencies. The ability to workaround is 
based on the operators’ accumulated experience in interacting with process and 
control systems. The operators usually workaround to overcome the control 
system’s limitations in dealing with process disturbance, though it is not 
uncommon for the workaround to improve general process efficiency that is 
superior the system’s own performance. The majority of workaround involves 
initiating change in one area to affect or offset others. It tends to be a temporary 
fix: once the operators intervene in the process, they observe impacts, and once 
they are satisfied, they then revert the process back to automatic state. In doing 
so, the operators have to be able to correctly sequence and time the impact. They 
also voluntarily ignore certain process impact or tolerate parametric deviation 
from normal practice. 
This section has described a number of factors that affect the papermaking 
process and their interaction with the automated control system from complete 
control of the grade changes. Recent control system innovations have facilitated 
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the operators’ exercise of their inference skills in controlling the process and 
dealing with process problems. Implementing grade change involves work at the 
computer interface in terms of both stock preparation and papermachine. Both 
the beaterman and the machineman exercise their “steering” the process by their 
ability to work around, making inference from system-generated cues as abstract 
information and system-related behaviour, co-ordinating and communicating 
with other team members. This is depicted in Figure 1. Contrary to solely 
following the system-related instruction, being able to do so is supported by their 
background knowledge of the actual production process and the skill to work 
through the process, and to communicate with other team members.  
2 – Grade change process 
The second part explores the operators’ roles at four phases of grade 
changing–preparation, manual control at start, supervising automatic control 
system, and manual intervention during the change process. Each section 
Figure 1: Skills to Implement the Grade Change at the Computer Interface 
mastery of abstract work content
knowledge of actual 
production process
traditional physical–
sensory skills
processual understanding
system-related knowledge 
(behavioural)
Skills to implement grade change at computer interface
making inference
steering the process
workaround
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describes roles, responsibility and action of the beaterman and the machineman 
in interacting with the process at each distinct stage. The empirical also 
highlights the case of colour-related problem as a good exemplification of issues 
facing the operators. 
The beaterman’s responsibility at stock preparation is to ensure the process 
can provide proper furnish, chemicals and dyes for the grade to be sent up to the 
headbox onto the wire at the papermaking machine. This is the blending process. 
He makes sure the grade page and process page are set up, and everything in the 
physical process, e.g., pump, is running as the machineman requires. The 
beaterman manually adjusts the automatically-controlled setpoints, when 
necessary. 
Achieving the right blend is vital to meet production objective, as using 
recycled pulps helps lower costs but can also compromise quality.  
Further, blending is the pre-wet end process from pulping that involves 
blending–mixing–the new (virgin) pulp with old recycled pulp of waste paper, 
sometimes called “broke,” other ingredients; such as, chemicals (“fillers”), dyes, 
and water. The process involves the mixture of pulps, broke, dye, clay, and 
chemicals such as the OBA 2. Blending is often described as “cooking.” There 
are many aspects of interactions among chemicals and blends that change the 
effects of the dyes.  
Although the beaterman controls the process through a computer interface, 
he needs to understand and memorise all differences among each ingredient and 
end product; mixtures such as, pulp, dyes, chemicals and broke. He possesses 
part-specific knowledge of each ingredient, interactions among chemicals, and 
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physical features of each kind of paper. His processual understanding of the 
chemicals and blend is equally vital, as he knows how these variables interact in 
actual production; such as the effects of dyes and paper brightness. This 
knowledge performs subsidiarily in the background as the beaterman engages in 
the focal act of blending. Its significance cannot be overemphasised, as a 
respondent once commented that:  
“… there are so many products, so much to remember–it’s 
unbelievable. … [We got] sizing, dyes, chalk, broke, and 
pulp. … It’s not just dyes, clay, broke and other chemicals 
[like] chalk. All mixed together and they do different 
things. I try to get them right, and it’s quite tricky.”  
(interview with the beaterman) 
Challenging issues facing the beaterman involves the blending process for 
different grades of paper, each requires different ingredients. The challenge is “to 
get them right” and this requires the operator’s unique skills, in order to get the 
mixture right.  For instance, the beaterman has to determine the right proportion 
of mixes between the new virgin pulp and recycled pulp (broke), by considering 
the colour of the end product, the colour of the broke, dyes and the impacts of 
other chemicals. Chalk, for example, can affect brightness. Yet, there is no fixed 
formula for mixtures of chemicals–such as, OBA, dyes, or clay–into the stock, 
which varies by the amount of broke 3. The aim is to achieve a balance. To offset 
chemical reactions of the furnish, other production crews may decide to 
workaround by altering the “pulp recipe” of certain grades. 
Further, the beaterman exercises his heuristic judgement to achieve the best 
compromise among quality, costs and time spent on changing the grade from one 
to the next. For instance, he must decide whether to alter the furnish during 
temporary single-wire run, as the production of the single-wire grade does not 
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require the furnish as bright as that of the twin-wire. However, altering the 
furnish only temporarily to achieve optimal single-wire quality does not justify 
extra costs associated with downtime and production of waste paper from such 
change. In this case, it is possible to compromise the paper quality as the 
beaterman is able to use the same ingredients in producing acceptable paper of 
both grades. According to one respondent, 
“Because we’re going back to the single wire, the furnish 
should be changed. The furnish of the twin-wire with a 
brighter furnish; the furnish of the single-wire grade, it’s 
the same stuff, but not as bright. I’ve told them to stay on 
the bright one because we’re not staying on this single-wire 
furnish very long. So it’s no point mocking about with the 
furnish. It’s too much to do. … It’ll be ok.”  
(interview with the beaterman) 
The beaterman also intergrates all other processes that lead to the blend 
chest, by co-ordinating with other production crews in all other areas. This 
requires his knowledge of the process, and his ability to teamwork and 
communicate with others. Teamwork and communication  skills allow for 
synchronisation of the beaterman’s process to others’ before his. 
“I need to make sure the guys are ok up the salvos, make 
sure they put the right recipe on; make sure the broke guy 
puts the right broke. Then I check the clay tanks. It’s 
constant check and check and everything, you got to make 
sure everything–your dyes are there: your dye tanks, pulps. 
You got to make sure you put dyes in place. … I’ve got 
[guys] at the salvos. They make up the pulp-recipe. And 
the broke guy should make up for the recycled paper. They 
cut the recycled paper. And I need the sort of recycled 
paper for the grade I am on. … For them to know what I 
need, they have to be experienced. … They have to put in 
what I actually have to put in. They have to know what I 
need.”  
(interview with the beaterman) 
The incident requires shared understanding of a current state of the 
production run and a production target among the beaterman, and production 
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workers at the salvo pulper and broke refiner. These personnel need to put the 
right mix pulp recipe and recycled paper of raw material to properly cater for the 
beating stage where all ingredients are mixed. The common understanding 
allows for an effective co-ordination, where the sense-giving and sense-reading 
activities take place. 
Since grade changing results in process disturbance at the paper machine, it 
is the machineman’s task to steer through this change. The process needs the 
machineman’s manual steering the process to the point where parametric 
fluctuation is minimal and the actual paper profile approach the target.  
Switching to the automatic control whilst profile is fluctuating maintains the 
fluctuation. The machineman switches on the automatic control also when he is 
unwilling to further risk destabilising the process, which will take longer to steer 
it back to a desirable steady state. In a “steady run,” the automatic system takes 
control of the process, the machineman monitors important parameters–such as 
weight, moisture, and colour–and trends, keying in data for the next grade and 
colour change. 
Preparing for a grade change, the machineman conceives steps needed to 
produce the targeted paper profile at the right time. 
He makes inferences from system-generated information to become aware 
of the current production stage. The system provides guidelines of how to reach a 
new production target, given current production state. He looks for the 
information–thereby, integrating process cues–of current production state and 
aim target: specified production specs, machine settings and the time to start the 
new grade. The machineman also refers to previous production records by 
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looking at the previous production data of the same grade; wet-end parameters 
such as pulp, chemicals, refiner settings; physical specifications such as weight, 
smoothness, moisture, colour; or machine settings such as speed. In effect, he 
performs a semiotic reading towards the production departure point by an 
interpretation of the system information.  
The machineman examines the Quality Information System (QIS), a 
system that logs the previous good run settings for every grade. This allows the 
operators to consider historical data of key production parameters. These key 
variables include the top/buttom wire left–right position, stock flow, slice tight 
and vacuum settings, etc. Often, the machineman averages up values of 
production settings; for example; 
“Every variable here … I could click on that. I could have 
a graph. That’s the last hundred times that roll was made. 
So I can keep it here. We made it [the speed] at 150, 145, 
and 166. They are good run settings. I’ll get the average up. 
The average speed for that grade is made at 159. For speed, 
I could use that information setting [of] 159. I know it 
could be made at 159.”   
(interview with the machineman) 
He is able to judge from experience whether the average speed of these 
previous “good run” settings are appropriate and whether any further adjustment 
is needed. An understanding how the production parameters are evolved as they 
reach the target allows him to decide what and how much tolerance is accepted 
during a transition.    
The machineman exercises discretion in interpreting data of the previous 
good production run. Since the aim is to minimise process disturbance, he needs 
to looks into each production parameters of the previous, current and target grade 
and make any necessary alteration. 
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“I’ll print off that page, you get a print out of it. I’ll go 
through it and select the way they build on important 
parameters that I think I’ll need [in order to] make that 
grade. I’ll take over the page there, and I will call up for 
the MeasureX system for the grade change.” 
“I will try matching variables there to variables there. 
Then, I will think about where I am just now and where I 
am going to. Is it too big a jump? Should I do it slow or 
faster? Or to do it in a hurry? Then I will carry out the 
change once I can put all information together.”  
(interview with the machineman) 
As he looks through the record, there is a working tacit process as he 
selectively decides which parameter to remain unchanged and by how much to 
change the others. His experience serves as a basis where each value is judged. 
Because every production is different, previous production figures, target profiles 
and state of the paper machine all serve as his subsidiary cues to speculate the 
best possible solution. 
The machineman looks for the “balance” at the set up of grade 
specifications. He aims for the best compromise between cost and quality, as the 
production state needs to develop from that of the previous grade. For instance, a 
machineman explains the “balance” with respect to smoothness specification. 
“We’ll have a balance how everything meets specification. 
… We also have a smoothness specification to be met as 
well. What we’ll decide whether it’s calender, with 
pressure in the paper, or calender with heat. We can change 
heat on the calender, and it smoothens the paper, [by] 
compressing it. … The thinner we’re making the paper, the 
smoother. That’s how we generally make paper. [That is] 
Only within the limits [of] the smoothness specification.”  
(interview with the machineman) 
 
Initiating the grade change involves communication between the 
machineman and other production crews on a telephone. He would periodically 
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speak with the beaterman. During the conversation, he looks at the screen as he 
converses. Underlying this is the machineman’s ability to communicate: to relate 
his area of responsibility with that of other team members along the production 
line.  
“If I increase the production speed, then I have to re-assess 
the time we give to the salvo pulper and the beaterman for 
changes. So, everytime I make the change of the 
production, I have to tell them “I’m going faster now, so 
I’ll be finishing quicker. There’s going to be changes 
earlier.” Everything that makes change in the production I 
will tell them. There will be changes in many areas. I am 
always working with the team. We have to understand the 
speed which changes the production rate on the machine.”  
(interview with the machineman) 
Thus, the machineman considers amount of time needed for the pulper and 
the refiner to adjust to the new grade, given the faster speed. They gradually alter 
the furnish towards a new target before the new production schedule, to avoid 
lengthy downtime producing excessive broke. The machineman sense-gives to 
the beaterman and the refineman his understanding of the speed and the upstream 
impact this causes. The sense-readers then understands what the new speed 
means for them by relating this articulate account to their experience in pulping 
and refining in order to make adjustment in accordance. 
Blending involves manually starting the process, feeding the machine, 
getting the machine running and settling the flow before activating an automatic 
control which maintains the right ratio at the right constant flow of mixtures.4  
Starting the system involves manually adjusting the pulp flows through 
valves, and manually maintaining the proportional blend, or mix, level. Start the 
blending requires steering skills of the operator to achieve consistent flows of all 
the ingredients, and chemicals at the right blend proportion. The beaterman 
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approaches this control process through a computer interface. He uses the 
information on the screen to adjust balance mixtures.  The ability to infer from 
the on-screen information to the actual/physical production run is based on his 
background knowledge. This can be tricky and is something to be addressed by 
the beaterman’s unique skills. That is, 
 “The tricky part is to get it to “settle” so that you’ll get a 
consistent flow.”   
(interview with the machineman) 
Because there are number of variables that can affect the blend, some of 
which are external to the control system. The beaterman needs to make the right 
hypothesis (of the source of disturbance), taking from both the abstract and 
sensory cues of the disturbance based on his background process and react 
quickly through the control interface. 
 Colour is one critical parameter. Any factor related to the production 
process affects the colour. According to one respondent: “Everything can affect 
colours [which include colours], but the colour cannot affect anything.”5 The 
preparation of stock to meet colour specification involves achieving the right 
mixture of ingredients. The key is to balance. The colour aspect of blending 
demands the operators’ knowledge of the chemicals’ feature.  
The process is started manually, and then programmed into automatic 
control system. The control system works by having the operators’ input of 
setpoints. The computer then controls and feeds the variable reading, from 
scanner, back down the loop of specified setpoints, making necessary adjustment 
to other stock and flow parameters.  
“As soon as you put in your change parameters, the system 
tunes the change. As soon as you put in your change 
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parameters, it will calculate what needs in the way of 
parameters on the machine: how much stock it needs; how 
much steam it needs. What it does is to say “Right! I am 
down here. I need to go there.” To go there, I need XYZ 
amounts of additives. It calculates that figure from machine 
parameters there at a time.”   
(interview with the software engineer) 
Starting the blend process for the right colour, the beaterman works 
manually through the control interface to get the desired colour before putting on 
the automatic control, by adjusting dye and chemical valves and their pump 
speed and taking the computer reading of the colour. According to a beaterman: 
“This is the colour window. It’s made for LAB: L is how 
deep or clean/dirty the paper looks; B value is how blue or 
yellow; A value is how green or red. These dyes are mixed 
together; you’re trying obviously get all in the middle. To 
achieve that, you have to have the right dye mixture. … 
[The system] tells you where the colour is, but you have to 
adjust it.”  
(interview with the beaterman) 
Doing so involves the beaterman’s relating the dye flows, stock flows and 
their levels in the blending chest, which depends on the amount of broke blended 
with virgin pulp. According to a beaterman:  
“Because this [the chest] is so full now, I only have to open 
this valve, actually breaks into there. So, this chest will 
come down, this will fill up, and gives a little more room. I 
don’t have much room left.”   
(interview with the beaterman) 
The beaterman thus needs to balance the chemicals, dyes and the pulp, in 
order to mix the right colour. For instance, the recycled pulp needs bleaching; 
overdoing it could result in rejecting the paper. Balancing sometimes requires the 
beaterman to workaround  the process.  
It is not straightforward to go from one colour to the next; it sometimes 
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involves offsetting chemical impacts on the sheet. 
“[The management] goes from pure grade onto a very 
bright grade, or a bright grade onto a pure grade–it is hard 
to go from one to another. It’s very difficult, sometimes 
you are over an hour trying to get the right colour, because 
you try to kill the system: you’re trying to kill the yellow, 
or the brightness or the OBA. It’s quite hard to do.”  
(interview with the beaterman) 
In this case, the beaterman can only use pure virgin pulp to produce 
security grade paper, such as cheques. Further, the OBA6 cannot be used. For the 
chemicals added into the system gives different reactions, in case of the OBA it 
yields sub-optimal quality. It is his skill to balance the chemical reactions. Any 
contamination of the OBA from previous grade must be offset by addition of 
other chemicals, such as a “broke wedge.”  
Supervising an automatic process 
Once on automatic control, the system maintains the flow and mix at the 
right percentages. It takes control of the flows of ingredients from the blending 
chest to the paper machine. The system takes into consideration the speed of the 
papermachine and how much time it takes until the stock will reach the wet end, 
and what adjustment the system requires, with different profile variations.  
“It will automatically open that valve as from the salvo to 
the refiner chest. … It’ll automatically start all these 
motors. It’ll automatically put that flow to the pipe. That 
26% valve in there: 391 litre/minute. … That’s the pulp 
system–starting the blend. That’s the broke system, al 
started by pressing one button there. I’ll start all this line to 
the machine chest: start that pump and open that valve, that 
will send it up the headboxes, to the machine. So, you got 
the stuffs on the machine, coming on the wire. Then you 
can feed the machine.”   
(interview with the machineman) 
For paper colour, the system adjusts the dye flows, taking colour readings 
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at the scanner.  
“The paper at certain colours, but what you’ve brought up 
the machine is much deeper than that. That’s the same 
colour, but it can look/appear deeper, or darker. So [it] 
takes the speed of the pump back, putting the same amount 
of dyes in. So, that brings it back to the point it doesn’t 
look so deep. It’s quite clever.”  
(interview with the beaterman)  
 At the papermachine, the control system is capable of performing minor 
automatic grade changing. That is, the system can supervise the process with 
minimal alteration in the chemical content, and without disturbing the control 
algorithm. 
Similar to grade changing, the automatic control system is designed to take 
care of the colour change process from start to finish.  
“The shade changes, the way it does is that it’ll calculate. 
It’s basically looking at where you are, where it’s going to 
and calculates how much dyes. It basically calculates the 
setpoint, put dyes to the setpoint, and adjusts the ramp as it 
goes. … It then waits a period of time, so the dyes flow 
down the machine. The scanners then read the reading. The 
scanner says “Right! I’ve the reading steady, I’ve the same 
from so many scans.” Or it’ll say “No! I will keep on 
scanning it.” until eventually there’s no point in changing 
and calculate the new setpoints.”   
(interview with the software engineer) 
The process involves the machineman’s keying in setpoints and monitoring 
the automatic process. He decides to intervene only at external disturbances (e.g., 
stuck dyes, muddy water). With process disturbance external to the control 
algorithm, the system is unable to reach the target profile. The machineman’s 
responsibility is then to exercise their knowledge addressing these issues. 
“If I have the information correctly going in [to the 
system], it should be able to calculate and do it. If it can’t, 
there’re some external factors, it’s the operators 
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knowledge. So, you can’t get rid of the guy. You still needs 
the knowledge there.”  
(interview with the software engineer) 
For weight control, the automatic control system adjusts key variables such 
as stock flow to maintain weight target setpoint. The basis weight also has its 
effect on other parameters, moisture, calliper, and thickness, whose interaction 
are calculated. For every time that the parameter fluctuates, the system makes 
gradual adjustment by cascading the effects. 
“We put in the setpoint and say “Right! I want the sheet of 
the paper to be 200 grams.” Then, what it does is, it then 
controls back and feds it back down the loop to the basis 
weight value, which then will adjust the stock. So, instead 
of the operator putting in setpoints for the stock flow, the 
system has calculated the new setpoint all the time, 
cascading it down. So, that’s kind of your basic real level 
of control.”  
(interview with the software engineer) 
 Colour is one of the sensitive issues facing end customers’ perceptions. A 
lot of rejections are caused by colour-related issues. Producing precise and 
consistent colour is “where the big saving is made,” according to one respondent.  
Colour measurement from the sensory equipment is capable of greater 
precision beyond human’s sensory; i.e., eyes. “It would be hard for me to 
visually notice that [i.e., minor colour variation] with my eyes. … The computer 
is a lot more accurate than the physical eyes.” Colour is measured in terms of the 
L, A, and B values, and other parameters such as luminance, brightness and 
fluorescence.7 For there are many factors affect colours, and parameters that 
interact with one another, the control strategy attempts to take these interactions 
into calculation as much as possible. Some dyes, for instance, interact with each 
other: the yellow dye, which also has red feature (L-A value), impacts the B 
value at the same time. 
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Like the grade change, the control system allows for automatic colour, or 
shade, change. The machineman’s task is to steer the production process through 
this change at the computer interface. An automatic operation logs details of 
current production state: dyes, base sheets, and the L, A, and B values. It knows 
the types of dyes and their dilution value so that it can calculate the interactions 
between the dyes and colours at any given concentration value. 
Identifying the cause of colour faults is difficult and requires considerable 
background experiential knowledge. To be aware of the physical process helps 
the machineman to identify issues external to the system’s awareness. This takes 
place when the machineman manually steps in to take control. 
Factors that affect colour consist of, but are not limited to: moisture level, 
weight/thickness of the sheet, compression of sheet to calender and starches, 
thickness of callipers, chemical contents (such as ash), dilution of dyes, broke 
content, previous grade making, or even water quality. The quality of retention of 
the dyes, chemicals, or pulp, may be sub-optimal; the quality of water may be 
poor or the water can become muddy; or the dye may stick onto the wire, for 
instance. The system cannot take all these factors into calculation. 
It is critical the beaterman understands how the control works. The system 
keeps calculating for new dye flow setpoints, using scanner reading at the end of 
the paper machine, until it reaches the target.  
“The process once sees that then asks itself “How far away 
is my error on the L, A, and B value?” If from outside my 
error, I need to calculate a new set of dye flow. So, it goes 
away, doing calculation to quickly get to the new setpoint 
and sends it down the machine. It does the same things 
again, wait until it [the paper] is coming down, keeps the 
scanning away, says right I’m stable. I’m within certain 
values to the L-A-B. It will keep going through that loop.”  
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(interview with the software engineer)  
With automatic control, the beaterman exercises his judgement when not to 
intervene in the process, regardless of the way the system steers the adjustment. 
He only concerns himself with what it finally achieves. 
“They’ll see the same thing on an auto grade change, and 
I’ll say to that guy “It doesn’t matter what happens in-
between. You’re given two points: it’s what happens from 
here to here, a relevant, as long as it gets to here at a given 
time. That’s what happens.”  
(interview with the software engineer) 
Without proper understanding, the beaterman’s undue intervention may 
rather distract the process from optimal production.  
“For you see a grade change but I’ve seen mills when a 
grade change takes place and moisture goes really high. It’s 
ramping the speed, it’s ramping stock on. The moisture 
goes high and the guys keep trying to change that, and 
taking automatic control off and do it manually. … It’s 
where it gets in the end that counts and not how it does it. 
… Colours are very much like that and … they’ll say “I 
wouldn’t have made that move.” And then you’ll get the 
price for taking the control off.”  
(interview with the software engineer) 
However, it is worth nothing that a brain behind the control system is a 
product of explicit operation. It performs only as far as what is programmable 
and what is measurable by sensory equipments. When it is not aware of 
additional dye being put in a water tank, the beaterman adds extra setpoints as a 
counterbalance to their impact. For instance, he puts extra pump speed to make 
up for additional amount of water to mix dyes. 
“This shows how much the pump speed of the dye is, [of] 
the OBA, … [and] the overall pump speed of the dye. … 
The material handling system comes with the dyes I need. 
… Then I got a tank of water that I added the dye to 
manually. It doesn’t come with the make-up; I have to 
make that up as well.”   
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(interview with the beaterman) 
The operators’ ability to draw inference from the information generated 
from the control system as the “windows to the process” is a key starting point 
for identifying the cause of colour-related problems. For instance, issues with 
retention and stuck dyes are reflected as changes on weight, moisture, and colour 
for a period of duration. Although the control system cannot pinpoint the cause 
of sub-optimal colour profile, it is the machineman’s experience and skill that 
infer from behaviours of these parameters. 
“That’s experience! That’s why you need the operator. For 
example, you know the chemicals going in. Chemicals 
need water carrier to put it down to the machine. But for 
example, when the water drops off, you’ll get chemicals 
going in … and then have adverse effects on the paper. 
You may see that the weight or moisture changes because 
that chemicals going in as a concentrate. … We’ll see 
maybe after 20 minutes of these blips. Then, you’ll realise 
usually a chemical things that doses in, you’ll see a timing, 
you’ll see it, maybe up to 20 minutes of what’s in the 
process.”    
(interview with the software engineer) 
A temporal surge in weight and moisture reading signals excessive dose of 
dyes on the sheet. An experience operator is able to infer from this pattern of 
change the same way we perceive coherence of a single object amid other 
changing clues. His experience is a platform (past integration that becomes the 
subsidiary awareness) that, in a semiotic process, connects the surge in weight 
and moisture profiles (abstract signs as the subsidiary awareness) with the 
conception that it is due to inadequate flow of water, which results in dyes stuck 
on the sheet (focal awareness). 
Similarly, there are different reasons behind the higher ratio of water:dye 
flows on a control-room display. 
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“[Normally] when the dyes are increasing and going up far 
too high, the dye would get watered down. I went to there 
and have the actual look to see the dye has taken up. It’s 
making up dyes; instead of putting, says, 10% dye with 
90% water, it’s putting no dye but 100% water, making the 
dye very weak. I’ll pick up on that to notice when the 
pump is increasing a lot of water than what we would 
normally run up, you get to know from the experience of 
what the pump is running, most of the time with certain 
grades.”  
(interview with the software engineer) 
An increase in a ratio between water and dye flows leads the machine to 
conceive possible causes for this deviation. The intuition derived from water and 
dye ratios at specific paper grades points him to articulate the idea that this is due 
to colour deviation or empty dye tank.  
Then it is the machineman’s responsibility, with other team members, to 
“hunt through and try to find out what the problem is.” Without such “windows 
to the process”, it would be impossible to know or it would take more time to 
realise the problem, or to find the solution. In that case, to look for colour faults, 
the production crews then have to “stand at the end of the machine and visually 
watch the variation of the colour.”   
Manual intervention 
A significant grade changing involving changes in the chemical contents 
often involves the machineman’s manual control, since the goal of papermaking 
is to produce acceptable paper at the lowest cost and the greatest speed. It is not 
uncommon for the machineman to, for example, try to manually increase the 
speed. 
“We work on the basis that we work as much as we can 
get. We have the standard speed. You don’t just get that 
standard speed: you try to get beyond the standard speed to 
reach your production target.”   
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(interview with the machineman) 
  Transition at the grade change usually demands the operators’ manual 
intervention to the automatic control process, which involves workaround. This 
is to improve process efficiency, and to deal with process disturbance and 
system-related anomalies. By being able to “workaround,” the system-related 
knowledge, and the background physical process knowledge function as 
subsidiary clues as they “tend” the machine. The machineman justifies impact of 
his skills by knowledge of parts and relationship among parameters that interact 
one another.   
He sometimes decides to manually intervene in the automated process at 
profile fluctuations. In certain instances, setting a new weight setpoint at grade 
change causes short-term variation to other parameters. The control system 
confuses this temporary disturbance with a persistent impact, trying to correct the 
situation by constantly chasing other parametric setpoints. The machineman, 
aware of this limitation, takes the automatic control off and aims only at one 
target profile, letting other parameters adjust accordingly. 
“For example, the weight. And … it takes 149 seconds for 
the time that basically the stock is asked to make that 
change until it reaches the real scanner, then to the real 
machine. So, if you have disturbance and within that time 
scales, the control could get to the situation where it’s 
chasing it. Because it’s a very short-term variation, and 
every now and again that short-term variation coming 
down the machine, scanner comes across and might catch a 
high part of the variation. So, it takes the stock off, then, 
the next time they come, the scanner picks up the lower 
part of the variation. So, you get in the situation where it 
constantly moving the value up to chase that short-term 
variation.”  
(interview with the machineman) 
Underlying this action is the machineman’s processual view of production 
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run and how the system’s limitation (that it is unaware of the time a new stock 
takes before it reaches the wire) affects the automated performance. Knowledge 
of a behavioural aspect, that the scanner catches the highest and lowest part of 
the variation, is key to identify when the automatic control is not doing the right 
job. The importance of the system-related knowledge cannot be overemphasised, 
according to the respondent: 
 “These [production] figures are adjusted by the computer 
incrementally to precise number. But it’s how much you 
move it at once. The computer will say if I would have to 
go at 25 right now, and I’m at 21, it’ll go like that: peak, 
and bottom, then smaller peak and bottom, until it reaches 
the target. Suddenly, the machine, other trends, would go 
up and down.”  
 (interview with the machineman) 
Once the problem is identified, the machineman decides to do the 
following:  
“You need to take the system off, and basically, just lock 
the value position and let it. … It is critical to get good 
time conscience in the control in this system.”   
(interview with the machineman) 
An ability to take the control off, and “just lock the value position and let 
it” presupposes conceptual mastery of the process run outside the control room. 
The control interface becomes instrumental to achieve settled chemical flows: in 
place of senses and muscles in hammering nails or bicycle-riding, the 
machineman relies on the meaning derived from numerical value and temporal 
movement of the weight parameters in order to achieve desirable flows. This is 
an exercise of the tacit skill with the right timing, according to the respondent: 
“It’s much easier to do it a bit a time, as long as you still 
make acceptable paper. You can still make little changes 
and you won’t even notice anything on the trend. If you do 
big changes, you will.”  
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(interview with the machineman) 
 
The system-related knowledge and the background process knowledge also 
allow the machineman to relate to actual production run at process invisibility or 
delayed process feedback. For instance, whilst machine speed is not instantly 
updated, the machineman’s awareness of the steam pressure allows him to 
correctly estimate the actual machine speed and the new setpoints to offset the 
deviation. 
“In a perfect world, it will be updated, so we get grade 
settings all the time. But things change on the machine, for 
instance, the machine we operated has got more steam 
pressure, which suddenly we’ve started running a bit 
quicker than we used to.”  
“For some reasons, the quality isn’t right, then, I have to 
ignore [the figures] here and there, go to look, and see 
what’s wrong–whether I need more or less speed.”  
“Then I’ll tell the computer. I’ll go and see. Instead of 
running [on automatic] 300 grams, I run [at] 285 grams. I 
have to put the new set point in. … They will automatically 
move to a new set point.”  
(interview with the machineman) 
Behavioural knowledge of the control system and understanding of the 
papermaking process allow the machineman to identify system malfunctions 
from an erratic form of data. For example, faulty sensors give faulty parameter 
readings causes all calculations to be wrong, as one machineman has put it:  
“Once it doesn’t work, … there was one of these numbers 
not working right, and because it takes parts with the 
thickness and flow and calculate. … There could be faulty 
consistency readings, then it’ll give bad numbers, and 
screwed everything out.”  
(interview with the machineman) 
 The key to steering the process is to keep parameters steady at raw 
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material change. For instance, to produce watermark paper, it is crucial to keep 
porosity within a narrow range of values, since too high porosity impairs 
watermark visibility. Because adding broke content increases the porosity, more 
refining is needed. The machineman thus lowers the machine speed to match 
conditions at refining. Critical to successful manoeuvre lies in the temporality; 
by properly timing the pace the altered stocks moves from the refiner to the 
papermachine. Accordingly, 
“Everything really has got to be in the steady area. Or else 
it’ll give you a lot of hell. … We’ll take the broke out with 
the batch, the pulp, the porosity is then up. So, when we’re 
running the refiner, you’ll start slowing the machine back. 
And you sorta chase things. If you are on watermark paper, 
to keep the watermark, you’ve got to have everything run 
pretty steady. If things are swinging about, and changing, 
like the porosity, that affects the wet line. … If the porosity 
comes up, the wet line will go back. It’ll lose the water 
things like that.”  
(interview with the machineman) 
The operators may sometimes find their manual workaround leads to a 
faster control response. For instance, to increase sheet moisture, a machineman 
decides to take the automatic control off, by temporarily increasing the setpoints 
for higher stream before reverting to the original setpoints and the automatic 
control system. 
“See that moisture, it has been [set at] 6%. If that suddenly 
went up to 8%, I could automatically increase the stream. 
Sometimes it’s a wee bit slow to respond, so I’ll put on 
manual, increasing the setpoint, get it to come. … I’ll bring 
that back in a wee bit. … You can make a manual move, 
it’s quicker than this sort of react. … Once I made a 
manual move, watch it stays over 2 or 3 minutes, watch 
what that’s doing, and then put it back to control again.”   
(interview with the machineman) 
Working around the process may involve the machineman in ignoring 
certain profile setting at the system. This happens when the standard machine 
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setting cannot deliver desirable product quality; for instance, the right thickness: 
“We can’t get the right thickness. We can’t get the right 
heat in the calenders. These are things that we work 
around. We got to tend the machine, if you like, to get what 
we want.”  
(interview with the machineman) 
For example, with different raw material, by adhering to the standard 
machine settings from the QIS log, the machineman cannot produce desirable 
paper. That means it is impossible to produce the target grade at the normal 
profile settings. By referring to his previous experience or tacit knowledge of 
producing an alternative grade, he is able to improvise with alternative recipe in 
order to produce acceptable paper. 
“It’s not always [that we follow the QIS] because, for some 
reasons, the company cannot get the pulp to make the 
paper we want. Different pulps have different properties. 
For some reasons, it makes me a part on the calender of the 
machine, giving a quality issue. … In the main, for a 
change like this, if I would be going from LFF300 to 
LFF350 [the production code], I 99.9% know by 
experience if I do the preparation and do the grade change 
there, it will be all right. The only thing that is going to 
stop that is that an unseen fault comes up., you know it, 
dirts or faults.” 
(interview with the machineman) 
By relying on his subsidiary knowledge of the chemical interactions among 
ingredients, the machineman decides to voluntarily allow for extra chemical 
effects. He adds extra ash content to the original spec to offset other chemical 
effects on colour during the grade change. 
“[A]t the moment, it runs 26% ash, the spec is at 24 target. 
I know it’s running at 26 at the moment to help the colour. 
So, I’m not going to go at 24, because it’s going to affect 
the colour during the change. So, I keep that the same as 
well. It’s still specs off-limit. I’ve changed the set point to 
26%. Ash is the chalk, helping with whiteness–they’ve got 
different kinds–one for whiteness, one for colour.”  
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(interview with the machineman) 
The subsidiary knowledge consists of chemical features of ash and the way 
it interacts with colour dyes. The ash, as chalk, helps increase brightness, which 
in turn affects the overall sheet colour, the L-A-B readings. Here the 
machineman decides to maintain higher level of ash than the spec to achieve 
higher brightness, and the right colour. 
Alongside processual understanding, it is equally important the 
machineman knows the way each ingredient affects the overall production and 
reasons behind the way the computer delivers information: 
“… there’re sets of chemicals that you overdosed will do 
certain things to the colour, and if you have the wrong 
broke it will do certain things to the colour. If you have 
wrong colour on the sheet, that would do certain things to 
the colour. Depending on what grade you’ve come from, so 
there was going to have certain colour from the previous 
grade. So, the system will say you are too yellow, but why 
you are too yellow you have to understand, and there 
maybe 4 or 5.”  
(interview with the production manager) 
What also matters are specific knowledge of a characteristic of each dye 
and physical conditions it has been kept.   
“[T]he way you have the system set up with metering 
pumps; you now mills has the potential in effect to drop a 
dye into water carriers and put that to the machine.” 
(interview with the machineman) 
“Also, you’ve got to take into effect that when you put 
dyes into the system, some dyes will hold to the stock a lot 
better than others.” … “The top coil dyes area really bad 
for falling through the wire. … These are things in the 
process that the mill put the dyes in the process at given  
points, because the dye needs to fix itself to the stock and 
fibre. For example, you got chemicals that go in the 
retention that it retains. It’s stuck into your paper. If that 
retention drops away slightly and falls through, the end at 
the wire will be different as well.”  
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“Someone can dilute the dye differently, says 75%. In 
reality, it should be 70%. So everytime a person sets 
amount of the dyes, it’s [the automatic system] gonna take 
more dyes than asked for. So it’ll chase. … The colour will 
be over-compensated, and the control wouldn’t be as 
good.” 
(interview with the software engineer) 
In addition to the chemical interactions, the papermaking process involves 
a whole web of production parameters, of which one affects the other.  To master 
this understanding, the machineman refers to his background knowledge of the 
actual process . For example, the loaded slice affects how the paper looks. Its 
level reflects how much water is mixed to the paper; it pressurises the flow box 
allowing for better dilution and dispersion of the pulp and better sheet 
formation–smoother, more dispersed and even. At times, he is unable to exactly 
match the loaded slice value to the log. 
“That’s what we made before: 22.5, it’s acceptable paper. 
… We are currently at 21-21.5. I know the last time we 
have made 22.5. I am quite happy with 21.5. I know it is 
not going to affect the smoothness, the calliper, or other 
physical things or the colour. All it affects is how the sheet 
looks.”  
(interview with the machineman) 
Although the machineman cannot afford to match the loaded slice from the 
previous record target, given prior production state the machine has moved from, 
that he is still confident he has steered a smooth transition. 
“It depends on where I was. I might decide the previous 
making [to 25] that’s too big a jump, some of these 
settings. And if I think I can make a decent quality by not 
moving everything on the machine as much, I’ll do that. 
And, then, slowly improve it as I am making it once we’ve 
started making good paper. We’ll improve it. But for this, 
from 21 to 22.5, it’s right side of setting of that change 
from [the basis weight of] 280 to 325.”  
(interview with the machineman) 
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To work around the machineman improvises by setting the loaded slice 
value lower from target. The aim is to avoid abrupt change, which increases 
broke. The smooth transition then proceeds with gradually increasing the slice to 
approach the original target. Doing so requires the machineman to know the way 
changes in loaded slice value affects a whole web of parameters, something 
mastered only thorough experience. He knows that to adjusts the setpoint in a 
way that is not going to significantly disturb key paper profiles (sheet colours, 
smoothness, callipers (thickness)) it must concur with change in sheet basis 
weight at the same rate.  
The transition ends where the process “settles down”: that is, once it 
reaches the production state where parameters stop fluctuating. Larger profile 
changes takes longer until the process settles. Therefore, it is critical the 
machineman steers the changing process with as minimal time and adjustments 
as possible, in achieving the minimum production costs and errors, and at the 
greatest speed.  
“22.5 looks right to me. … And I’ll say, “OK, it’s going to 
take a couple of minutes to do that to settle down.” If I’m 
moving to 25, it takes longer: lots of things would cling on 
the machine when everything is moving.  It would [affect 
other variables] while it’s changing. Once it’s got there and 
everything is settled down, that’s fine. But it’ll take you 
half an hour to get there. But I can go half way in 10 
minutes and still making acceptable paper and improve it 
later on. … What I’m looking for is the balance of quality 
and how long it takes to change. It saves a lot of money. … 
As long as the paper is fine, and once you’ve made good 
paper, you could make little adjustment to improve it 
further.”   
(interview with the machineman) 
Identifying the causes of faults also involves communication with other 
team crews. When actual production parameters stay away from the target, the 
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machineman responds by both working through the computer interface and 
having the production team checking the actual production facilities. He starts 
questioning the cause of anomaly, verbalising his process knowledge. As one 
machineman puts it, 
“I work with them all [the production team]. It depends on 
who noticed the problem first. Usually, when a variable 
stays away from the target, I want to know the reason 
why.”  
“I would say “Ah!, there’s something wrong here.” … You 
would know that the porosity, as I say, you would know 
that the spec is going up and up and up, and you would see 
changes: the consistency of the stock would change. … 
The rest of the figures are in the specification, but porosity 
aren’t. … We’re running the consistency for anything of 3-
4.5. That would change because obviously where the 
refiner is not working properly, the consistency there 
would get thicker. And I would see that. But my first line 
of communication would be the guy up the stairs.”   
(interview with the machineman) 
When the refiner does not work properly, the machineman knows that this 
causes upward erratic movement of porosity and stock consistency value (the 
stock getting thicker) from semiotic reading as he makes inferences from the 
porosity and consistency readings. He then has to relate his process with other 
crews in the refining area.  
This second part confirms that the background process knowledge and the 
ability to logically relate to the process are inevitable to the operators’ skill set. 
Together these allow them to draw inferences from the computer interface in the 
control room to the actual production process, and to effectively respond to 
issues at various stages of process transition. From the data, these are: “cooking” 
ingredients, consulting production log, manual adjusting stock flows, supervising 
the automated process, spotting on problem and manually intervene the process 
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by working around the problem to meet the production goal.   
Conclusion 
A number of factors that affect the papermaking process hinders the ability 
of automated control system from taking complete control of grade changes. 
Implement the grade change involves work at computer interface at both stock 
preparation and papermachine. Recent control system has facilitated the 
“triggering” of the operators’ tacit knowledge in making inference from system-
generated information to the actual process. Besides, the operators rely on their 
tacit knowledge of the actual production process, system-related behaviour, and 
skills to logically work through the process, co-ordinate tasks and communicate 
with other production crews. This is consistent with Polanyi. Since any 
performance has its root in tacit knowledge, it is inevitable that working with the 
computer interface requires the operators’ tacit knowledge of each constituent 
(Polanyi M., (1967b: 4). Together, they enable the operators to successfully steer 
the process by preparing for grade change, manually starting change process 
before activating any auto-pilot control, supervising automatic process, then 
identifying any process problem and making decision to manually intervene.  
Critical to successfully steering the production process, both the beaterman 
and the machineman workaround the process to overcome system limitation in 
response to process issues. Working around is the key problem-solving skill in 
the computerised papermaking. Contrary to simply following the system-related 
instruction, the operators’ tacit knowledge allows them to perform problem-
solving skill in an innovative way. It allows them to meet the objective of paper 
production of producing the best acceptable paper at the lowest costs. 
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1
 These include: machineman, beaterman and other production workers. 
2
 the Optical Brightening Agent 
3
 the recycled pulp 
4
 By the ALCONT, in this case. 
5
 interview with the software engineer. 
6
 The OBA is the chemical that  brightens the paper. It is often cheaper to apply 
OBA than to use the bright virgin pulp, especially when one can use the recycled 
pulp. Production of certain premium grades, however, requires only the use of 
the bright virgin pulps. 
7
 L & A is red and green; B is yellow and blue 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This research has examined the exercise of tacit skills in the computer-
mediated paper-making environment. The research mobilised Michael Polanyi’s 
philosophy of tacit knowledge as a basis for an interpretation. The methodology 
aims at interpreting meaning embedded with the subject’s experience, in order to 
understand the tacit knowledge, based on qualitative interview and observation 
techniques. Prior to the field work, we conducted the secondary research into an 
existing body of literatures, in order to secure background understanding of the 
case. 
This thesis consists of six main chapters. Chapter 1 outlined the thesis. The 
context to the fieldwork, the theoretical framework and the methodology were 
introduced. The chapter also provided information of the research site. 
Chapter 2 described a theoretical basis for an interpretation of the 
phenomenon that follows. It justified the centrality of tacit knowledge to all 
kinds of skilful performances and its potentiality for problem-solving. The text 
was divided into two parts. The first proposed that the tacit knowledge underlay 
all exercises of knowledge and skills, illustrated in light of an informal process of 
the logic of tacit integration. Mobilising intelligent effort and delivering skilful 
performance involved the integration of specifiable and non-specifiable 
subsidiary elements. These served as clues, a base from which we directed our 
focal effort. This applied to all ranges of activities from skilful physical 
activities, uses of tools, to embracing intellectual frameworks. Here, we typified 
the tacit knowledge based on its explicit expression into the physical, semiotics 
and intellectual. This contributed to the understanding of how Polanyi’s thought 
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could be applied. The tacit knowledge resulted from building up of the 
experience. The exercise tacit knowledge also led to a heuristic act that 
encompassed problem-solving. The experience served as resource, which 
allowed an expert to deal with diverse problem situations in a novel manner. As 
the experience expanded, his approach became increasingly subtle, adaptive and 
does not necessarily follow a logical pattern. 
The first part also explained how Polanyi’s thought was influenced by 
others. Notably, the thinking of Merleau-Ponty and Dilthey contributed to 
Polanyi’s idea on the gestalt view of the tacit knowledge and the instrumental 
roles of body and mind in the tacit integration. Rothschild’s idea contributed to 
Polanyi’s idea on interpersonal communication. 
The second part presented viability of Polanyi’s idea in a philosophical 
debate. The critics were divided into two main arguments. The first denied 
personal elements in beliefs, experience and intellectual framework. The second 
view asserted the tacit knowledge only became useful only if their elements and 
process could be fully articulated. These are important for an absence of the tacit 
knowledge ruled out the possibility of the heuristic act. The section illustrated an 
impossible feat of articulating all parts and processes of the tacit knowledge, and 
that the personal element became inevitable for psychological facts that formed 
parts of the beliefs, experience and scientific practice. 
Chapter 3 presented a methodological consideration. Owing to a close 
analogy between the tacit knowledge and the experience, we proposed a study of 
the meaningful experience to produce a truth-like statement–a thick description–
of the subject’s perspective that belonged to a particular issue. Multiple 
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triangulated methods were applied to interpret a set of meaningful experience, 
expressed as narrations and interactions. Our approach also stressed researcher’s 
employed the “human instruments” to secure both direct and indirect tacit 
knowledge of the phenomenon. This called for a secondary research into an 
existing body of literature, and a qualitative fieldwork based on interviews and 
observation techniques.Breakdown of the routine activities provides an occasion 
for the study the tacit knowledge as people articulate what has normally been 
taken for granted. This research applied the critical incident interviews to 
identify the critical phase–events and behaviours–that were described or 
observed to a significantly diverged outcome from the general aim of a particular 
activity. We then adopted the qualitative interview and observation techniques to 
collect the articulated account of the experience . The interview encouraged 
respondents to tell stories of their experience. The researcher learned about 
context by personal contact and discussion. Taking field notes from the 
observation allowed the researcher to identify recurring observed patterns. The 
narration were then broken down into statements, sequences and action units, to 
be classified into skill categories.  
Introduction to the case of paper-making was described in chapter 4. Paper 
industry was a continuous process manufacturing where the whole production 
generally covered the entire stream from pulping to making dry sheet of paper, 
whose process involved an interaction of interdependent parameters. Work was 
craft-based and subject to more than one production crew. Goal of paper-making 
was to produce acceptable paper quality at greatest speed and lowest cost. Work 
content involved working at a control interface as "windows to the process" to 
identify process anomaly and often to solve complex and non-routine problems. 
 161 
Each production team member was responsible for certain parts of the process. 
The computer technology automated–substituted–tasks normally performed by 
the operators in control and monitoring functions. Such computerised and 
automated environment has transformed the paper-making into a stochastic 
process, marked by routine operations punctuated with periods of non-routine 
variances that accompany high attentiveness and activity. It aided their problem-
solving by prompting articulated “triggers” to the tacit knowledge as process 
visibility, diagnosis and troubleshooting information, and knowledge resources.  
Early computerisation had made the process visible in forms of system-
generated abstract information. Together with the integration of control and 
information systems, it had broadened the operators' supervising responsibility; 
hence, their additional skill requirement. Recent computer technology imposed 
finer control schemes and tighter integration. One notable feature was the 
information-processing capability that approached our exercise of tacit 
knowledge in experiential-based learning and problem-solving. This has led to 
the system's active decision support  as process diagnosis, troubleshoot, 
simulation, prediction, corrective advice, and  consultative referential resources. 
As a result, the work demands additional skill hierarchy to work "on top" of 
these capabilities. Tacit knowledge, or skills, required for successful paper-
making includes mastery of work with the system-generated abstract 
information, traditional physical-sensory skills, processual understanding of the 
paper-making, knowledge on behavioural aspects of the system, and capability to 
effectively communicate with other production crews based on common 
understanding. 
Chapter 5 reported our finding. The grade changing was critical to the 
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paper-making process and mills’ profitability of paper mills, due to major 
process disturbance and output variation it caused. The goal was for the 
beaterman and the machineman–the key production workers–to achieve a smooth 
transition to minimise broke, and to maximise acceptable paper production. The 
operators “steered” the process through the control interface by making 
inferences from the system-generated information to the actual production 
process. They communicated with other team crews and, in some cases, directly 
interacted with the physical process. They initiated and supervised the grade 
change, identifying and solving process-related issues, as they made inference of 
the abstract cues. Critical to a successful grade change was working around the 
process and control system to overcome its limitation and to improve overall 
process efficiency.  
Working around involved delivering novel solutions by taking alternative 
problem-solving routes from the standard. The operators did whatever it took to 
produce acceptable quality of paper at lowest cost, based on their ability to time 
and sequence impacts. The workaround tended to be a temporary fix during the 
operators’ manual intervention before they reverted back to the automatic state. 
Its ability depends on their accrued experience of the computerised work 
environment in conjunction to their direct exposure with the physical process. 
This points to the crucial role of the traditional physical-sensory know-how, in 
the work dealing mainly with the abstract content.  
This provided a contradictory argument to the deskilling thesis that the 
technology had rendered them obsolete. From our finding, this traditional know-
how served instead as a critical component assisting the workers in the 
background. It was impossible that the abstract reasoning alone enabled the 
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production crews to exercise their problem-solving skills in an effective manner. 
The workaround became the craft for the computerised work process, whose 
applicability depends on the mastery of abstract reasoning in connection to the 
background physical-sensory know-how.  
Several cited work in this thesis on the skills in papermaking did not 
explicitly address the definition of tacit knowledge and skills, with a notable 
exception of Zuboff (1988) who provided the definition of the intellective skill, 
which replaced the action-centred skill. Although Zuboff does not adopt the 
deskilling view, her finding tends to neglect the salience of the traditional know-
how. That the intellective skills is central to running paper machines in the 
computer-mediated environment, which exclusively rely on abstract cues, 
explicit reasoning, and procedural thinking, is far from adequate. Our finding 
opposed the creation of the “doubly abstract world” in exercising paper-making 
skills (See Zuboff S. (1988: 87)). Instead of constructing abstract mental images 
out of memory and imagination to refer to concrete reality, the finding suggests 
the background experience of the physical production process is key to become 
an effective papermaker. Yet, the differing conclusion might reflect difference 
between the US and the UK contexts. Greater product standardisation and sheer 
scale of the industry have incentivised the US mills to stay uniformly current 
with the newer technologies, as opposed to incremental investment in several of 
the UK mills. (Magee G. B., 2009: 42).  
Another contribution of this research was the application of the thoughts of 
Michael Polanyi to explain the phenomenon, where the work was mediated by 
symbolic representation. The methodological choices combined the critical 
incident technique with the thickly descriptive method. The tacit knowledge was 
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made visible to the researcher at the breakdown of the routine events. The critical 
incident technique helped us identify this disruption. However, the limitation 
resided in the full applicability of our proposed method. The granted level of 
access to the field, and the time frame posed a constrain on the extent to which 
the observation was conducted.  
 Further research possibilities consists of an exploration of the critical skills 
in other computer-mediated work settings. The existence of the non-formalisable 
know-how warrants the inevitability of the peculiar form of problem-solving. 
The comparative studies among the manufacturing industries and between the 
blue-collar and the white-collar industries provides an ample opportunity to 
contribute to the greater understanding of the unique human skills.
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